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1  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
By the end of the 1990’s Real Business Cycle Theory had become the dominant 
macroeconomic doctrine (Plosser (1989)). According to that theory economic cycles are 
driven by technological innovations  reflecting the natural volatility grounded out of the 
dynamic Walrasian general equilibrium system. The old Schumpeterian idea (Schumpeter 
(1912)) that the business cycle is nothing but a manifestation of the dynamic process of 
capitalism itself had found a first rudimentary mathematical foundation. This theory leaves no 
meaningful role for a benevolent central bank as recessions are no application for stabilization 
policy but on the contrary have cleansing effects driving inefficient producers out of markets. 
The return of Keynesian theory in the early 1990’s was driven by two major streams coming 
from academia and institutional changes. On the one hand empirical evidence seemed to 
suggest that major central banks implement their policy by setting a nominal short term 
interest rate as their operating target. This empirical finding reemphasized the role of interest 
rates for monetary transmission and its implications for the business cycle. In a seminal paper 
Blinder and Bernankee (1992) find evidence using Vector Autoregressive Analysis (VAR) for 
a decline in bank loans and real output roughly contemporaneously after a monetary 
tightening in the form of higher interest rates. Several years later first seminal papers were 
published that implemented interest rate policy into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
framework (DSGE) (Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999)). In another influential study Taylor 
(1993) reviewed earlier work by Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993). He reports evidence that 
leading state of the art models had three major common conclusions concerning the conduct 
of monetary policy rules. First, it prevailed that monetary targeting rules were outperformed 
by interest rate rules in terms of the loss inflicted on society. Second, interest rate rules that 
react on inflation and on output performed better than rules that just focused on only one of 
these variables. Third, instrument rules that directly react on movements of the exchange rate 
lead to worse results for society than rules that neglect the exchange rate. In a quest to 
condense these key insights into a simple and transparent rule Taylor proposed the by now 
well known Taylor rule.  
This major academic stream was accompanied by institutional changes that took place in the 
strategic framework of leading central banks. At the beginning of the 1990’s many central 
bank’s stood in front of a pile of broken classes as monetary targeting or exchange rate 
targeting had failed. The Bank of England and other leading central banks  implemented a full 
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fledged regime of  ‘Inflation Targeting’. Due to the clear cut theoretical concept and the 
obvious success in terms of keeping the inflation rate close to the inflation target ‘Inflation 
Targeters’ have become prime examples for central banks that implement a successful and 
transparent strategy that combines new theoretical insights and its practical implementation.  
From an academic perspective key f or the return of New Keynesian macroeconomics was the 
reinvention of a non-vertical Phillips curve derived from solid microeconomic relationships 
which made Keynesian economics presentable at a theoretical level as it provided a micro-
founded justification for stabilization policy. Due to the existence of nominal inertia the 
central bank had a meaningful role to protect society from aggregate shocks. Nominal inertia 
enables the central bank to manage aggregate demand via steering the real interest rate  
according to its preferences. New Keynesian macroeconomics create d a new apparatus of 
thought. It is now possible to think Keynesian but micro-founded at the same time.  
As an important contribution to literature we present within this study a simple but at the 
same time powerful static version of a New Keynesian macromodel. In spite of its simplicity 
it can carry the main insights of New Keynesian macroeconomis (see Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler 1999) to an in termediate level and deal with issues such as inflation targeting, 
monetary policy rules, and central bank credibility. 
Within this study we build on this new apparatus of  thought to find convincing answers to 
questions surrounding the conduct of monetary policy in a currency area. The unique feature 
of a currency area is that different macroeconomic agents, the ECB, national governments and 
labor unions focus on different levels of macroeconomic aggregates. The ECB whose policy 
we assume to be conducted according to the notion of Inflation Targeting focuses on union 
wide averages, whereas national governments focus on national aggregates. Surprisingly the 
effects of diverging real interest rates and its impact on economic activity is not yet well 
understood. In a monetary union idiosyncratic supply shocks might be destabilizing for 
individual member states even if the common central bank implements the Taylor principle. 
The study is structured as follows: In the first chapter we will derive and review the 
theoretical and mathematical foundations of New Keynesian economics. In the focus of our 
analysis stands the interaction between a representative household and a representative firm. 
We will analyze in depth the habitat of a representative agent. We will see that the 
advancement of New Keynesian economics was driven by two factors. On the one hand by 
the quest to derive macroeconomic equations from solid microeconomic relationships and on 
the other hand from the desire to be able to explain the data. We will identify the key 
parameters of New Keynesian macromodels governing the disequilibrium dynamics. In 
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particular we will analyze to what extend different mechanisms of expectation formation 
impact on the correlation structure of the model. As a contribution to literature we will show 
how to simplify the New Keynesian model into a simple but powerful framework.  
Equipped with this apparatus we will then analyze the neuralgic points of a currency union. 
Quite surprisingly this stream of literature seems heavily under researched. The main focus of 
research (e.g., Dixit and Lambertini (2003)) is still on potential target conflicts which may 
arise if the common central bank and the national governments have diverging preferences on 
the inflation target or trend growth in output. The question how monetary and fiscal policy 
should react to asymmetric shocks originating in some parts of the currency area is not 
addressed at all. Our analysis will show that the creation of a currency area calls for a 
renaissance of fiscal policy from a stabilization perspective. In particular we will show that 
the current macroeconomic design as enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is too 
one dimensional as it neglects the interplay between monetary and fiscal policy in a currency 
area. We will make some propositions along which we think the SGP should be reformed. 
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2  THE STRUCTURE AND MECHANICS OF NEW      
  KEYNESIAN  MACROECONOMICS 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Over the last de cade a new consensus model has emerged in monetary macroeconomics, 
labeled New Keynesian macroeconomics (Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford 
(2003)). It consists of three simple building blocs: a forward-looking IS-equation that is 
derived from the constraint optimization problem of a representative household, a forward-
looking Phillips curve that maps the optimal pricing decision of monopolistically competitive 
firms facing restrictions on their ability to adjust prices in a flexible manner, and a 
relationship  that describes how monetary policy is conducted.  
This introductory study serves as a map that comprises the key elements of New Keynesian 
macroeconomics. On the one hand we will supply in depth descriptions of state of the art New 
Keynesian macromodels derived from utility functions of representative households and the 
intertemporal optimization calculus of monopolistically competitive firms (Woodford 2003) . 
We will see how it is possible to legitimize macroeconomic stabilization policy from a 
microeconomic perspective (Woodford (2001)). This roundtrip through New Keynesian 
macroeconomics will show the virtues and shortcomings of this macroeconomic  doctrine. In 
principle we will see that it is possible to reduce the New Keynesian macromodel to a  system 
of three equations. 
As an important contribution to literature we will present a simplified framework that 
condenses the key insights of New Keynesian macroeconomics into a static model. In spite of 
its simplicity it can carry the main insights of New Keynesian macroeconomis (see Clarida, 
Gali and Gertler 1999) to an intermediate level and deal with issues such as inflation 
targeting, monetary policy rules, and central bank credibility.  Compared to existing literature 
we propose a more general approach to model expectations in a static framework (Walsh, 
2002). Additionally we present the linkages between our static  approach and a dynamic 
macromodel by means of impulse response analysis. 
After having identified these key relationships we will systematically analyze the implicit 
dynamics nested within a New Keynesian macromodel. In particular we will show that the 
cognitive abilities of forming expectations are key to understand the abilities of central banks 
to smooth out macroeconomic  fluctuations. If economic agents have a high degree of  
awareness on the functioning of the economy they will react stronger on changes in the real 
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interest rate. Economic agents that are backward looking will ignore changes in the monetary 
stance and just be guided by actual macroeconomic outcomes.  
 
 
2.1 The Structure of New Keynesian Macromodels : A  Review 
 
This introductory chapter serves as a roadmap for the chapters to come. Within this chapter 
we describe the “social habitat” of our representative agent. This seems necessary as in depth 
descriptions combined w ith complete and accurate mathematical derivations are rarely found. 
Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003) are notable exceptions although concrete derivations are 
often left to the interested reader. 
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Figure 1: The Interaction between Sectors in the New Keynesian Model 
Own Source 
 
Before going into details let us take a preliminary look at the individual sectors of the 
economy. The representative household supplies work Nt , consumes the final good Ct and 
receives profits tP . Households work in the intermediate good sector from which they 
receive their wage bill t tW N  for the work effort they supply. In the simplest version of the 
New Keynesian macromodel labor markets are assumed to be perfectly flexible. Households 
will spent a part of their wage bill on consumption t tPC ; the rest will be saved either in terms 
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of money Mt or bond Bt holdings. The existence of complete contingent claims markets 
enables households to spread consumption over time. One unit of government bonds today 
will be redeemed tomorrow including the interest rate payments (1+it) tB . Money holdings do 
not earn an interest. Additionally our representative household is a shareholder of the 
intermediate good sector. As these firms operate in an environment of monopolistic 
competition they earn profits tP  on their fixed capital stock K . P rofits are transferred to 
shareholders. Therefore the flow budget constraint, which traces the different types of 
activities households unfold, can be stated as follows: 
 
( )1 1 11t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t jP C M B W N i B M+ + + + + + - + + - + - ++ + £ + + + +P  for j=0,1,2,…  (2.1) 
 
The second single most important sector that gives a Keynesian flavor to our economy is the 
intermediate good sector which operates in an environment of monopolistic competition and 
sticky prices (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)). The monopolistically competitive firm sells its 
products to the final good sector subject to a standard isoelastic demand function (Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977)) 
 
  jtjt t
t
p
y Y
P
e-
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
,             (2.2) 
 
where pjt denotes the price of its own product in relation to the overall price index Pt, and the 
elasticity of demand is denoted by e .  
The final good sector which bundles the output of the intermediate good sector into the 
aggregate commodity Yt is assumed to operate  in an environment of perfect competition. This 
means in particular that the final good is sold at marginal costs. This assumption implies that 
the revenues of the final good sector are simply the weighted average of the input prices 
charged by the individual firms operating in the intermediate  good sector. This statement can 
be written more compactly in mathematical terms as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) 0t t t tPY p i y i di- =ò .          (2.3) 
 
The very fact that prices are not adjusted in a synchronized way throughout the economy 
creates welfare distortions. The existence of sticky prices calls for a benevolent policymaker 
 7 
Intermediate Good 
Sector
Final Good 
Sector
(”Bundler”)
Equity
Profits
Households
Central Bank
RevenuesGoods
Wage Bill
Goods
Revenues
C
O
N
T
I
N
G
E
N
T
C
L
A
I
M
S
Labour Supply Bond
Demand
Coupon
Intertemporal
Elasticity of S
u
b
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
Price
D
i
s
p
e
r
s
i
o
n
Bond
Supply
Coupon
Govern-
ment
that limits the  detrimental impact on consumer welfare (Woodford (2003), 382 pp.).  We 
assume this to be the central bank which controls the nominal interest rate ti  in the economy. 
As prices are predetermined some economic agents will not be able to adapt to a changing 
economic environment. Due to the assumption of sticky prices monetary policy has a leverage  
on real short term interest rates. Thereby the central bank can manage aggregate demand as a 
change in the interest rate changes the slope of the intertemporal budget constraint which 
induces households to reallocate their consumption patterns through time. Interest rate policy 
will be conducted in such a way that the inflation rate will be close to the inflation target 
while equally having a concern for economic activity. This is of course nothing but a short cut  
for the well known strategy of inflation-forecast-targeting (Svennsson (1999)). We will 
address in depth the question how monetary policy will deal with demand and supply shocks 
under this central bank strategy. We will see that in the case of a demand shock monetary 
policy will maneuver interest rates to a level where those firms that are allowed to reset prices 
will charge the same price as those firms that are not allowed to change prices. In effect we 
will see ex post neither a quantity nor a price reaction in the data. In other words the impact of 
demand shocks on economic activity can be completely undone. In the case of a supply shock 
the central bank will spread the macroeconomic loss inflicted on society equally across the 
two target variables according to its preferences.  
 
 
2.1.1  The New Keynesian Phillips Curve: Optimizing Firms 
 
The Phillips curve was always at 
the heart of macroeconomic 
debate and to a certain extent the 
dominating Phillips curve of its 
time always mirrored the 
dominating macroeconomic 
paradigm. Since the mid 1990’s a 
new paradigm has come into reign 
in monetary macroeconomics named “New Keynesian Macroeconomics”. Just as in earlier 
periods of macroeconomic history the dominating paradigm namely “Real Business Cycle 
Theory” was redeemed by New Keynesian Macroeconomics by the invention of a new 
Phillips curve  (e.g. Sbordone (2002) ). The same happened about 35 years earlier when 
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Friedman (1969)  in his presidential address to the American Economic Association casted his 
doubt on the existence of a stable trade-off between unemployment and inflation.  
Within this chapter we will highlight the NKPC in its different versions by focusing on 
mathematical derivations as well as on the economic intuition. The NKPC is a behavioral 
relationship that tells us why we observe inflation in an economy and which forces reduce the 
purchasing power of money. In a market economy firms are those agents that set prices. To 
that extend the NKPC curve tells the story of a representative firm that sets its price. This 
implies market power as a price taker has no room to maneuver the price for the product it 
sells. 
In the following section we will discuss the various alternative derivations of the NKPC. We 
will start with Taylor’s (1979) model and end the chapter with state of the art hybrid versions 
of the NKPC as proposed by Gali, Gertler and Salido-Lopez (2001) or by Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). The advancement of the NKPC was driven throughout the last 
two decades by two factors. On the one hand the quest to derive macroeconomic relationships 
from microeconomic optimization calculus and on the other hand from the desire to be able to 
explain stylized facts as embedded in the data. 
 
 
2.1.1.1 Taylor Contracts  
 
In the early 1980’s the proposition of a non-vertical Phillips curve by Taylor (1979) virtually 
reinvented New Keynesian Macroeconomics. Sticky prices imply a meaningful role for 
macroeconomic stabilization policy in the short to medium run as the central bank has the 
power to smooth out macroeconomic fluctuations triggered by exogenous shocks. In the focus 
of Taylor ’s model are monopolistically competitive firms that negotiate wage contracts. In a 
simplified theoretical framework (Bofinger (2001), pp.102-103) one can tell Taylor ’s story as 
follows. In each period a mass of 50% of workers renegotiate wages. According to standard 
microeconomic theory a monopolistically competitive firm will price its output at a constant 
margin over marginal costs. As the capital stock is fixed, wages w t are the only source of  
variations in variable costs as the log price level Pt is equal to the log wage wt plus the mark-
up m:  
 
t tp w m= + .              (2.4) 
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The log-price level is simply the weighted average of the level of log-wage contracts  
negotiated over the current period and over the last period:  
 
( )1
1
2t t t
p w w -= + .            (2.5) 
 
Taylor offers the following theory for wage negotiations. He assumes that workers care on 
two components while negotiating wages. On the one hand they want to participate in 
economic  activity as measured by the output gap. On the other hand they bargain for a 
weighted average of those contracts fixed over the lifetime of the contract: 
 
( )1
1
2t t t t t
w w E w yg+= + + .         (2.6) 
 
Inserting the contracting equation (2.6) into equation (2.5) yields 
 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1
1 1 1
2 2 2t t t t t t t t t
p p E p y p E p yg g+ - - -
é ùæ ö æ ö= + + + + +ç ÷ ç ÷ê úè ø è øë û
,   (2.7) 
 
where we have set 0m = . After some algebraic manipulation this expression can be rewritten 
as: 
 
( )1 1 1
1 1 1
2 2 2 2t t t t t t
p p p y y
g e- + -= + + - + .       (2.8) 
 
where 1t t t tE p pe -= -  
 
Hence Taylor succeeds in explaining why the price level might be sticky as a consequence of 
staggered wage setting. As each period only a fraction of workers resets wage s, decisions 
taken in the past still influence the presence. Although workers are assumed to built rational 
expectations some economic agents are not able to process new information as their hands are 
tied due to settled contracts. Therefore macroeconomic shocks e t need time to be incorporated 
into pricing decisions. Nevertheless those workers that renegotiate wages in the current period 
look into the future so that expected eve nts also have an impact on the current price level Pt. 
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Equation (2.8) can equally be expressed in terms of inflation rates pt. Subtracting pt -1 from 
both sides of the equation yields: 
 
( )1 12t t t t t tE y yp p g h+ -= + + + .          (2.9) 
 
Equation (2.9) shows that the price level Pt is inertial but not the inflation process tp  itself. 
This result reflects the assumption that workers negotiate on wage levels and not on wage 
changes. This assumption has important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. In 
particular monetary policy can design a credible cold turkey disinflation at zero costs in terms 
of output. Therefore credible disinflations can go hand in hand with a constant real interest 
rate ( )ei p- , whereby stabilization recessions can be avoided. Unfortunately this implication 
of Taylor’s specification stands in sharp contrast to work by Ball (1994), who presented sound 
empirical evidence that disinflation’s can only be designed if society is willing to temporarily 
sacrifice output. Ball concluded that policy should legislate regulations against long labor  
market contracts as they impair the ability of economic agents to react to a changing 
economic environment. 
Additionally Taylor ’s version of the NKPC conflicts with stylized facts according to which 
inflation is an inertial process  as a shock to the inflation rate just produces a single jump in the 
inflation rate (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)). Not surprisingly given the poor 
empirical predictions of Taylor’s model follow -up models tried to remedy these deficiencies. 
But before going into a detailed description of the so called Fuhrer and Moore (1995)  
approach, we will highlight Calvo’s version of a NKPC as it has become the main engine of 
today’s macroeconomic state of the art models in monetary macroeconomics. To summarize: 
Taylor succeeded in giving a meaningful role to stabilization policy, but he failed to present a 
convincing empirical specification. 
 
 
2.1.1.2   Fuhrer and Moore 
 
The Fuhrer and Moore (1995) approach to the NKPC can be seen as a direct extension of 
Taylor’s version of staggered wage contracts. Taylor’s version implied that inflation is a non-
inertial process and that periods of disinflation can be designed at zero output costs. This 
implication is not backed up by the data. Therefore Fuhrer and Moore (1995) intended to 
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design a version that was closer to the data but in the spirit of Taylor (Bofinger (2001) , p. 103, 
Walsh (2003), p. 228). In a simplified framework one can sketch Fuhrer and Moore’s (1995) 
story as follows. Assume that each period a mass of 50 percent of all workers renegotiate 
wages. Then the index of real wages vt is defined as the weighted average of this periods 
contracts ( )t tw p-  and the real value of last periods contracts ( )1 1t tw p- -- : 
 
( )1 1
1
( ) ( )
2t t t t t
v w p w p- -= - + - .         (2.10) 
 
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) propose that workers care on two components while negotiating 
wage contracts. On the one hand they want to be compensated for the state of the economic 
cycle yt. On the other hand workers bargain for a weighted average of the real wage index 
over the lifetime of the settled contract. In a nutshell the real contract ( )t tw p-  can then be 
stated as: 
 
( )1
1
2t t t t t t
w p v E v ky+- = + + .          (2.11) 
 
Inserting the relevant expressions yields the following real wage contracting equation: 
 
( )( )t t t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t1w p w p E w p 2ky2 - - + +- = - + - + .      (2.12) 
 
As prices are set by monopolistically competitive firms at a constant mark-up over marginal 
costs prices evolve as a weighted average of the wage level. Subtracting wt-1 from both sides 
of the equation and collecting terms yields the following expression: 
 
( )1
1
2
2t t t t t
w E kyp p +D = - + .          (2.13) 
 
As the inflation rate is defined by  
 
t t t 1w w -p = D - D ,            (2.14) 
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we can state the Phillips curve in terms of inflation by subtracting t 1w -D  from both sides of 
the equation: 
 
t t 1 t t 1 t t
1 1
E y
2 2- +
p = p + p + g + h .      (2.15) 
 
where: 
( )t t t 1
t t 1 t 1 t
       y y y
       ( E )
-
- -
= +
h = - p - p
 
 
Equation (2.15) nicely depicts that Fuhrer and Moore (1995) succeed in deriving an inertial 
Phillips curve (Roberts (1997)). If inflation is high in the current period it will remain above 
average in the following periods. Thereby they reconcile the NKPC with stylized facts from 
VAR-analysis according to which inflation is a persistent process.  
 
 
2.1.1.3  Calvo Pricing 
 
Calvo’s (1983) proposition of a NKPC is the workhorse of today’s state of the art models in 
monetary macroeconomics (see Smets and Wouters (2005), Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Evans (2005)). According to Calvo (1983) the process of price adjustment follows a time 
dependent rule. Each period only a fraction of ( )1 q-  firms in the economy receive a signal to 
reset prices optimally. The rest keeps its old price. Those firms that reoptimize will take in 
particular into account the probability of being stuck with the new reset price for j periods to 
come. The adjustment price is determined by the projected path of marginal cost over the 
expected time horizon that elapses until the next price adjustment signal arrives. Obviously 
the approach to model changing prices based on a time dependent black-box approach is 
taken for reasons of mathematical convenience rather than for sound empirical evidence. 
From microeconomic price data we know that prices are fixed mainly due to menu costs, 
implicit customer relationships and pressure of competition (Blinder (1994)).  
There are two common ways to derive a NKPC a la Calvo. The “quick and dirty way”, which 
is for instance used by Gali, Gertler and Salido-Lopez (2001) and the more sophisticated 
approach taken by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). Due to the unchallenged 
dominance of Calvo-pricing in monetary macroeconomics we will present both approaches. 
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Way I: Deriving it the quick and dirty way 
The “quick and dirty way” to derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be sketched as 
follows (Whelan (2005), Walsh (2003)). Assume that only a fraction of ( )1 q-  percent of 
firms are allowed to reoptimize its price in the current period, while the remaining part of all 
firms has to keep its old price. Given this assumption one can show that the average duration 
of a reset price is equal to:  
 
   1
1
Dq q
=
-
.             (2.16) 
 
Hence, if a mass of 0.75q =  have to keep their old prices every quarter, the average price 
duration will be equal to four quarters. Assume as auxiliary assumption that those firms that 
are allowed to reset prices are guided by the following quadratic loss function: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )2* *0
k
t t t t kk
L z z pqb
¥
+=
= -å ,          (2.17) 
 
where b denotes the discount factor and *tz  is the optimal reset price. Naturally , it is the 
objective of the representative firm to minimize Lt. Therefore at each point in time the bliss 
point is given by * *  t t iz p i N+ += " Î . The term ( )* *t t kz p +-  measures the distance between the 
optimal price *t kp +  and the new reset price 
*
tz . If a firm would be stuck for k periods with the 
new reset price *tz  then the expected quadratically measured distance can be evaluated as 
follows: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 22 3* * * * *1 2 3 ... kt t t t t t t t t t kz p z p z p z p z pqb qb qb qb+ + + +- + - + - + - + + - .  
                             (2.18) 
 
An optimizing firm will choose *tz  in such a way that this weighted sum is minimized. Taking 
the derivative with respect to *tz  it has to hold that:  
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 *
1 *
1
2 *
2
3 *
3
2
        2
        2
        2
        ...
0,
t
t t
t
t t
t t
t t
L z p
z
z p
z p
z p
bq
bq
bq
bq
+
+
+
¶ = -
¶
+ -
+ -
+ -
+
=
         (2.19) 
 
which can equally be rewritten more compactly as: 
 
( ) ( )* *0 0
k k
t t t kk k
z E pqb qb
¥ ¥
+= =
=å å .     (2.20) 
 
Equation (2.20) nicely shows that firms choose their prices in such a way that on average the 
geometrically weighted reset prices *tz  is equal to the expected cumulated sum of optimal 
prices *t kp + . As 1qb <  the left hand geometric sum can be simplified to: 
 
( )* *1
1
k
t tk o
z zqb
qb
¥
=
=
-å  .        (2.21) 
 
Inserting (2.21) into (2.20) the optimal reset price is given by: 
 
( ) ( )* *01
k
t t t kk
z E pqb qb
¥
+=
= - å .      (2.22) 
 
Equation (2.22) can be further simplified by noticing that there are two ways of representing 
first-order difference equations. A first-order inhomogeneous difference equation can be 
stated as follows: 
 
             1t t ty ax by += + .           (2.23) 
 
Iterating this relationship forward yields under the assumption that 1b <  the following 
equivalent representation (see Hamilton (1994), p. 28) : 
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0
k
t t t kn
y a b E x
¥
+=
= å .          (2.24) 
 
Accordingly equation (2.23) can be rewritten as: 
 
( )* *1 1t t t tz E z pqb qb+= + - .        (2.25) 
 
where: ( )1a qb= -  
               b qb=  
 
So far we have analyzed the behavior  of those firms that are called upon to reoptimize. All 
other firms keep the price level pt -1 of the previous period. Accordingly the aggregate price 
level evolves according to the following weighted average 
 
 ( ) *1 1t t tp p zq q-= + - ,           (2.26) 
 
which can equally be written when solved for the reset price *tz  as follows: 
 
 ( )* 1
1
1t t t
z p pq
q -
= -
-
.           (2.27) 
 
Substituting out the optimal reset price *tz  in equation (2.25) and multiplying the equation by 
( )1 q-  yields the following equation 
 
 ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 1t t t t t t tp p E p p mcq qb q qb q m- +- = - + - - + ,    (2.28) 
 
which can be transformed into: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 1t t t t t t t t tp p E p p mc p pq qb q qb q m q- +- = - + - - + - + .  (2.29) 
 
Collecting terms yields: 
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  ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 1t t t t t t t t tp p E p p mc p pq qb q qb q m q- +- = - + - - + - + .  (2.30) 
 
Equation (2.30) can equally be expressed in terms of the inflation rate as follows: 
 
    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1
1 1 1
t t t t t tE p mc
qb bq q qb q
p b p m
q q+
- + - - -
= + + + .  (2.31) 
 
Simplifying and collecting terms we arrive at the NKPC: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1
1 1
t t t t t tE mc p
q qb
p b p m
q+
- -
= + + - .      (2.32) 
 
Note that the term t tmc pm + -  is nothing but the deviation of prices from their distorted 
steady state level. Therefore let us define the following variable, which measures the degree 
of disequilibrium: 
 
  rt t tmc mc pm= + - .           (2.33) 
 
Let us assume that there is a proportional relationship between the output gap and deviations 
of marginal costs from its steady state level: 
 
r
t tmc yl= .             (2.34) 
 
By this assumption we can substitute out rtmc  in equation (2.32) with the help of equation 
(2.34): 
 
1t t typ bp g+= + ,           (2.35) 
 
where it holds that: ( )( )( )1 1 /g l q qb q= - - . Note that equation (2.29) is not yet a stochastic  
relationship as we did not introduce an error term. Therefore let us assume that there are 
stochastic shocks to the degree of monopolistic power in the good markets t tm m e= + : 
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     ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1
1 1 1 1
t t t t t tE mc p
q qb q qb
p b p m e
q q+
- - - -
= + + - + .   (2.36) 
 
Compared to Taylor ’s version of a Phillips curve  two major differences stand out. First, in the 
focus of Calvos model is an optimizing firm that sets prices and not workers that renegotiate 
wages. The question which process drives wages is left open. For direct comparisons 
additional assumptions on the functioning of labor markets would have to be made. Second, 
as the reset signal follows a Poisson process firms automatically have a larger time horizon 
while reoptimizing. Additionallyq , the share of Calvo price setters might be considered as a 
deep parameter of the economy, which is invariant to monetary policy.  Thereby one might 
argue that equation (2.36) is immune to the Lucas-critique (Lucas (1976)). 
 
Way II: The sophisticated approach 
The previous section showed how to derive the NKPC under the auxiliary assumption that 
firms are confronted with quadratic adjustment costs (Rotemberg (1987)). Quite naturally one 
might ask the question why not to evaluate the implications of price stickiness directly in 
terms of their implications for profit maximization. The answer to this question is the second 
approach to evaluate the implications of price stickiness on the firm level. Following the 
seminal work of  Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) let us assume that there exists the following market 
structure on goods and labor markets (see Figure 2). A continuum of intermediate firms 
( )1 ,... nI I  produces differentiated goods. These firms operate in an environment of 
monopolistic competition. Firms hire their labor input Nt from a perfectly competitive labor  
market. The final good sector which bundles the output of the intermediate good sector into a 
homogeneous aggregate commodity Yt operates under conditions of perfect competition.  
For reasons of mathematical convenience we assume that firms have the following simple 
linear production technology: 
 
jt t jty A N= ,             (2.37) 
 
where yjt denotes the output of firm j at time t and N jt refers to the labor input of firm j at time  
t. The term At depicts a productivity shock which is assumed to be iid with ( ) 1tE A =  and 
variance 2as . In the simplest scenario one may assume perfec tly flexible labor markets where 
just a homogeneous type of labor is supplied. As shown by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) each firm 
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in the intermediate good sector faces an isoelastic demand function for its output (see 
equation (2.2)) which depends on its own price pjt  in relation to the overall price index Pt, and 
the elasticity of demand e . In the absence of shocks the demand for yit is synchronized with 
aggregate output Yt. Let us make the standard assumption that the prime target of a 
monopolistically competitive firm is to maximize profits. The intertemporal profit function of 
the monopolistically competitive firm operating in the intermediate good sector can be 
constructed as follows. 
 
Labour Markets
I1 I2 I3 In
Intermediate Good Market:
Monopolistic Competition
Final Good Market:
Perfect Competition
 
Figure 2 : The Hypothesized Market Structure in New Keynesian Models 
 
Each firm will receive a marginal profit of ( )jt t tp P mc-  per unit it sells. The period profit 
flows for the expected time horizon over which the firm is not allowed to reoptimize can be 
stated as: 
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,          (2.38) 
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where q  denotes the probability of receiving no reset signal and t i+D  depicts the stochastic 
discount factor of households for risky assets. Making use of the isoelastic demand function 
(2.2) one can substitute out yjt in terms of the aggregate commodity Yt. Collecting terms the 
intertemporal profit function can be written more compactly as follows (see Walsh (2003)  p. 
235): 
 
1
0 0
jt jtJ k
t k t k t kk
t k t k
p p
E mc Y
P P
e e
q
- -
¥
+ + +=
+ +
é ùæ ö æ ö
ê úP = D -ç ÷ ç ÷
ê úè ø è øë û
å .    (2.39) 
 
The firms’ action parameter is to choose the optimal reset price *tp  such that expected profits 
are maximized. Taking the derivative with respect to the optimal reset price *t jtp p=  yields: 
 
( )
( )
( )
1* *
0
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1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
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2
2 2
1 1
1
1 1
        1
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p
c Y
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+ +
+ +
é ùæ öæ öê úç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ê úè øè øë û
+
=
  (2.40) 
 
Which can be rewritten as: 
 
     ( )
* *
, *0
1
1 0k t tt t k t k t kk
t k t t k
p p
mc Y
P p P
e
q e e
-
¥
+ + +=
+ +
é ùæ ö é ù
D - + =ê úç ÷ ê ú
è ø ë ûë û
å .     (2.41) 
 
Note as profits are redeemed to shareholders they are discounted with the stochastic  discount 
factor of households, which own the portfolio shares of the firms operating in the intermediate 
good sector. Given the isoelastic utility function (2.138) households trade off consumption 
today versus tomorrow by the following stochastic discount factor: 
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k t k t k
t k
t
Y
Y
s
b
-
+ +
+
æ ö
D = ç ÷
è ø
.          (2.42) 
 
Inserting this so-called pricing kernel of shareholders into equation ( 2.41) and rearranging the 
equation yields: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1* *
1 1 1
* *0 0
1 1
1 0k kt tt t k t k t t k t kk k
t k t t k t
p p
E Y Y E Y mc
P p P p
e e
s s se qb e qb
- -
¥ ¥- - -
+ + + += =
+ +
æ ö æ ö
- - =ç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø
å å (2.43) 
 
which can be rewritten as: 
 
( )
( )
1
* 0
*
1*(1 )
1
0
1
1 1
k
t t k t kk
t kt
t
t k
t t kk
t k
E Y mc
Ppp
p
E Y
P
e
s
e
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s
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e
e
qb
-
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+ +=
+
-+
¥ -
+=
+
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø=
- æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
å
å
.    (2.44) 
 
By dividing both sides of the equation by the aggregate price level Pt, equation (2.44) can be 
restated as: 
 
( )
( )
1
* 0
1
1
0
1
k t k
t t k t kk
tt
t k t k
t t kk
t
PE Y mc
Pp
P PE Y
P
e
s
e
s
qb
e
e
qb
¥ - +
+ +=
-
¥ - +
+=
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø=
- æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
å
å
.     (2.45) 
 
In order to give some economic intuition to this non-linear first order condition let us assume 
that prices are fully flexible. This means that each period all firms receive a signal to change 
prices. Inserting ( )0q =  into equation (2.45) yields (King, Robert and Wolman (1996)): 
 
*
1t t
p mce
e
æ ö= ç ÷-è ø
.           (2.46) 
 
In the flex-price equilibrium monopolistically competitive firms price their output at a 
constant mark-up over marginal costs. The size of the mark-up depends on the pricing power 
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of the monopolistically competitive firm which can be directly related to the inverse of the 
elasticity of demand e . The more elastic demand is, the lower will be the mark-up in 
equilibrium. The first order condition nicely shows that intertemporal optimality implies in 
principle that firms have to make forecasts on future demand as well as on future prices unless 
both variables are driven by common factors of the business cycle. 
The first order condition for *tp  is a  highly non-linear expression.  Under the assumption that 
we are only interested in small perturbations around steady state we can derive linear 
approximations by the technique of log-linearization. Assume that Xt is a strictly positive 
variable and  tX  is its natural level. Then the variable  ˆtx  denotes the logarithmic deviation of 
the variable from its steady state level (see e.g. Edmond (2004)): 
 
( )
( )
( )
ln / ˆ
0 0 ˆ                      0
ˆ                      1 ,
t t t
X X xt
t t t t
t
t t t
t t
XX X X e X e
X
X e X e x
X x
æ ö
= = =ç ÷
è ø
@ + -
= +
       (2.47) 
 
where we have taken a first-order Taylor approximation around steady state. By applying the 
same log-linearization technique to two stochastic variables one can show that: 
 
( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1t t t t t t t tX Y X Y x y x y@ + + + .       (2.48) 
 
If the cross terms ˆtx  and ˆty  are sufficiently small it is legitimate to drop them out. But let us 
turn to a more general case where we have the following continuous and differentiable 
functions f() and g(): 
 
( ) ( ),t t tf X Y g Z= .          (2.49) 
 
We assume that Xt, Yt and Zt are strictly positive variables. By applying the ln function to 
both sides of equation (2.49) it holds that: 
 
( ) ( )( )ln lnln , lnt tx Y tf e e g Zé ù =ë û .      (2.50) 
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Taking a Taylor approximation of the left hand side of the equation it has to hold that:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
ln ln
, ln ln1ln , ln ,
, , ln ln
t
t t
t
t t t t tXX Y
t t
t t t t t t tY
f X Y X X X
f e e f X Y
f X Y f X Y Y Y Y
é ùé ù-
ê úê úé ù @ +ë û ê úê ú+ -ê úë ûë û
  
                             (2.51) 
 
The right hand side can be approximated by applying the same Taylor approximation by 
noting that: 
 
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
ln 1ln ln ( ) ln lnt
t
Z
t z t t t t
t
g e g z g z z z z
g z
é ùé ù é ù@ + -ê úë ûë û
ë û
.   (2.52) 
 
Equating equation (2.51) and equation (2.52) results in: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
, ln ln
, ln ln ln ln
t
t
t t t t tX
t t t t t z t t t tY
f Y X X X X
f Y X X Y Y g z Z Z Z
-
+ - @ -
,   (2.53) 
 
For the most general case 
 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2, ,..., , ,...,n mt t t t t tf X X X g Y Y Y= ,       (2.54) 
 
the log-linearized approximation can be written as: 
 
( ) ( )1 2 1 21 1ˆ ˆ, ,..., , ,...,i ii i
n mn i i m i i
t t t t t t t t t tx Yi i
f X X X X x f Y Y Y Y y
= =
@å å .    (2.55) 
 
To get some intuitive understanding let us assume that ( ) 2f x x= . A simple linear Taylor-
series expansion around the point x =2 can be written as : 
 
( ) 2 ( 2)
        2 2
xf x f x
x
@ + -
= + D
.          (2.56) 
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The log-linear approximation of ( ) 2f x x=  at the point x=2 is: 
 
ˆ ˆ2t ty x= .              (2.57) 
 
Hence in log-linear approximation a deviation of the variable Xt from its steady state value X  
causes a deviation of the variable Yt from its steady state by approximately 2 percent. 
Let us now return to our economic application. So far we have only analyzed the behavior of 
those firms that receive the signal to optimize. Of course, by the very assumption of Calvo 
pricing there remains a mass of q  percent of firms in the intermediate good sector which have 
to keep the old price. Assume for reasons of mathematical convenience that the inflation 
target of the central bank is equal to zero (Sbordone (2002), p. 270). Note that the aggregate 
price level evolves according to the following formula , where we have made use of the fact 
that all firms that are called upon to reset prices face the same optimization problem: 
 
( ) 11 * 111 tt tP p P
qq qa a-- --é ù= - +ë û .         (2.58) 
 
Log-linearizing equation (2.58) around its steady state can be done by applying the following 
formula: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )** * * * *1 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , ,t ttt t t t t t t t t t t t t t tP PpF P p P P p F P p P p p F P p P P p- - - - -= + ,  (2.59) 
 
where: 
( ) ( )* 1, , 1tP t t t tF P p P P qq -- = -           (2.60) 
 
( ) ( )( )* 1, , 1 1tP t t t tF P p P P qq a -- = - -         (2.61) 
 
( ) ( )
1
*
1 1, , 1tP t t t tF P p P P
qq a
-
-
- -= -          (2.62) 
 
Substituting out the partial derivatives and collecting terms yields: 
 
( )( ) ( )* 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0 1 / /t t t tp p p pa a -= - + ,        (2.63) 
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which can be simplified to:  
 
( ) ˆ ˆ0 1 t tqa ap= - -% ,          (2.64) 
 
where ˆ tq% = ( )* ˆt tp p  is the ratio of the optimal reset price in relation to the aggregate price 
level Pt expressed in terms of  percentage deviations around a non-inflationary steady state and 
ˆ tp  denotes the percentage deviation of the inflation rate from the inflation target. Equation 
(2.64) shows that deviations of the inflation rate from the inf lation target depend in particular 
on the ratio of firms that are allowed to optimize versus those that do not optimize : 
 
ˆ ˆ
1t t
q
ap
a
=
-
% .          (2.65) 
 
As we have already computed the optimal relative reset price tQ%  (equation (2.45)) it remains 
from a mathematical perspective the tedious task to log-linearize the expression derived for tQ%  
in order to substitute out ˆtq%  in equation (2.65). The first-order condition of the optimizing 
firm can be stated as: 
 
( ) ( )
1
1 1
0 0
ˆk kt k t kt t k t t t k t ik k
t t
P PE Y Q E Y mc
P P
e e
s sqb m qb
-
¥ ¥- -+ +
+ + += =
æ ö æ ö
=ç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø
å å% .  (2.66) 
 
As indicated by equation (2.66) we can separately log-linearize the left-hand side and right 
hand-side functions. So let us in a first step log-linearize the left hand side function. 
 
The steady state is defined as: 
 
( ) ( )
1
1
0
, , , k t kt k t t k t t t k t
k t
P
F Y Q P P E Y Q
P
e
sqb
-
¥ - +
+ + +
=
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
å% % .    (2.67) 
 
The partial derivatives we needed to log-linearize are given by: 
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( ) ( ) ( )
1
0
, , , 1
t k
k t k
t t t t i t k t t k tY k
t
P
f Y Q P P Y E Y Q
P
e
sqb s
+
-
¥ - +
+ + +=
æ ö
= -ç ÷
è ø
å% %  (2.68) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
0
, , , 1
t
k t k
t t t t k t t t k tP k
t
Pf Y Q P P P E Y Q
P
e
sqb e
-
¥ - +
+ +=
æ ö
= -ç ÷-
è ø
å% %  (2.69) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1
1
0
, , , 1
t
k t k
t t t t k t k t t k tP i
t
Pf Y Q P P P E Y Q
P
e
sqb e
+
-
¥ - +
+ + +=
æ ö
= -ç ÷
è ø
å% %  (2.70) 
 
( ) ( ) 10, , ,t k t kt t t t k t t t k tiQ
t
P
f Y Q P P Q E Y Q
P
sqb
¥ - +
+ +=
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
å% % % % .     (2.71) 
 
Applying the formulae (2.55) it will have to hold that: 
 
   
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
11 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , , , , ,
ˆ                                                                           , , , 0
t t t
t
Y t t t k t t P t t t k t t P t t t k t t
Q t t t k t t t
f Y P P Q Yy f Y P P Q Pp f Y P P Q Pp
f Y P P Q Q q
++ + + + +
+
+ +
+ @
% % %
% %   (2.72) 
 
Substituting out the partial derivatives ( )...xf  in (2.72) yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 11 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , 1 11 1
k
t t t t k t t k t k tk
F Y Q P P Y Y q Y y p ps s s qb s e
qb qb
¥- - -
+ + +=
é ù= + + - + - -ë û- - å
% %
                             (2.73) 
 
The right hand side function has the following steady state: 
 
( ) ( ) 10, , ,
k t k
t t t t k t t k t kk
t
PF Y mc P P E Y mc
P
e
sm qb¥ - ++ + +=
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
å .   (2.74) 
 
The necessary partial derivatives to log-linearize are given by: 
 
      ( ) ( ) ( )1 10, , ,  1t
k t
y t t t t k t ti
t
Pf Y mc P P Y mc Y
P
e
sm qb s¥ - ++ =
æ ö
= -ç ÷
è ø
å    (2.75) 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )1 10, , ,  mct
k t
t t t t k t tP k
t
Pf Y mc P P P E Y
P
e
sm qb e¥ - ++ =
æ ö
= -ç ÷
è ø
å    (2.76) 
 
 ( ) ( ) 1 10, , ,  mct k
k t
t t t t k t k tP k
t
Pf Y mc P P P E Y
P
e
sm qb e
+
¥ - +
+ + =
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
å    (2.77) 
 
 ( ) ( ) 1 10, , ,t k
k t
mc t t t t k t k t t ki
t
P
f Y mc P P mc E Y mc
P
e
sm qb
+
¥ - +
+ + +=
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
å% .  (2.78) 
 
Log-linearizing we have to apply the following formulae to a non-inflationary steady state : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
11 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , , , , ,
ˆ, , , 0.
t t t
t
Y t t t t k t t P t t t t k t t P t t t t k t t
mc t t t t k t t
f Y mc P P Y y f Y mc P P P p f Y mc P P P p
f Y mc P P Q q
++ + + + + +
+
+ +
+ @%
  
                             (2.79) 
 
Substituting out the partial derivatives and collecting terms results in the following 
expression: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ mc  mc 1 1
1
k
t t t k t k t t kk
Y Y E mc p p y
s
sm m qb q s
qb
-
¥-
+ + +=
+ + - - + -
- å .  
                           (2.80) 
 
Equating the left hand side approximation (2.73) and the right hand side approximation (2.80) 
it holds true  that: 
 
         ( ) ( ) ( )0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
k
t t t t k t t kk
q p Emc E pqb qb
¥
+ +=
+ = - +å% .    (2.81) 
 
Note that we have used the fact that  mcm =1. Under the assumption that 1b <  it holds that 
the following equation 
 
0
k
t t t ki
y a b E x
¥
+=
= å ,          (2.82) 
 27 
 
can be rewritten as: 
 
1t t t ty ax bE y += + .           (2.83) 
 
Therefore equation (2.81) can be restated as: 
 
 ( ) ( )1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1t t t t t t tq mc E q E p pqb qb + += - + + -% % .       (2.84) 
 
where it holds that: 
 
1a wb= -  
b wb=  
ˆt ty q=  
( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt t i t i tx mc p p+ += + -  
 
Remember for small perturbations of the inflation rate around its non-inflationary steady state 
we have derived the following expression: 
 
ˆ ˆ
1t t
q
q
p
q
=
-
.             (2.85) 
 
This equation can be used to substitute out ˆtq  in terms of ˆ tp . 
 
( ) 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ11 1t t t t t tmc E E
q q
p qb qb p p
q q + +
æ ö= - + +ç ÷- -è ø
,    (2.86) 
 
which can be transformed into: 
 
1ˆ ˆ ˆt t t t tE mcp b p l e+= + + .         (2.87) 
 
where: 
( )( )1 1q qb
l
q
- -é ù
= ê ú
ë û
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Equation (2.87) relates the inflation rate to the projected path of marginal costs. There is a 
long tradition in macroeconomic theory that relates the inflation rate directly to some output 
measure.  This has the advantage that the inflation rate can be directly explained in terms of 
the economic cycle. Nevertheless substituting out marginal costs by the output gap has its 
downside risk. As we will see below, we have to make assumptions on technology and more 
importantly on the functioning of labor markets. In other words , replacing marginal costs by 
the output gap in the NKPC is more than “just mathematics”. Assume that firms produce 
according to a linear production technology t t tY A N= . Log-lineariz ing the production 
function yields (Walsh (2003), p. 238): 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆt t t t t t t tY y N Aa A N n= + .         (2.88) 
 
Which can be simplified to: 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆt t ty n a= + .          (2.89) 
 
Hence deviations of production from its trend path are driven by technology and labor. But 
how is labor input determined? Let us assume for the baseline scenario that labor markets are 
perfectly competitive. From the households’ equilibrium condition we know that the real 
wage is equal to the disutility of labor and the marginal utility of consumption. Given our 
concrete isoelastic utility function it holds that: 
 
t t
t
t t
W NMC
P C
h
s
c
-= - .           (2.90) 
 
Log-linearizing this expression yields: 
 
[ ] [ ]ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt tt t t t t
t t
W N
mc w p n y
P C
h
s
c
h s-
æ ö æ ö
= - - +ç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø
.     (2.91) 
 
The steady state level of the real wage and the ratio of marginal disutility of work in relation 
to the marginal utility of consumption can be written as: 
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( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt t t t tmc n y y nh s= + - - .        (2.92) 
 
Substituting out labor ˆtn  by the production function we can rewrite marginal costs as follows: 
 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ1-t t tmc a yh h s= + + .        (2.93) 
 
Which can be further simplified to: 
 
( )t
1ˆ ˆ ˆ    mc = t ty a
h
h s
h s
é ùæ ö+
+ -ê úç ÷+è øë û
.        (2.94) 
 
So far we succeeded to express marginal costs in terms of output ˆty  and technology ˆta . By 
analyzing the flex-price equilibrium we will show that we can further simplify equation 
(2.94). If prices are flexible it will hold that 
 
t t t
f
t t
W A N
P C
h
s
c
m -
= = ,           (2.95) 
 
where the superscript f denotes the flex-price equilibrium. Applying the same log-
linearization techniques we can express the equilibrium value as follows: 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆf ft t tn c ah s+ = .            (2.96) 
 
From the production function we know that: 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆf f ft t ty n a= +  .            (2.97) 
 
Combining equation (2.91) and (2.92) by substituting out ˆ ftn  and replacing ˆ
f
tc  by ˆ
f
ty  we see 
that the flex-price output gap can be stated as: 
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1ˆ ˆft ty a
h
s h
æ ö+= ç ÷+è ø
 .           (2.98) 
 
Substituting the flex-price equilibrium ˆ fty  in equation (2.94) we can make the following 
prediction on the relationship between marginal costs ˆ tmc  and the output gap ˆty : 
 
( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ft t tmc y ys h é ù= + -ë û .         (2.99) 
 
Substituting out ˆ tmc  in the Phillips curve (2.87) we arrive at the following well known NKPC 
which relates inflation rates to the output gap ˆ ˆ ˆ ft t tx y yé ù= -ë û : 
 
( ) ( )
1
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆt t t tE x
q bq
p b p g
q+
- -
= + .        (2.100) 
 
This expression nicely shows that the output gap is the driving variable in the inflation 
process. Iterating the NKPC forward it can be rewritten as follows under the assumption that 
1b < : 
 
( )0
i
t t t kk
E yp bk
¥
+=
= å % .         (2.101) 
 
Without any doubt the NKPC a la Calvo has its merits as it is directly derived from solid 
microeconomic foundations, which many macroeconomists regard as a virtue of its own. 
Nevertheless it suffers intrinsically from the same drawbacks  as Taylor’s (1979) version. As 
optimizing firms decide on price levels and not on price changes, the NKPC implies the same 
serious empirical defects. In particular it is unable to explain the persistent response of 
inflation to macroeconomic shocks. Not surprisingly this was sufficient impetus for some 
economists to propose alternatives which are closer to the data. In the following two sections 
we will highlight three different alternatives. One is a direct extension of Taylor’s version, 
namely Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and one is a direct extension of Calvo-pricing (Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)). Another string in monetary macroeconomics was initiated by 
Mankiw and Rice (2001) and Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2001), who categorically reject the 
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notion of sticky prices. They argue instead that the degree of information updating in the 
economy is sticky. 
 
 
2.1.1.4  The Sticky Information Phillips Curve 
 
The NKPC has been criticized on a number of grounds which led to fruitful extensions  
(McCallum (1997)). Besides these extensions which we will discuss in this section an 
alternative proposition to the NCPC which has been labeled as “Sticky Information Phillips 
Curve” (SIPC) which was originally proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2001). Mankiw and Reis 
criticize in particular that a sticky price Phillips curve implies disinflationary booms , if a real 
balance effect is present. Typically they assume that aggregate demand can be described by a 
quantity relationship of the following form (see Mankiw and Reis (2001), p. (1301): 
 
             t t tm p yy- = .            (2.102) 
 
Therefore , announced disinflations boost aggregate demand as the real quantity of money 
increases. 
 
t0 1/(1-q)
pt*
Announced Shift in 
Monetary Policy
Average duration  
 
Figure 3: The “Dilemma” of a Calvo Price Setter 
 
The detailed story goes as follows. A Calvo price setter that is allowed to reset its price with a 
probability of (1-q) is likely to be stuck with the reset price on average for (1/(1-q)) periods  to 
come. If a shift in the inflation target is announced in three quarters from period t0 on a Calvo 
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price setter chooses its prices to be optimal on average. This implies that the Calvo price setter 
anticipates that he will not be able to adjust prices in the period the inflation target is changed 
as his price is still fixed with a certain probability. This implies that prior to the announced 
disinflation prices will be cut which boosts economic activity. To remedy this deficiency 
Mankiw and Reis propose an alternative Phillips curve .  
Assume that at each point in time only a fraction of firms engages into the process of 
acquiring costly new information in order to update prices. So just as in the Calvo price model 
prices are adjusted infrequently at random intervals. But in contrast to the Calvo case prices 
are not sticky, but firms just price their output at an outdated information set. Mankiw and 
Reis  postulate that the optimal price *tp  for those firms that are allowed to reoptimise is given 
by (Mankiw and Reis (2001), p. 1299): 
 
 *t t tp p ya= + .            (2.103) 
 
Hence the price depends on the aggregate  log price level Pt and the state of the cycle yt. Those 
firms that do not update their information set in period j are stuck with their old state of 
knowledge. Accordingly they set the price for period t guided by an outdated information set 
they acquired j periods ago: 
 
             *kt t k tz E p-= .            (2.104) 
 
As we assume to have an infinite amount of firms j in the economy, the aggregate price level 
is just the weighted average of all prices currently charged 
 
( )0 1
k
k
t tk
p zq q
¥
=
= -å ,          (2.105) 
 
where q is the rate of arrival of price adjustment. Higher values of (1-q)  indicate that the 
economy on average updates information more promptly. Substituting out jtz  in equation 
(2.104) the aggregate price level pt can be stated as follows: 
 
( ) ( )0 1
k
t t k t tk
p E p yq q a
¥
-=
= - +å .        (2.106) 
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Obviously this  formulation nests a Phillips curve as it relates the price level to some output 
measure. In order to transform equation (2.99) in terms of the inflation rate some further 
substitutions are necessary. Mankiw and Reis (2001) propose to take the first term out of the 
sum.  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
10
1
j
t t t t j t tj
p p y E p yq a q q a
+¥
- -=
= + + - +å .    (2.107) 
 
Iterating this equation one period backwards yields: 
 
( ) ( )1 1 1 10 1
k
t t k t tk
p E p yq q a
¥
- - - - -=
= - +å .      (2.108) 
 
Subtracting pt-1 from pt one can retrieve the following expression for the inflation rate 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 10 01 1
k k
t t t t k t t t k t tk k
p y E y E p yp q a q q p q q a
¥ ¥
- - - -= =
= - + - + D - - +å å .  
                             (2.109) 
 
Note from equation (2.101) we know that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )10 1
k
t t t t k t tk
p p y E p yq a q q a
¥
- -=
- - = - +å      (2.110) 
 
Substituting out this expression in equation (2.107) we can restate the (SIPC) as follows: 
 
[ ] ( ) ( )10/(1 ) 1
k
t t t k t tk
y E yp aq q q q p a¥ - -== - + - + Då     (2.111) 
 
As we will show below this Phillips curve is immune against disinflationary booms. Assume 
that monetary policy announces a credible cold turkey disinflation in three quarters to come. 
Optimizing agents that update their information set over this period will choose 
0 0
* *
1 3 2 3,  t t t tE p E p+ + + +  and 0
*
3 3 t tE p+ +  in such a way that it will incorporate the new stance of 
monetary policy. As a consequence the price level will not change due to the announced shift 
in monetary policy until the shift actually occurs. Hence those agents that update the 
information set j periods in advance will choose *kt t k tz E p-=  in such a way that it incorporates 
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the shift in monetary policy. As prices are not intrinsically sticky there is no incentive to 
lower the price level in advance. In each period all prices are reset but some prices are based 
on outdated information.  
 
t0
Etpt*
Announced Shift in 
Monetary Policy
*
t j tj 1
E p
¥
-=å
time
 
Figure 4: Price Setting under Sticky Information Phillips Curve 
 
Of course one might critically ask whether this conclusion applies to a scenario where the 
central bank conducts inflation targeting by means of manipulating the real interest rate . In a 
regime of interest rate targeting lower inflationary expectations might give a restrictive 
monetary impulse as expected real interest rates increase. Typically in a purely New 
Keynesian IS-framework a real balance effect is not present unless one deviates from the 
assumption that money and consumption enter the utility function separately (see Woodford, 
ch. 4, pp. 301). The fact that the SIPC does not have more adherents can be traced back to 
extensions of the basic Calvo model. Within the next section we will highlight these 
extensions. 
 
 
2.1.1.5  Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
 
The NKPC combines elements of the “Real Business  C ycle” framework w ith Keynesian 
elements of monopolistic compe tition and sticky prices. Nevertheless it has its problems when 
it meets the data . Therefore extensions have been developed to reconcile the virtues of micro 
foundation with stylized facts. These Phillips curves are labeled as “Hybrid New Keynesian 
Phillips Curves” (HNKPC) as they combine forward looking elements with backward looking  
behavior. Gali, Gertler and Salido Lopez (2001) propose the following derivation for a 
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HNKPC. The log price index pt can be defined as a weighted average of last period’s prices 
pt -1 and those prices that are reset in the current period: 
 
( ) *t t 1 tp p 1 p-= q + -q .          (2.112) 
 
Those prices *tp  that are reset in the current period can be decomposed into
rat
tp , where the 
index (rat) denotes forward looking and btp , where the index (b) denotes backward looking. 
Clarida, Gali and Lopez-Salido (2001) propose the following updating scheme for backward 
looking price setters: 
 
b *
t t 1 t 1p p - -= + p .            (2.113) 
 
Accordingly backward looking firms update *t 1p -  by last periods inflation rate. Of course 
alternative rules of thumb are thinkable and actually implemented (see C hristiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans 2005). So for instance one  might assume that backward looking 
agents update their prices by steady state inflation. 
 
*
1
b
t tp p p-= + .            (2.114) 
 
Generally rule-of-thumb behavior has become a very common theme in monetary 
macroeconomics as it is a straightforward way to introduce inertia in macroeconomic models. 
Rule -of-thumb behavior can be rationalized by a broad list of arguments (Amato and Laubach 
(2003)). It does not produce any computational costs as the information needed to update 
prices is assumed to be publicly available. The fraction of firms that updates by rule -of-thumb 
implicitly learns as yesterdays inflation rate incorporates the pricing decisions of those agents 
that optimize. In steady state rule-of-thumb setters will set prices equal to those who do Calvo 
pricing.   Under the assumption of Calvo pricing forward looking firms set prices according to 
the following rule:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
k
rat
t t t t kk 0
ˆp 1 E mc p
¥
+=
= -bq bq +å .      (2.115) 
 
Equation (2.112) can be rewritten as follows: 
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( )*t t t1 p p- qæ öp = -ç ÷qè ø .          (2.116) 
 
Equation (2.116) can be simplified by substituting out the reset price *tp  by the weighted 
average of those price setters that follow a rule of thumb and those that optimize.  
 
( )( ) ( )rat bt t t t t1 1 p p p p- qæ ö é ùp = - w - + w -ç ÷ ë ûqè ø      (2.117) 
 
Based on the seminal work of Sbordone (2002) one can derive the following expression for 
average marginal costs if firms implement a CES technology 
 
( )ˆ ˆ
1
f
t t k t t kmc mc p p
ae
a+ +
= - -
-
%
% ,         (2.118) 
 
where a%  denotes the labor share and e  the elasticity of demand. Accordingly marginal costs 
are given by ( ) ( )( )( )/ 1 /t t t t tMC W P Y Na= - %  in levels. In order to obtain a Phillips curve in 
terms of inflation and deviations of marginal costs from their flex-price values we need to 
substitute out ( )ratt tp p-  and ( )bt tp p-  in (2.117). The distance between the price set by 
forward looking agents and the log price level can be stated as follows by substituting out 
(2.18) in (2.115): 
 
( ) ( ) ( )krat ratt t t t k t t t ,t k 1k 0 ˆp p 1 E mc p p 11 1
¥
+ + +=
é ae ea ùæ ö- = -bq bq - - +bq + pç ÷ê ú- a -aè øë û
å .  
                             (2.119) 
 
With this expression at hand it will have to hold that: 
 
( ) ( )
k
rat
t t t k t t kk 0 k 1
ˆp 1 E m c E
¥ ¥
+ += =
= -bq x bq + på å .     (2.120) 
 
        where 
( )
1
1 1
-a
x =
+ a e -
 
 37 
 
Combining these expressions yields: 
 
b
t t 1 t
1
p p
1 -
- = p -p
- q
.         (2.121) 
 
Next insert (2.119) and (2.121) into (2.117) in order to obtain: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k kt t 1 t t t k t t kk 0 k 1
1 1 ˆ1 1 E mc E
1
¥ ¥
- + += =
- q é ùæ ö æ ö é ùp = w p - p + -w -bq x bq + bq pç ÷ ç ÷ê ú ë ûq - qè ø è øë û
å å  
                             (2.122) 
 
Collecting variables and multiplying the equation by the forward operator ( )1 Fbq-  yields: 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]1 1
1 1 1
1 ...
1 1 1t t t
F
bq q q v q vv
p p p bq
vbq bq q v vbq bq q v vbq bq q v+ -
+ - - -
= + + -
+ + - + + - + + -
                             (2.123) 
 
By applying the operator  ( )1 Fbq-  to the bracket the equation can be rewritten as: 
 
    
( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1t t b t t t
mc
bq q q v bq q v
p p g p l p
vbq bq q v vbq bq q v+ - +
+ - - -
= + + +
+ + - + + -
% . (2.124) 
 
This can ultimately be written in the standard form of a HNKPC: 
 
t f t t 1 b t 1 t tE mc+ -p = g p + g p +l + e% .        (2.125) 
 
   
( )( )( )
( )
1
1 1
f b
where: 1 1 1
            ,  ,  1 1
-
- -
l = -q -bq - w xf
g =bqf g =wf f = q + w -q -bé ùë û
 
 
The hybrid specification nests the purely backward looking NKPC as well as the purely 
forward looking one. Therefore it bridges the gap between the old style accelerationist type of 
Phillips curve and the New Keynesian one. Although the HNKPC is intrinsically inertial it is 
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common practice in applied work (Smets and Wouters ((2005)); Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez 
(2003)) to augment equation (2.125) by a serially correlated error term. This indicates that the 
HNKPC is still not able to generate enough inertia out of their structural relationships. Based 
on this notion of the Phillips curve we will explore the true degree of forward-lookingness fg  
and backward-lookingness bg  nested in the data. Equation (2.125) nests the case of a purely 
backward looking Phillips curve ( 1bg = ) as well as the standard NKPC ( 0bg = ). The 
dynamics enshrined in the NKPC crucially depend on two relations. On the one hand on the 
relative magnitude of bg  in relation to fg . On the other hand on 
'
p
k  which depicts the 
responsiveness of inflation to deviations of marginal cost from its steady state level. The 
relative size of bg  in relation to fg  critically determines the persistence of the inflation 
process. The higher the degree of backward-lookingness the higher will be the persistence of 
the inflation process as embedded in the autocorrelation functions. The degree of backward 
lookingness depends in particular on the percentage of price setters that update by rule of 
thumb and the share of Calvo-price setters in the economy. The second crucial parameter 'pk  
denotes the sensitivity of inflation with respect to marginal cost and indirectly over the 
production function to output. Therefore the parameter 'pk  can be interpreted as the slope of 
the Phillips Curve. Note in particular that the parameter 'pk  depends negatively on the degree 
of Calvo-price setters. Hence the more economic agents are able to adjust prices to changing 
economic conditions the looser becomes the link between changes in the economic cycle and 
the inflation process itself.  Given the absolute magnitudes of ,b fg g  and 
'
pk  it is easy to see 
that by far the most important variable in explaining the inflation process is the inflation rate 
itself and not the deviation of marginal costs from its flex-price equilibrium. In section (4.3) 
we will systematically evaluate the implications of variations in the degree of forward and 
backward lookingness and its implication for the model dynamics. To summarize. This 
section analyzed the price setting behavior of firms. We saw that firms are only called at 
random intervals to reset prices. This type of price stickiness leads to price dispersion in the 
economy, which has detrimental effects on consumer welfare. Therefore the non vertical 
(NKPC) curve leaves a meaningful role to a central bank that smoothes out the impact of 
macroeconomic shocks on welfare. 
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2.1.2  Optimizing Households 
 
New Keynesian macroeconomics centers around a representative household that cares on 
utility. It is the dominant doctrine 
to assume that households are 
guided by optimization behavior . 
In other words households behave 
as if they are maximizing an 
intertemporal utility function 
(Woodford, ch. 2, (2003)). 
 
 
0 0
i
t ii
E Ub
¥
+=å ,            (2.126) 
 
where Ut denotes the instant utility. We will assume throughout the section that the utility 
function is separable in its arguments, which means nothing but that the individual variables 
enter the utility function additively. So if we assume for instance that the period utility 
depends in particular on consumption C t and the work load Nt an additive utility function will 
have the following generalized form: 
 
( , ) ( ) ( )t t t tU C N U C U N= + .        (2.127) 
 
This assumption simplifies the mathematical exposition as the derivative with respect to e.g. 
consumption C t only depends on consumption itself: 
 
( ) ( )C t tU C h C= .           (2.128) 
 
So let us turn our attention to a representative household that designs its optimal intertemporal 
consumption path. The standard assumption that marginal utility is increasing (U C>0) at a 
decreasing rate (UCC<0) holds. This implies in particular that a representative household is 
risk averse and would be willing to give up a fraction of his overall consumption spending in 
order to be isolated from stochastic shocks beyond its control. This property of the utility 
function is key to understand why the representative household appreciates stabilization 
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policy as an effective tool to smooth out fluctuations in macroeconomic income (Campbell, 
Lo, McKinlay (1997)). 
 
C
U(C)
C2C1
U(C)1
U(C )2
E()<U(E())
0.5(U(E(C ))+U(E(C)))1 2
0.5E(U(C)+U((C)))1 2  
Figure 5: A Risk Averse H ousehold 
 
We will build on this property later on when we rationalize monetary policy from a utility 
based welfare criterion (Woodford (2001)). The figure shows that a risk averse economic 
agent will always prefer the certain outcome ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 20.5 U E C U E C+  to a gamble where 
he receives U(C 1) and U(C 2) with a 50% probability, although the expected value of 
consumption is the same. 
 
 
2.1.2.1  The Purely Forward Looking IS-Equation 
 
Given these preliminaries let us take a somewhat deeper look at the habitat of our 
representative agent. It is common practice to assume the existence of com plete contingent 
claims markets. Assets are traded that offer complete insurance against any risk that stems 
from (firm-) specific income, (firm-) specific price or taste shocks.  This implies that the 
wealth is  equal across households in equilibrium , so that all households face the same flow 
budget constraint. In particular all representative agents own a proportionate share of the 
market portfolio of firms supplying in the intermediate good sector. The presence of complete  
contingent claims markets imply that a risk free bond exists. As it is well known from finance 
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literature a general class of asset pricing models can be written as follows (Campbell Lo 
Mckinelay (1997)) 
 
, 1 1t t t t tB E A+ +é ù= Dë û ,           (2.129) 
 
where Bt stands for the nominal price of a bond today, and At+1 is the stochastic price of the 
bond tomorrow , Qt+1 is the so called stochastic discount factor, which is often equally labeled 
as the pricing kernel. Generally the pricing kernel is defined as (Cochrane, 2004, p. 8.): 
 
             ( )
1
,
( )k C t
t k
C t
U C
U C
b +D = .          (2.130) 
 
Equation (2.130) tells us that risky assets are typically traded at a discount as 1( )tU C + < 
( )tU C . Different models of asset pricing, e.g. the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) are 
nothing but alternative theories for ,t kD . Let us assume that a risk free asset which has a face 
value of Bt=€1 exists and pays of a certain nominal return of At+1=1+it tomorrow. According 
to the fundamental pricing relationship it will have to hold that: 
 
( ), 11€ 1t t t tE i+é ù= D +ë û .         (2.131) 
 
As A t+1 is not a random variable, households  do not have to build expectations on At+1: 
 
( ), 11 1t t t tE i+é ù= D +ë û .          (2.132) 
 
Under these assumptions , 1t t tE +D  can be defined as: 
 
 , 1
1
1t t ti
+D = +
.            (2.133) 
 
Hence with complete contingent claims markets there exists a stochastic discount factor , 1t t +D  
that is equal to ( ) 11 ti
-+  for risk less assets. If one assumes that government bonds Bt are risk 
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free it is legitimate to discount 1t jB + -  in the flow budget constraint of households with the 
discount factor , 1t t +D : 
 
, 1 1t j t j t j t j t j t j t t j t j t jP C M B W N B+ + + + + + + + + - ++ + £ + D + P .  for j=1,2,3,.. (2.134) 
 
Substituting out the pricing kernel of households (2.134) can be rewritten as: 
 
( )1 11t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t jP C M B W N i B+ + + + + + - + + - ++ + £ + + + P  ,  for j=1,2,3,..  (2.135) 
 
Accordingly our representative household allocates his recourses on consumption spending 
Pt+jCt+j and his money holdings Mt+j and bond holdings Bt+j. His spending patterns are 
financed by labor income Wt+jN t+j, dividend payments and profits t j+P  from the intermediate 
good sector . In equilibrium it will have to hold that 
 
( )
( )1 1 , 1 1
;
;
c t t t
c t t t t t t
U C P
U E C P
x b
x+ + + +
=
D
,       (2.136) 
 
where tx  denotes stochastic shocks to preferences. Substituting out the stochastic discount 
factor , 1t t +D  this can equally be written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1
1
; ; 1tC t t t C t t t
t
P
U C E U C i
P
x b x+
+
é ù
= +ê ú
ë û
.     (2.137) 
 
This equation is nothing but the well known intertemporal-Euler equation, which is also often 
labeled as the intertemporal IS-equation. The equation states that the marginal utility of 
consumption today has to be equal to the discounted marginal utility of consumption 
tomorrow corrected for changes in the price level. In equilibrium it holds that households 
cannot improve their welfare by realocating their spending patterns. To animate the above 
said let us assume that the representative household has the following additive period utility 
function in consumption 
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( )
1
;
1
tt
t t
CU C e
s
xx
s
-
=
-
,          (2.138) 
 
where s  measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of log consumption with respect 
to changes in the real interest rate. This so called power utility function is the single most used 
function in monetary macroeconomics. The marginal utility of consumption UC can be written 
as follows: 
 
( ); tC t t tU C C exsx -= .          (2.139) 
 
Substituting out Uc in equation (2.137) one obtains the following non-linear equation: 
 
( ) 11
1
1 1 t tt tt t
t t
P Ci E e
P C
s
x x
sb +
-
-+
-
+
æ öæ ö
= + ç ÷ç ÷
è øè ø
.        (2.140) 
 
Log-linearizing the intertemporal Euler-equation the following approximation holds: 
 
1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ1 ( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )
ˆ ˆ    ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )
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f i P P C C C c f i P P C C C c
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+ + + + + +
@ + +
+ +
. 
                            (2.141) 
 
Substituting out the partial derivatives and simplifying terms yields  
 
( )1 1 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 t t t t t t t
t t
P C
E i c c
P C
s
sb p s s x x
-
+
+ +-
+
é ùæ öæ ö é ù@ - + - + -ê úç ÷ç ÷ ë ûè øè øë û
.   (2.142) 
 
This can be approximated by: 
 
( ) ( )1 1 1
1 1ˆ ˆt t t t t t tc E c i p x xs s+ + +
= - + + - .      (2.143) 
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Hence the Euler equation predicts that today’s consumption depends negatively on the real 
interest rate ( )1t ti p +-  and positively on the expected consumption level Ct+1. If we assume 
that the capital stock is constant we can substitute out consumption by output ( ˆ ˆt tc y= ):  
 
( ) ( )1 1 1
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆt t t t t t ty E y i p x xs s+ + +
= - + + - .      (2.144) 
 
This equation is the well known intertemporal IS-equation. It has many supporters as it is 
derived from solid microeconomic foundations, namely from the constraint optimization 
problem of a representative household. The New Keynesian IS -equation nicely depicts that 
monetary policy can manage aggregate demand by temporarily changing the slope of the 
intertemporal budget cons traint. Increasing real interest rates imply that households have an 
incentive to postpone consumption into the future. This means nothing but that monetary 
policy can steer real interest rate according to its ultimate objectives. Unfortunately the purely 
New Keynesian IS-equation is unable to explain stylized facts (Fuhrer (1997)). In particular it 
implies that consumption growth ( 1ln lnt tC C+ - ) and real interest rates should be positively 
correlated: 
 
( )1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )t t t t tE y y i ps+
- = - .        (2.145) 
 
This is at odds with the data. High real interest rates today foreshadow an economic 
depression and not a period of prosperity as predicted by the intertemporal IS -equation. 
Moreover the New Keynesian IS -equation predicts that a shock to aggregate demand will 
generate only a single jump in output which stands in sharp contrast to the hump shaped 
behavior documented in VAR studies (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)). In order to 
address these issues extensions of the New Keynesian IS -equation have been designed which 
we will highlight in the next sections. 
 
 
2.1.2.2  Hybrid Specifications of the New Keynesian IS-Equation 
 
Extensions of the purely forward looking IS-equation have been designed to scope with issues 
like hump shaped responses of output to macroeconomic shocks and negative correlation’s of 
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the real interest rate with and output. Abel (1990) has proposed the following period utility 
function which was for instance implemented by Smets and Wouters (2003) in a widely 
appreciated New Keynesian model 
 
( )11
1
t
t t tU e C H
sx
s
-= -
-
,           (2.146) 
 
where Ht denotes a variable that measures the degree of habit formation in consumption 
which they assume to be given by 1t tH hC -= . By this assumption Smets and Wouters (2003) 
succeed to introduce inertia in consumption decisions as period utility depends on last periods 
consumption level Ct-1. The marginal utility of consumption can now be stated as: 
 
( ) ( )1; tC t t t tU C e C hC
sxx --= - .         (2.147) 
 
Inserting these expressions into the Euler equation (2.137) yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1
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t t t t t
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e C hC C hC i e
P
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+
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By applying the same linearization apparatus as we did beforehand we need to compute the 
following expressions : 
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                            (2.150) 
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Using the partial derivatives and assuming that the steady state of consumption is equal to 
1t tC P= =  we arrive a t the following approximation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1
1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 1 1t t t t t t t
h h hc c c i
h h h h
p x x
s s- + + +
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+ + + +
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Let us assume that the capital stock in the economy is fixed, so that the only source of short 
run variation from steady state is consumption: ˆ ˆt ty c= , then it holds that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1
1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 1 1t t t t t t t
h h h
y y y i
h h h h
p x x
s s- + + +
- -
= + - - + -
+ + + +
  (2.157) 
 
This is the so called hybrid version of a New Keynesian IS-equation. It collapses to the purely 
forward looking IS-equation if we set the degree of habit formation h equal to zero. The 
higher the degree of habit formation the more economic agents center their optimal 
consumption choices around last periods consumption leve l Ct -1. Just as in the case of a 
HNKPC it proofed to be necessary to augment the intertemporal IS-equation by highly auto 
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correlated shocks (Smets and Wouters (2005)) to display a gradual and hump shaped response 
to diverse categories of macroeconomic shoc ks (Fuhrer (2000)).  
To summarize: This section proposed two possible specifications that govern the 
intertemporal allocation schemes of households. Basically we saw that “anything goes” in the 
sense that plausible variations in the utility function lead to alternative specifications of the 
intertemporal IS-equation. 
 
 
2.1.2.3  The Optimal Labor Supply Decision 
 
The last section has derived the optimal allocation scheme for consumption through time. 
Besides his consumption decision a representative household has to decide how much labor to 
supply. Before analyzing the labor supply decision let us take a somewhat closer look at the 
interaction between firms and households in the New Keynesian framework. So far we have 
only analyzed the monopolistically competitive firm taking its decisions on production in the 
light of expectations on the future path of marginal costs. Additionally we have analyzed a 
representative household that allocates consumption optimally through time. We did not 
analyze labor markets where the labor demand of firms meets the labor supply of households. 
Nevertheless as the basic New Keynesian framework assumes labor markets to be perfectly 
flexible they are uninteresting from a stabilization perspective as wages  are able to adjust to a 
changing economic environment. Let us clarify this statement by a thought experiment. For 
the implications of sticky wages see Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). 
Monopolistically competitive firms price their output above marginal costs. Therefore it will 
be profitable for these firms in the intermediate good sector to accommodate demand shocks 
as long as prices are equal or above marginal cost ( fixjt jtp mc³ ) as profits will increase. 
Monopolistic competition is a necessary condition for monetary policy to be able to manage 
aggregate demand. F irms can only induce workers to work more by increasing nominal 
wages. As prices are sticky for a fraction of q  percent of all firms this implies that some firms 
will operate in an environment of decreasing marginal unit profits. Note if product markets 
would be perfectly competitive firms would have no incentive to accommodate demand 
shocks as fixjt jtp mc£ . 
Due to price stickiness those firms that are fixed with their prices can only react on the 
production side whereas those that are allowed to reoptimize will change prices and 
quantities. With these preliminaries in mind let us now analyze in some depth labor markets. 
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From the perspective of an individual household the well known relationship that the marginal 
utility of consumption divided by the marginal disutility of labor  has to be equal to the real 
wage has to hold in equilibrium: 
 
N t
C t
U W
U P
= .           (2.158) 
 
So let us for instance assume that the following additive separable intertemporal utility 
function is able to explain the behavior of our household (Walsh (2003), p.232): 
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Figure 6: Demand Shock Accommodation by a Monopolistically Competitive Firm 
 
If firms operate with a linear technology of the form 
 
jt t jty A N= ,           (2.160) 
 
it will have to hold in equilibrium that: 
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Log linearly approximated the flex-price equilibrium can be written as 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆf f ft t tn c ah s+ = ,           (2.162) 
 
where the superscript f denotes flexible prices. Substituting out the steady-state level of 
employment ˆ ftn  by means of the production function ˆ ˆ
f f f
t t ty n a= +  the flex-price equilibrium 
can be written as a function of technology shocks as follows: 
 
1ˆ ˆf ft ty a
h
s h
æ ö+= ç ÷+è ø
.           (2.163) 
 
Note as long as we assume that labor markets are flex-price markets they are not a source of 
welfare losses. Therefore the simple New Keynesian macromodel does not take labor markets 
into account. Of course this assumption has downsides. Obviously labor  markets are not 
perfectly competitive; therefore a model that neglects to put inertial reactions in labor markets 
will underestimate the global need for stabilization policy in terms of household’s willingness 
to give up consumption in order to be isolated from stochastic shocks beyond its control.  
The degree of natural output volatility ˆ fty  depends besides the size of technology shocks 
themselves on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution s  and the Frisch elasticity c . If 
economic agents are more risk averse fluctuations from technology to output will be 
somewhat dampened, as economic agents have a strong incentive to smooth consumption 
(Canzoneri, Cumby. and Diba (2004)). 
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2.1.3  The Role of Monetary Policy  
 
So far we have only analyzed the 
private sector in the New 
Keynesian economy. We studied 
the interaction between 
households and monopolistically 
competitive firms.  
 
Now we turn our attention to a 
benevolent central planer in the form of a central bank. The overall goal of monetary policy is 
to promote welfare. This is usually interpreted in terms of keeping the inflation rate close to 
the inflation target while equally having a concern for economic activity. The implementation 
of monetary policy is based on a so-called monetary strategy. The strategy facilities the 
internal decision-making process as well as the transparency and accountability in relation to 
the public. The strategy of inflation-forecast targeting has become more and more popular 
throughout the last decade. Countries like New Zealand, Canada, the UK, Sweden, Finland, 
Australia and Brazil have introduced a full-fledged inflation-targeting regime. Other central 
banks most notably the FED and the ECB implicitly implemented such an approach. 
Following Bofinger (2001) , Svensson (2002)  and Woodford (2003)  inflation forecast 
targeting can be defined by the following main characteristics: 
· There is a numerical value for the inflation target. Achieving this inflation rate is the 
dominant goal of monetary policy although some space for other goals like stabilizing 
output around its trend is left. 
· Interest rates are set in such a way that the inflation forecast will return to the inflation 
target in the periods to come. Therefore the inflation forecast plays a prominent role in 
the decision-making process. The speed of dis- and reinflation is determined by 
preferences. 
· The decision-making process is characterized by a high degree of transparency and 
accountability. 
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2.1.3.1  The Quadratic Loss Function 
 
It is common practice to characterize the preferences of central banks by quadratic loss 
functions. The goal variables are modeled in terms of the output gap and the inflation rate. 
The central bank’s intertemporal optimization problem can be stated within the linear 
quadratic framework as follows: 
 
( ){ }2 20 00 kt t k y t kkL E ypb l p p l¥ + +== - +å      (2.164) 
 
The parameter b  denotes the discount factor and l measures the relative weight attached to 
the goal of output stabilization. Note under the assumption that b converges to one the 
intertemporal loss function converges to the sum of unconditional variances: 
 
[ ] [ ]t t y tL Var Var yp l= + .           (2.165) 
 
The popularity of the quadratic stems from the fact that it is able to map the popular strategy 
of ‘inflation-forecast targeting’. The nested regimes can be stated as follows: 
· Strict-inflation targeting: y 0l =  
· Flexible-inflation targeting: y 0l >  
The intuition behind the quadratic loss function is quite simple. Policymakers stabilize 
squared deviations of the inflation rate around the inflation target while equally holding 
squared deviations of the output gap near null. The quadratic implies that positive and 
negative deviations of target values impose an identical loss on economic agents. Additionally 
large deviations from target values generate a more than proportional loss. If ly is equal to 
null policymakers only care about inflation. This type of central bank is  called inflation nutter. 
If ly goes to infinity, policymakers only care on output. This preference type will be called 
output junkie. Although the approach to use a quadratic function is very plausible it has been 
criticized as being ad hoc. In particula r Woodford (2001) has argued that there is a need to 
find a microeconomic rationale for the quadratic loss function. 
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2.1.3.2 A Welfare Based Approach to a Quadratic Loss Function 
 
Quite arguably the overall goal of monetary policy is to promote economic welfare. This 
means in particular that consistent with the structural equations of the model the central bank 
sets a path for its instrument { }{ }0,i ¥  consistent with its targets in s uch a way that the expected 
utility of a representative household is maximized.  Nevertheless given no general consensus 
on relevant variables there is quite some ambiguity how  to specify a concrete loss function. 
Woodford (2001) has shown that it is possible under certain assumptions to derive a “natural 
welfare criterion” based on a representative household’s utility function (Woodford (2003) , p. 
382 ch. 6)): 
 
“An important advantage of using a model founded upon private-sector optimization to 
analyze the consequences of alternative policy rules is that there is a natural welfare criterion 
in the context of such a model, provided by the preferences of private agents, which are 
displayed in the structural relations that determine the effects of alternative policies.” 
 
The following pages reproduce the mathematical derivation of a micro-founded approach to 
the quadratic loss function. This section draws on Grimm and Ried (2005), Walsh (2003) and 
Woodford (2001/ 2003). The starting point of our analysis is the following expected utility: 
 
{ }0 0 t ttE Ub¥=å .           (2.166) 
 
Let us assume for reasons of mathematical convenience that the period utility contribution to 
the expected utility of a representative household can be stated as follows: 
 
( ) ( )
1
0
; () ;t t t t tU u C z v n i z di= - ò % .         (2.167) 
 
Just as in the previous sections we assume that households draw utility from consumption 
whereas the production of commodity yt imposes disutility. The vector zt is composed of 
macroeconomic shocks. Using the national income identity t tY C=  and the production 
technology ( ) ( ( ))t t ty i A f n i=  of firm i which links labor input to output the utility function 
can be restated as follows: 
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          ( ) ( )
1
0
; ( );t t t t tU u Y z v y i z di= - ò ,         (2.168) 
 
where the aggregate commodity is composed of the weighted average of the individual 
intermediate goods: 
 
1 11
0
( )t tY y i
q
q q
q
- -é ù
= ê ú
ë û
ò .          (2.169) 
 
For notational purposes let us restate the following conventions. Let Y  be the steady state of a 
variable, the n the deviation around the steady state is defined as: t tY Y Y= -% , where the log 
deviation is given by ( )ˆ logt tY Y Y= . Given these notational conventions the variable s Yt  and  
2
tY  can be approximated up to second order as follows: 
 
21ˆ ˆ
2
t
t
Y Y y y
Y
- » +            (2.170) 
 
2
2ˆ tt
Y Yy
Y
æ ö-» ç ÷
è ø
.            (2.171) 
 
Let us  now consider the following second-order approximation to output of a households’ 
utility function around the steady state level ( ),0Y  (Woodford (2001) , p. 16) : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )32 ', ,1 1; , 0 2 2t t C t z t CC t C Z t t t z z tU Y z U Y U Y U z U Y U z Y z U z O z» + + + + + +% % % .  (2.172) 
 
This can be rewritten as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )32 2 2 ', ,1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,0 ,   2 2 2t t C t t z t CC t C z t t t t z z tU Y z U Y U Y Y Y U z U Y Y U z Y Y z U z O z
æ ö» + + + + + + +ç ÷è ø
 
                             (2.173) 
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by substituting out tY%  and 2tY%  by using equations (2.170) and (2.171) and dropping out cross 
terms such as 2ˆt tz Y . Equation (2.173) can be further simplified by defining the following 
coefficients: 
 
 CC
C
YU
U
s = -% , ,C Zt t
CC
U
z
YU
f = -% . 
 
So that: 
 
( ) ( )1 2 11ˆ ˆ ˆ, 1 . . .2t t C t t t tU Y z YU Y Y Y t i ps s f
- -ì ü» + - + +í ý
î þ
%% %     (2.174) 
 
where t.i.p. denotes terms independent of policy. Equation (2.174) gives a second order 
approximation to output. Let us now take a second order approximation of the household’s  
disutility of producing commodity i around the steady state ( );0Y : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )32 '1 1( ), ,0 2 2t t y z t yy t yz t t t zz ttv y i z v y y i z y i z y i z z On n n n n= + + + + + +% % %  . 
                             (2.175) 
 
Substituting out ( )ty i%  and 2 ( )ty i%  by the analogue to equation (2.170) and (2.171) we can 
rewrite (2.175) as follows: 
  
( ) ( ) 21ˆ ˆ ˆ( ); ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) . . .
2t t y t t t t
y i z y y i y i q y i t i pn n h hé ù» + + - +ê úë û
% % % ,  (2.176) 
 
where we have defined the following coefficients: 
 
,;yy y z tt
y yy
y z
q
y
n n
h
n n
= = -% % . 
 
So far we have succeeded in taking a second-order approximation of a household’s utility 
function in terms of output. This is a step in the right direction, as the variable output can be 
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rewritten in terms of the output gap and the inflation rate via the Phillips curve. Accordingly it 
is possible in principle to restate the approximations (2.173) and (2.176) in terms of a 
quadratic loss function.  
To proceed we need to define the distorted steady state level that prevails if prices would be 
flexible. In equilibrium it holds that households equate the marginal disutility of labor divided 
by the marginal utility of consumption to the real wage. Given the assumptions made on the 
production technology (see Woodford, 2001 p. 13) it holds that the efficient steady state level 
is given by ( )*;0 1s Y = , whereas the distorted steady state under monopolistic competition is 
defined as: 
 
( ) 1/ 1 .y CU qn q
-= = - F          (2.177) 
 
with: ( )1 qF = . 
 
Accordingly the parameter F  summarizes the degree of macroeconomic distortion. If one 
assumes for reasons of mathematical convenience that the overall distortions are sufficiently 
small in size then the terms 2yˆF  and ˆtq yF , can be dropped out so that equation (2.176) 
simplifies to: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 21ˆ ˆ ˆ( ), 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) . . .
2t t C t t t t t
y i z U Y y i y i q y i t i pn h hé ù» - F + + - +ê úë û
% %   (2.178) 
 
where: ( ) ( )/t yz t yyq v z Yy= . 
 
If percentage deviations of aggregate output from steady state are equal to those across 
individual outputs  in the intermediate good sector the following second-order Taylor 
approximation holds: 
 
( )11ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 1 var ( )
2i i
Y E y i y iq -» + - ,      (2.179) 
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So far we have only taken a second-order approximation for a single household working for 
firm i. To make inference on the aggregate level of the economy we have to integrate over all 
commodities produced in the economy. It approximately holds that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
0
2 1
1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ); 1 ( ) 1 ( ) var ( ) ( ) . .
2
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 var ( ) . . .                     
2 2
t t C t t i t t t
c t t t t i t
y i z Yu Ey i Ey i y i qEy i t i p
U Y q Y Y y i t i p
n h h
f h h q h-
é ùé ù= - F + + + - +ê úê úë ûë û
é ù» - - + + + + +ê úë û
ò % % %
% % %
                             (2.180) 
 
Now we can combine the utility of consumption and the disutility of labor. The aggregate 
approximation can be stated as follows: 
 
[ ] ( ) ( )2 11 1ˆ ˆ ˆvar ( ) . . .2 2C t t t t i tV YU q Y Y y i t i psf h s h q h
-ì ü» F + + - + - + +í ý
î þ
% % %% %   
                           (2.181) 
 
As it is our ultimate goal to show that the period utility function can equally be stated in terms 
of a standard loss function which is commonly used in monetary macroeconomics we need a 
measure for the flex-price output ˆ fty . Given that we have made the assumption that the 
aggregate price index is normalized to one it will have to hold in equilibrium that: 
 
1 y C
U
q
n
q
æ ö =ç ÷-è ø
.           (2.182) 
 
To get a linear approximation of this non-linear equation one can take a first-order 
approximation at the flexible-price output level ˆ ftY , which can be stated as  (see Walsh p. 
552) : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ), ,ˆˆ ˆ,0 , 0 , 01
f f
y yy t y z t C cc t c z ty YY z U Y U Y YY U z
q
u u u
q
æ ö é ù+ + = + +ç ÷ ë û-è ø
.  
                           (2.183) 
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In order to obtain a  closed form solution for the flex-price output gap ˆ fty  divide both sides of 
the equation by ( ) ( ) ( ), 0 ,0 / 1C yU Y yqu q= -  to obtain: 
 
ˆ ˆf f
t t t tY q Yh h s sf- = - +% % % % ,         (2.184) 
 
so that the flex-price equilibrium  can be written as: 
 
ˆ f t t
t
qY sf h
s h
æ ö+= ç ÷+è ø
%%
%% .           (2.185) 
 
The utility function can now be written more compactly as follows: 
 
( ) [ ]
( ) ( )
1
2
12*
1 ˆ ˆ ˆvar ( ) . .
2
1 ˆvar ( ) . .
2
t t
C t t i t
C t i t
q
V YU Y Y y i t i p
YU x x y i t i p
sf h q h
s h
s h s h
q h
s h
s h
-
-
ì üF + + æ ö+ï ïæ ö» - + - + +í ýç ÷ç ÷ + +è ø ï ïè øî þ
ì üæ ö+ï ïæ ö» - + - + +í ýç ÷ç ÷ +è ø ï ïè øî þ
%% %%% % %% %
%%% %%
,   
                             (2.186) 
 
where the output gap is defined as: 
 
*ˆ ˆ ;ft t tx Y Y x s h
F
º - =
+
.         (2.187) 
 
The final step is now to substitute out ˆ ( )ty i  by the inflation rate. Under the assumption of an 
isoelastic demand function 
 
( )ˆlog ( ) log log ( ) logt t t ty i Y p i Pq= - - ,      (2.188) 
 
the following holds true for the degree of price dispersion: 
 
2ˆ ˆvar log ( ) var log ( )i t i ty i p iq= .         (2.189) 
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Substituting out ˆvar ( )i tp i  in (2.186) the utility function can be stated as follows: 
 
( ) ( ){ }2* 1 21 ˆvar ( ) . . .2t C t i tU YU x x p i t i pq h q-æ ö» - - + + +ç ÷è ø %    (2.190) 
 
As noted by Woodford (2001) equation (2.190) is  derived under very general assumptions 
where no specific assumptions on the nature of price dispersion in the economy have been 
made. Nevertheless if we want to simplify the approximation further we need to specify the 
relationship  which governs inflation, namely the NKPC:  
 
1t t t tx Ep k b p += + .          (2.191) 
 
Following Woodford (2001, p. 396) let us define the following measures: 
 
log ( )t i tP E p iº  and var log ( )t i tp iD = . 
 
The very fact that prices are not adjusted in a synchronized fashion throughout the economy 
puts welfare burdens on consumers. If price changes are not adjusted in a synchronized 
fashion it has distortionary effects on the equilibrium allocation which are comparable to the 
dead weight loss generated by taxes as prices are out of equilibrium. Therefore a policy that 
limits price dispersion in the economy fosters economic welfare. Let us define the following 
measure: 
 
1 1log ( )t t i t tP P E p i P- -é ù- = -ë û .         (2.192) 
 
Maintaining the standard assumption of Calvo-pricing the aggregate price level can be 
rewritten as: 
 
( )( )
( )( )
*
1 1 1
*
1
  log ( ) 1 log
            1 log
i t t t t
t t
E p i P p P
p P
q q
q
- - -
-
é ù= - + - -ë û
= - -
,     (2.193) 
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where 1 1log ( )i t tE p i Pa - -é ù-ë û  is equal to zero by definition. Note that we can equally define 
the dispersion measure tD   as follows: 
 
 1
var log
  
t i tp P-é ùD = -ë û .           (2.194) 
 
Making use of the fact that [ ]22( ) ( ) ( )Var x E x E x= -  we can rewrite (2.194) as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) 221 1log ( ) log ( )t t t t t t tE p i P E p i P- -é ù é ùD = - - -ë ûë û .     (2.195) 
 
Inserting equation (2.193) into (2.195) it will hold have to hold that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )22 2*1 1 1 1log ( ) 1 logt t t t t t t tE p i P p P P Pq q- - - -é ùD = - + - - - -ë û .   (2.196) 
 
This can be rewritten as: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )2* *1 1 11 log logt t t t t t tp P p P P Pq - - -D = - - - - - ,    (2.197) 
 
as ( ) ( )( )2 21 1 11 ( )t t t t t tP P P P P Pq- - -- = - - - -  it holds that we can restate this relationship as 
follows: 
 
( ) ( )2 21 111t t t t tP P P Pq - -D = - - -- .        (2.198) 
 
Which can be simplified to: 
 
( )211t t tP P
q
q -
D = -
-
.          (2.199) 
 
Accordingly it will hold that: 
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( )21 11t t t tP P
qq
q- -
D = D + -
-
.          (2.200) 
 
Up to a first -order approximation that it holds that: ( )2logt tP P O= + . Equation (2.200) can 
be rewritten as: 
 
2
1 1t t t
qq p
q-
D = D +
-
.            (2.201) 
 
Integrating forward from any initial level this relationship can be rewritten as: 
 
( )31 21 1
t t s
t t s O
qq q p
q
+ -
-
æ öD = D + +ç ÷-è ø
å .       (2.202) 
 
Note that it is our aim to approximate expected utility, therefore we have to iterate the 
dispersion measure forward in order to substitute it out of equation (2.190): 
 
( )320 0 0. . 1
tt t t s
t st t s
t i p o a
q
b b q p
q
¥ ¥ -
= = =
é ùD = + +ê ú-ë û
å å å .   (2.203) 
 
Equation (2.203) can be simplified by the following transformations: 
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where it holds that ( )( )1 1y
q qb
l
q
- -
= . Finally one can substitute out the degree of price 
dispersion in the utility function to obtain: 
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0 0
. . .i it t i t t i y t ii iE V E y t i pb b p l
¥ ¥
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Hence based on Woodford’s exposition we have shown up to a second-order approximation it 
holds that the utility function of a representative household can be approximated by a scaled 
version of a standard loss function. To restate the case : The main advantage of this procedure 
is that it might be interpreted as a natural welfare measure in a general equilibrium 
framework. In particular it gives some indication which relative weight to assign to which 
target variable  from a micro-founded perspective. Nevertheless there is some downside risk. 
As we saw, a substantial amount of assumptions is necessary to approximate a utility function 
by a loss function. In particular we had to make assumptions on the functioning of labor  
markets and on technology. 
Equation (2.205) and the implied weight yl  have quite substantial implications for the 
conduct of monetary policy. Assume that a central bank aims at keeping fluctuations of the 
inflation rate around the inflation target within a certain range denotes pD . If the central bank 
faces a steep Phillips curve, the output gap will fluctuate by steepyD , whereas in the case of a 
flat Phillips curve the output gap will be set by the central bank within the interval flatyD . 
Accordingly F igure 7 shows that a central bank that has its prime focus on stabilising the 
inflation rate cannot simultaneously put a high weight on output stabilisation if the Phillips 
curve is flat. This result can be explained by the transmission mechanism nested in New 
Keynesian macromodels. As monetary policy uses the interest rate to manipulate the output 
gap a flattening Phillips curve implies that monetary policy needs to use its nominal interest 
rate more rigorously to move the output gap in order to have the desired impact on the 
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inflation rate. In the case of a steep Phillips curve modest movements in the output gap can 
already have a large impact on the inflation rate. 
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Figure 7: On the Relation between the Phillips Curve and Output Stabilization 
 
 
2.2  New Keynesian Macroeconomics Made Simple 
 
In the last section we have derived in depth the framework of New Keynesian 
macroeconomics. We have seen that the individual equations mirror the equilibrium 
behaviour of interacting sectors in a highly stylized economy. Each sector can be described by 
a single equation. As a consequence the New Keynesian macromodel can be reduced to three 
main building blocs (see Bofinger, Mayer and Wollmershäuser (2005)). 
· A HNKPC depicting the pricing decisions of monopolistically competitive firms in the 
intermediate good sector. 
· An intertemporal IS -equation depicting the optimal allocation schemes of households 
allocating consumption and bond holdings over time. 
· And the policy rule that tell us how monetary policy is conducted.  
In the following section we will show the model in action. In particular we demonstrate that it 
is possible to simplify the New Keynesian framework to an intermediate level while equally 
preserving its main insights. Quite arguably this endeavour has many advantages. The least of 
them is not that it is a powerful alternative to the IS/LM-AS/AD model which is still the 
central tool of macroeconomic teaching in most textbooks. In its basic version it is at the same 
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time more simple and more powerful than the IS/LM-AS/AD model. In its more complex 
version it can analyze important concepts such as inflation targeting and monetary policy 
rules that have become standard tools in New Keynesian macroeconomics. Compared with 
other approaches such as Walsh (2002) or Taylor (2001) it deals explicitly with the central 
bank’s reaction to demand shocks and focuses on the concept of central bank credibility, 
which plays a pivotal role in the concept of inflation targeting. 
 
 
2.2.1 A Simplified Framework for Monetary Economics 
 
This section will present a model that develops the Romer (2000) approach into a simple, but 
at the same time comprehensive macroeconomic model. In spite of its simplicity it can carry 
the main insights of the New Keynesia n macroeconomics (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1999)) to an intermediate level and deal with issues such as inflation targeting, monetary 
policy rules, and central bank credibility. Compared to existing approaches (Walsh (2002) and 
Taylor (2001)) we offer an important contributions. Our approach has the advantage of 
modeling expectations in a more general way so that issues of credibility that play a pivotal 
role in inflation targeting can be addressed. In this respect, a main innovation of the model is 
that we integrate  the Barro and Gordon (1983) time inconsistency problem into our analysis. 
Finally, our model explicitly treats the reaction of monetary policy to demand shocks. This 
issue is crucial to an understanding of central banking but has been neglected, above all in the 
graphical analysis by Walsh (2002).  
 
 
2.2.1.1 Its Main Building Blocs 
 
The model consists of three building blocs: 
· An IS-equation 
· A Phillips curve, and 
· A monetary policy rule 
 
Let us postulate that the output gap y  depends on autonomous demand components a, the real 
interest rate r and a  demand shock e1: 
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 1y a br= - +e . (2.206) 
 
The output gap y is defined as the deviation of (the logarithm) of aggregate output from its 
potential, or full capacity level. This approach is very much in line with Romer (2000). It is 
clear from this equation that in the absence of shocks the output gap (which is zero then) 
depends on the real interest rate which is given by a / b . In accordance with Blinder (1998, 
p.31) this rate is called the  neutral real short-term interest rate ( 0r ). From a New Keynesian 
perspective the IS-curve depicts the optimal allocation of consumption of households in 
equilibrium over time. 
Second, let us postulate that the second building block can be simplified to the following 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve: 
 
 2
e d yp = p + + e . (2.207) 
 
The inflation rate is determined by expectations about inf lation pe, the output gap y , and a 
supply shock e2. The parameter d is nonzero and positive. For reasons of simplicity we 
assume in the most basic model that the central bank is credible, that is that private sector 
inflation expectations are identical with the central bank’s inflation target 0p . This 
automatically translates into 0
ep = p  so that the Phillips curve can be rewritten as: 
 
 0 2d yp = p + + e . (2.208) 
 
In a later section we discuss inflation expectations in a more general way. In particular we 
show that our approach of modeling the Phillips curve can be regarded as a special case of the 
New Keynesian perspective, in which expectations are formed rationally and the current 
inflation rate is related to the expected future inflation rate. Walsh (2002), by contrast, 
assumed that the private sector has adaptive expectations and he did not show under which 
condition inflation fluctuates on average around the central bank’s inflation target. As a third 
building bloc we specify the way according to which monetary policy is conducted. The 
strategy of inflation targeting can be derived as follows: 
 
            ( )2 20 yL y= p - p + l  with yl ³ 0.      (2.209) 
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Accordingly, the central bank aims at stabilizing squared deviations of the inflation rate from 
the inflation target while also being concerned with economic activity. 
Given the transmission structure of a change in the monetary policy stance, which runs from 
the real interest rate, optimal monetary policy can be derived logically best by applying the 
following two-step procedure. First insert the Phillips-curve (2.208) into the loss function 
(2.209) and second, we minimize the modified loss function with respect to y. The solution 
gives an optimal value for the output gap: 
 
             22
y
d
y
d
e
l
= -
+
.           (2.210) 
 
The result nicely shows the impact of varying degrees of preferences on output stabilization. 
If the central bank only cares on output economic activity will be totally stabilized in the 
limit: 
 
             lim 0
y
y
l ®¥
= .             (2.211) 
 
In the case of an inflation nutter supply shocks that hit the economy will be amplified by a 
factor of ( )1 d . 
 
             20
1
lim
y
y
dl
e
®
= - .      d<1,    (2.210) 
 
If we insert equation (2.210) into the Phillips curve (2.208) we can derive the following 
reduced form expression for the deviation of the inflation rate from the inflation target: 
 
             0 22
y
yd
l
p p e
l
- =
+
.          (2.212) 
 
Just as beforehand we can analyze equation (2.212) in the limit: 
 
             0 2lim
yl
p p e
®¥
= + .           (2.213) 
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It prevails that in the case of an output junkie supply shocks hit the economy undampend, 
whereas in the case of an inflation nutter (l=0) the effects of a supply shock on inflation will 
be totally undone by suitable monetary policy action: 
 
              00limyl
p p
®
= .           (2.214) 
 
Under a strategy of inflation targeting one way to conduct monetary policy is to follow an 
instrument rule (Svensson and Woodford (2003)). Such a rule makes the reaction of the 
instrument of monetary policy depend on all the information available at the time the 
instrument is set, that is the exoge nous variables 1e  and 2e  and the structure of the economy. 
In our framework, the instrument rule can be derived by inserting equation (2.210) into 
(2.206) and by solving the resulting expression for r: 
 
 ( )1 22
1opt
y
a d
r
b b b d
= + e + e
+ l
. (2.215) 
 
The rule shows the following characteristics: The optimal response to demand shocks 1e  does 
not depend on the central bank’s preferences yl . As the interest rate changes according to 
( ) 11 b e  the output gap remains zero, irrespective of the preference type. Thus, as long as 
demand shocks are part of the information set of the central bank they do not inflict any costs 
on society. The reaction of the central bank to supply shocks depends on preferences yl . A 
central bank that only cares about inflation (ly=0), requires a strong real rate response and, 
accordingly, a large output gap (see point A in Figure 8). With an increasing ly the real 
interest rate response declines (see point B in Figure 8). In equilibrium ( )1 2 0e = e =  the real 
interest rate will be given by the neutral real short-term interest rate 0 /r a b= . 
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2.2.1.2 The Model in Action 
 
The strategy of inflation targeting can also be presented with our graphical analysis (see 
Figure 8). The instrument rule enters as a horizontal line in the y-r space (marked by ( )1 2,r e e  
to highlight the shift parameters of the monetary policy line). As before, the AD-curve that 
could be derived from inserting the policy rule  (2.215) into the IS curve (2.206) would be a 
vertical line. The loss function of the central bank can be illustrated by circles around a bliss 
point in the y-p space. The bliss point that represents the first best outcome with a loss of zero 
is defined by an inflation rate p  equal to the inflation target p 0 and an output gap of zero. We 
can derive the geometric form of the circle by transforming the loss function (2.209) into: 
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Figure 8: Demand Shock under Inflation Targeting 
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where (0; p0) is the center of the circle and the radius is given by L . In the case of a demand 
shock we can see from Figure 8 that monetary policy is always able to maintain the bliss 
combination. In the case of a supply shock the loss function helps us to identify the optimum 
combination of p  and y.  Here the shifted Phillips curve serves as a constraint under which the 
radius of the circle has to be minimized. The optimum combination is graphically given by 
the locus on the Phillips curve ( 1 1;y p ) that is tangent to an isoquant of the loss function (see 
Figure 9). In order to attain this point the central bank will adjust its instrument so as to 
realize the optimum output gap 1y . An alternative view of inflation targeting is given by the 
so-called “targeting rule” of the central bank (Svensson and Woodford (2003)). Such a rule 
gives a high level specification of monetary policy that can be directly derived from the 
central bank’s strategy. Targeting rules are an important device to describe actual central 
banks as the institutional changes that took place during the last two decades aimed at 
committing central banks at the target level, that is specifying a concrete inflation target. 
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Figure 9: Supply Shock under Inflation Targeting 
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By eliminating the supply shock 2e  from equations (2.210) and (2.212) we arrive at the 
following consolidated first-order condition: 
 
 0
y y
d
l
p = p - . (2.217) 
 
In contrast to instrument rules, targeting rules are a linear relationship between endogenous  
target variables that will have to hold with equality if monetay policy is conducted optimally. 
By the very definition of a first -order condition this ensures that, for a given value of private 
sector expectations and thus for any given location of the Phillips curve, the loss function 
(2.207) is minimized.  
Graphically, the optimal outcome is thus described by the intersection of the  Phillips curve 
PC1 with the targeting rule of the central bank (see Figure 10). Equation (2.217) shows that an 
increasing ly (i.e., an increasing weight on output stabilization) leads to a steepening of the 
reaction function RF(ly). 
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Figure 10: Supply Shock and the Targeting Rule  
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2.2.2 Three Approaches for the Specification of Inflation      
   Expectations 
 
So far we modeled inflation expectations ep  in a very simple way. For a more general 
analysis we have to specify in detail how expectations may be formed. Thereby we can 
distinguish three cases: 
· adaptive expectations: ( )1e e -p = p p ; 
· rational expectations: ( )e E Ip = p , where I is defined as the private sector’s information 
set; 
· rational expectations and a credible central bank: 0
ep = p . 
Adaptive expectations are at the core of the model developed by Walsh (2002). He implicitly 
assumed that initially expectations are exogenously given. This can be seen in his graphical 
analysis (see Walsh (2002), Figure 1. p. 335) where he started with inflation expectations that 
are higher than the inflation target of the central bank. Although Walsh did not explain how 
these initial expectations are formed, his case can be translated into our framework as an 
unexpected shift of the Phillips curve to the left.  
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Figure 11: Adaptive Expectations and Stabilization Recessions 
 
The new equilibrium is the intersection of the reaction function RFrat with the unchanged 
Phillips curve. However with a negative output gap the Phillips curve which is the inflation 
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determining relationship tells us that the inflation will start to fall, so that in the next period 
1
ep p= . If expectations are purely autoregressive this process will continue until some 
periods later 0
ep p= . During the transition period the economy will go through a stabilization 
recession.  
In our view, it seems useful to endogenize expectations. In order to map the standard New 
Keynesian Phillips curve in which current inflation is determined by rational expectations 
about future economic conditions (Calvo (1983)) into a static framework, we have to impose 
that the disturbance term 2e  is purely white noise. Under this assumption the private sector 
expects inflation to return immediately to equilibrium in the period following a shock. And 
this equilibrium is exactly defined by the central bank’s inflation target, provided that the 
inflation target is credible. This proposition can be verified as follows: We assume that the 
central bank is guided by the loss function (2.209) and the structure of the economy is given 
by equations (2.206) and (2.208). Substituting the Phillips curve into the loss function and 
deriving the optimal output gap yields: 
 
 ( )0 22 2e
y y
d d
y
d d
= - p - p - e
+ l + l
. (2.218) 
 
Inserting equation (2.218) into the Phillips curve (2.208) we get the following optimal 
inflation rate for the  central bank as a function of private sector expectations: 
 
 ( )
2
0 22 2 2
y ye e
y y y
d
d d d
l l
p p = p + p + e
+l +l + l
. (2.219) 
 
At the beginning of a period private agents settle goods and labor market contracts. Therefore 
they have to build expectations on the inflation rate. We assume that the private sector is 
guided by the following loss function: 
 
 ( ){ }2e eL = p p - p . (2.220) 
 
The first-order condition of the private sector is given by: 
 
 ( )opt e ep p = p . (2.221) 
 72 
 
While forming its expectations, the private s ector takes the optimal inflation rate of the central 
bank, equation (2.219), into account. Accordingly it has to hold that: 
 
 
2
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y ye e
y y y
d
d d d
l l
p = p + p + e
+l + l + l
. (2.222) 
 
Solving for the private sector expectations yields: 
 
 0
ep = p , (2.223) 
 
because the current supply shock is not an element of the information set of the private sector. 
Thus, assuming that the private sector’s inflation expectations are identical with the central 
bank’s medium term inflation target is simply a special case of rational expectations. 
 
 
2.2.3 A Central Bank with an Inflation Bias 
 
The rational expectations solution also allows a discussion of a central bank with an inflation 
bias, which correspondingly suffers from low credibility (see Barro and Gordon 1983). For  
this purpose we have to modify the central bank’s loss function as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( )2 20 yL y k= p - p + l -  with k  > 0.  (2.224) 
 
By introducing the parameter k , the central bank targets an output gap that is above zero. This 
could be rationalized by monopolistic distortions in goods and labor markets that keep 
potential output below an efficient level. Compared with the loss function that we have used 
so far, the bliss point (k; p0) has moved to the right (see Figure 12). 
In line with Barro and Gordon (1983) the game between the private sector and the central 
bank can be modelled as follows. The private sector forms its inflation expectations, which 
enter in the contracts settled on the goods and labor market. Using these private sector 
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expectations the central bank chooses an inflation rate that minimizes its loss function so that 
we arrive at the following targeting rule: 
 
 y ye k y
d d
l l
p = p + - . (2.225) 
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Figure 12: Different Monetary Policy Outcomes  
 
In comparison to equation (2.217) the new reaction function of the central bank has shifted to 
the right because of the inflationary bias. If the private sector forms expectations rationally, it 
minimizes the following loss function:  
 
 ( ){ }2e eL = p p - p . (2.226) 
 
Accordingly, the private sector will take the first order condition of the central bank into 
account while building its expectations. Thus, our framework comes to the result that 
monetary cheating does not pay off as the economy will end up with no gains in output 
( 0raty = ) but higher rates of inflation ( 0
ratp > p ) (see point B in Figure 12). Compared to 
surprise inflation (point A with p  = ps and y = ys, which is based on a Phillips curve with 
pe = p0) this solution is clearly inferior because it leads to a higher inflation rate without a 
positive gain in output. The loss circle lies outside the circle attached to the solution with 
surpr ise inflation. Even if the central bank announces an inflation target, rational agents will 
 74 
realize that it has a strong incentive to renege on its announcement. In order to avoid the high 
social loss under discretion, a mechanism is required that credibly commits the central bank to 
the inflation target p0. 
Thus, our framework can be easily extended for an analysis of the issues that are related to the 
Barro and Gordon (1983) model. Although these results are well-known in literature, the 
model has the advantage that it provides a coherent framework for a discussion of monetary 
policy, which includes both traditional stabilization issues and the topics related to time 
inconsistency.  
 
 
2.2.4  The Dynamics of the Models: A Comparison 
 
In the previous section we have simply postulated a proximity between New Keynesian 
macroeconomics and the presented static three equation model. In this section we will justify 
this claim (Bofinger, Mayer, Wollmershäuser (2004)). The proximity of this simple reduced 
form New Keynesian macromodel and the standard New Keynesian macromodel can be 
explained by analyzing the impulse responses.  
The objective function of the central bank is an intertemporal loss function, summing up the 
expectations about discounted current and future deviations of inflation from target and output 
from potential: 
 
        ( ){ }2 2t t t 0 y t
0
L E y
¥
t
+ t +t
t=
= b p - p + lå .        (2.227) 
 
For the solution of the central bank’s dynamic optimization problem we adopted an approach 
which basically draws on Clarida et al. (1999) and Svensson (2003). The intertemporal loss 
function (2.226) is minimized subject to the Phillips curve equation. This leads to the 
following Lagrangian: 
 
    ( ) ( ){ }2 2, 0 , , , 1, ,0t t t y t t t t t t t t t tH y dyt t t t t t tt b p p l x p bp¥ + + + + + + += é ù= - + + - -ë ûå %  (2.228) 
 
where t , tx +t  denotes the t-period-ahead expectations of variable x, conditional on the central 
bank’s information in period t on the state of the economy and the transmission mechanism of 
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monetary policy (which is equal to t tE x +t ). The term in parentheses following the dynamic 
Lagrange multiplier ,t ttx +%  represents the central bank’s t-period-ahead forecast of the NKPC in 
period t. Differentiating with respect to t ,t+tp  and t ,ty +t  gives the two first-order conditions: 
 
           ( ), , 02t t t tt tx p p+ += - -%             (2.229) 
 
and 
 
             ,2 t tt
y
d
tlx +=% .            (2.230) 
 
A basic assumption underlying the first foc is that the central bank takes private sec tor 
expectations about next period inflation rate t 1,t+t+p  as given. The literature typically refers to 
this kind of procedure as discretionary optimization, in contrast to optimization under 
commitment. If a central bank credibly commits to a once-and-for -all policy rule, it 
internalizes the effects of its own interest rate decision on the expectations of the private 
sector. For 1t ³  the first foc would then be ( ) 1t ,t 0 t ,t t 1,t2 0t t t-+t + t + t -b p - p - b x - b bx = . Setting 0t =  
and eliminating the Lagrange multiplier leads to the consolidated first-order condition: 
 
             ( )0t t
y
d
y p p
l
= -            (2.231) 
 
Obviously the targeting rule of the central bank is identical to relationship (2.217). Henceforth 
optimal monetary policy is conducted in an identical fashion. Inserting (2.231) into NKPC 
yields the following forward-looking first-order difference equation  
 
          
2 2
1 0 2,
1y
t t t t
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= + + ,  
     (2.232) 
 
which can be solved using the MSV (minimum state variables) approach of McCallum 
(1983). The MSV-approach can be applied as follows. Note let us assume that the shock terms 
in the Phillips curve and the IS-equation can be specified as follows: 
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             1, 1 1, 1 1,ˆt t te r e e-= +            (2.233) 
 
and 
 
             2, 2 2, 1 2,ˆt t te r e e-= +           (2.234) 
 
In this system the minimal set of state variables includes only 2,te , so the solution will be of 
the form 
 
              2,t tp a be= +% %%            (2.235) 
 
Taking expectations of (2.235), 
 
             1 2 2,t t tEp a b r e+ = +% %% ,          (2.236) 
 
and inserting (2.236) into (2.232), and solving the resulting expression for tp  yields  
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Setting the first term in paranthesis equal to a  and the second term in paranthesis equal to b , 
and solving the resulting equations for a  and b , respectively, finally gives 
 
             
2
02
y y
d
d
a p
l bl
=
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and 
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The solution of (2.232) then is: 
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For d=1 the dynamics of the inflation rate can be simplified to: 
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Taking one-period-ahead expectations of (2.240) (and considering equation 2.234) gives: 
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Inserting (2.240) into the consolidated foc (2.231) yields the dynamic law of motion of the 
output gap: 
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Taking again one-period-ahead expectations of (2.243) (and considering equation (2.234)) 
gives: 
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With the dynamics of inflation and output at hand we can finally derive the optimal interest 
rate rule. Inserting (2.242), (2.243) and (2.244) into the IS-curve and solving the resulting 
expression for the monetary policy instrument ti  yields the following instrument rule: 
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 78 
If a central bank follows this rule : 
· it perfectly offsets demand shocks 1,te  as the interest rate impacts on the output gap 
with a factor b; 
· it faces a trade-off in the case of supply shocks 2,te  which crucially depends on the 
preferences of the central bank ly; 
· it keeps the nominal interest rate constant in the absence of shocks. 
A basic requirement for ensuring the long-run neutrality of money is that d  approaches unity. 
From a theoretical point of view setting b  equal to unity is somewhat problematic as d  
depicts the discount factor of a representative household that maximizes its utility. It can be 
shown that the neutral real interest rate 0r  is defined as ( )log- b . Thus, in order to avoid a 
value of 0r  equal to zero, b  must be below 1. 1 The discount factor b  also appears in the 
Phillips curve as profits of firms are assumed to be transferred to households so that they are 
discounted with b. From an empirical perspective the postulation that d  should be one is less 
problematic as estimated discount factors are typically not statistically different from one  
(Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)). In the case of 1b = , the long-run inflation rate and the 
long-run inflation expectations converge to the level of the inflation target ( t t t 1 0E +p = p = p ), 
the long-run output gap is zero ( ty 0= ), and the long-run nominal interest rate equals the sum 
of the equilibrium real interest rate and the inflation target ( t 0 0i r= + p ). Otherwise there will 
be a long-run trade-off between the level of the inflation target (which can be freely chosen by 
the central bank) and the level of the output gap. To see this assume that 1b = , meaning that 
the costs resulting from the anticipation of deviations of inflation from its target level and of 
output from potential are weighted more strongly as they occur earlier in time. Inflation will 
then be biased downwards ( t 0p < p ) at the expense of a positive output gap which crucially 
depends on the central bank’s choice of 0p : 
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The point that the long-run Phillips curve is steep and not vertical was also made – among 
others – by Woodford (1999, p. 32). The dynamics of the New -Keynesian model can be 
                                              
1 Quarterly models often assume d = 0.99 (0.995), so that r0 = 4.0  % (2.0 %). 
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simplified substantially, if we specify two of the model’s parameters appropriately. First, we 
set equal to one. This has the convenient effect that in the limit, after scaling the intertemporal 
loss function (2.227) by a factor of (1-b), the intertemporal loss approaches the weighted sum 
of the unconditional variances of inflation and the output gap (Svensson, 2003): 
 
          ( ) [ ] [ ]
1
lim 1 t t y tL Var Var yb b p l® - = + .       (2.247) 
 
By interpreting the intertemporal loss in terms of the variances of the goal variables, the 
optimality of an interest rate rule (such as (2.245)) can then be illustrated by the so-called 
efficiency frontier which depicts the second-order trade-off between the variances of inflation 
and output (Taylor, 1979). Hence although there is no trade off at the level of the variables, 
there is a trade-off in the second moments that is compatible with the same steady state 
solution. Second, we will gradually lower the autocorrelation of the supply shock   to zero. 
This exercise is most crucial for the purpose of the present Section as it turns out to be the 
exclusive source of dynamic movements in a simple New-Keynesian macromodel as 
originally proposed by Clarida , Gali and Gertler (1999). For 1b =  the dynamics of the 
inflation rate as expressed in equation (2.240) reduces to 
 
          0 2,2
2
y
t t
y yd
l
p p e
l l r
= +
+ -
.          (2.248) 
 
According to (2.244) deviations of the inflation rate from its target only occur in the event of 
supply shocks. The extent of the deviation crucially depends on the preference parameter of 
the central bank, and hence on the extent to which the central bank accommodates supply 
shocks. By additionally setting 2 0r =  equation (2.244) further reduces to 
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which is identical to equation (2.240) of the BMW model. The expected inflation rate for the 
next period which was given by equation (2.242) can also be substantially simplified after 
inserting 1b =  and 2 0r = : 
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             1 0t tE p p+ = .            (2.250) 
 
Equation (2.249) implies that in the long-run inflation is expected to be anchored by the 
central bank’s inflation target. Recall that this was a basic simplification for the formulation 
of the Phillips curve in the BMW model. In Section (2.2.2) we justified equation (2.250) by 
the assumption that the central bank’s monetary policy is credible and that the private sector 
therefore believes in the central bank’s commitment to the inflation target. Now we provide 
the analytical proof of this simplification which is valid in a macroeconomic environment in 
which the duration of shocks is limited to one period. If we set 1b = , the non-neutrality of 
money in equation (2.246) disappears and the dynamics of the output gap evolve according to: 
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As was the case with the inflation rate, deviations of output from potential only occur in 
response to supply shocks which are only partially compensated by the central bank. By 
setting ß=1 and 2 0r =  equation (2.251) can be further simplified to 
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which is then identical to the reduced form solution in the simplified framework. 
For 1b =  and 2 0r =  the optimal interest rate rule of the dynamic New-Keynesian model 
simplifies to 
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With the nominal interest rate being defined as t t t t 1i r E += + p  and with equation (2.242), the 
policy rule can be expressed in terms of the real interest rate 
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which is identical to the optimal policy rule (2.215) of the BMW model if the neutral real 
short-term interest rate 0r  equals a / b . 
The dependence of the dynamic behavior of the New-Keynesian model on the autocorrelation 
coefficient of the supply shock 2r  and its identity with the BMW model for 1b =  and 2 0r =  
can be illustrated by calculating and depicting the impulse response functions of the New-
Keynesian model. Figure 1 shows the responses of the nominal interest rate, the output gap 
and the inflation rate to a one standard deviation supply shock which hits the economy in 
period 1. For this simulation the model was calibrated as follows: b 0.4= , d 0.34= , 1l = , 
ß=1, 2,tVar 1é ùe =ë û , 0 2p = , and 0r 2= . The basic message of Figure 13 is that the lower 2r , 
the lower the persistence of the deviation of ti , ty , and tp  from their equilibrium levels 4 
( 0 0r= + p ), 0, and 2 ( 0= p ), respectively. For 2 0r = , the dynamics are reduced to a single 
peak in period 1 which is typical for a comparative static model since in the period directly 
following the shock (period 2) the model’s variables immediately return to their equilibrium 
values. 
While the comparative statics appear to be plausible at first sight, the high initial jump and the 
gradual return of the variables that follows the jump for 2 0r >  require a somewhat deeper 
look at the dynamics of the New-Keynesian model. To explain this we take the Phillips curve 
as an example. The NKPC not only produces a positive correlation between the level of 
inflation and real output, it also defines a negative correlation between the expected change in 
inflation and real output (for  ß=1). The dynamic implication of these opposite -signed 
correlations is that, in response to, say, a positive shock to inflation, the level of inflation will 
rise, while the change in inflation will always be negative. This can only occur if inflation 
jumps up immediately in response to the shock, and subsequently falls back to its 
equilibrium.2 
The fact that the presented simplified framework represents a special case of the New-
Keynesian model can also be demonstrated by computing the efficiency frontier. On the basis 
of equations (2.249) and (2.252) the variances of inflation and output can be calculated as: 
 
                                              
2 While the New Keynesian models is derived from sound economic principles, this dynamic implication is 
seriously at odds with the data. There is a host of empirical evidence suggesting that both inflation and output 
exhibit gradual and ‘humpshaped’ responses to real and monetary shocks, instead of the ‘jump’ behavior 
resulting from purely forward-looking model specifications (see e.g. Estrella and Fuhrer, 2002). 
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Figure 13: Responses to a Supply Shock 
 
Since 2,te  follows a first-order autoregressive process (see equation (2.234)), its variance can 
be expressed as: 
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The values of [ ]tVar y  and [ ]tVar p  that are associated with different values of l  are the 
plotted as the convex efficiency frontiers in Figure 2. At points on the frontiers, it is 
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impossible for the policymakers to reduce the variance of inflation without increasing the 
variance of the output gap, given that the central bank sets interest rates according to the 
optimum policy rule (2.254). Policymakers can, however, choose alternative points along the 
frontier by varying the relative weight l  that they put on output versus inflation stabilization. 
For the construction of the curves we increased the preference parameter l  from 0.01 (high 
preference for inflation stabilization; the lower right end of the frontier) to 10 (a high 
preference for output stabilization; the upper left end of the frontier) in steps of 0.01. With a 
falling 2r , both, 2,tVar é ùeë û  and the squared term in brackets in equations (2.255) and (2.256) 
will become smaller so that the efficiency frontier shifts towards the origin of the 
[ ] [ ]t tVar y Var- p  space. For 2 0r =  the efficiency frontier is identical across the models 
which underlines that the presented framework is appropriate.  
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Figure 14 : The Efficiency Frontier 
 
 
2.3  Concluding Remarks 
 
Within the next chapters we will apply a standard reduced form New Keynesian model to 
address a variety of questions linked to the interaction between varies economic agents. The 
purpose of this chapter was to underline that the popularity of the New Keynesian framework 
stems from its micro foundations. The individual reduced form equations mirror the 
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equilibrium behavior of interacting sectors in a highly stylized economy. We have shown that 
each sector can be described in a highly reduced form by a single equation. As a consequence 
the New Keynesian macromodel can be reduced to three main building blocs. Accordingly in 
the following chapters we will base our models on three equations grounded out of the 
dynamic general equilibrium framework of New Keynesian macroeconomics.  
Additionally the purpose of this paper was to demonstrate the proximity of the presented 
comparative -static framework to a standard dynamic New Keynesian macro model à la 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). The key to understand this proximity is to see that under 
discretion the first-order conditions of both models are identical. Therefore, we showed that 
when supply shocks converge from an first-order autoregressive process to a white noise 
process the ‘dynamics’ of the two models (as encapsulated in the consolidated first-order 
condition) become the same. To illustrate this point, we showed the convergence of the 
impulse response functions and the efficiency frontiers.  
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3  MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION IN  
  THE EURO AREA WITH DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS ON 
  THE PHILLIPS  CURVE 3§ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In this chapter we apply a static version of a New Keynesian macromodel which we have 
developed in section 2.2 to a monetary union potentially describing EMU. With the launch of 
the third stage EMU its member countries have delegated monetary policy to an independent 
central bank setting monetary conditions in line with the average macroeconomic 
environment in the union. The unique feature of a currency area is given by the fact that the 
different macroeconomic agents, the ECB, national governments and labour unions focus on 
different levels of target variables. The common central bank whose policy we assume to be 
conducted according to the notion of inflation targeting (Svensson (1999)) focuses on union 
wide aggregates. It sets its nominal interest rate for the currency area consistent with its 
inflation target while equally having a concern for economic activity. This means in particular 
that the interest rate policy of the ECB will be indifferent against mean preserving 
distributions of macroeconomic outcomes across member countries. In contrast national 
governments basically focus on national aggregates. This constellation calls for rules which 
balance the chances and perils that are nested in monetary and fiscal policy interaction with 
decentralised fiscal authorities (Aarle, Bartolomeo, Engwerda and Plasmans (2002)). On the 
one hand unsustainable national policies, e.g. non anticipated fiscal expansions that are not 
consistent with the inflation target of the ECB, lead to prolonged business cycles with a boom 
in the home country and negative spill over effects for the rest of the union. On the other hand 
fiscal policy serves as a buffer to prevent idiosyncratic shocks from spreading to other 
member countries. Therefore a monetary union calls for a renaissance of fiscal stabilisation 
policy and stringent rules at the same time. As consequence the Maastricht Treaty which led 
to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) superimposed some broad guidelines on fiscal policy 
such as the 3% deficit criterion (Bofinger (2003)). Among the rich universe of aspects we 
analyse in particular whether fiscal policy should actively engage in stabilising business 
cycles or whether the fiscal stance should be state independently neutral. Our analysis will in 
                                              
3§ This chapter benefited from presentation in Dresden (Annual Meeting of the German Economic Association (2004) and 
Göttingen (6th Göttingen Workshop on International Economic Relations). For valuable comments the author would like to 
thank in particular Michael Carlberg (Helmut Schmidt Universität Hamburg) and Timo Wollmershäuser (ifo -  Institute for 
Economic Research) . 
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particular focus on the sustainability of fiscal policy and provide a rationale for the 3% deficit 
criterion as well as for its suspension. 
There is a large body of related literature that analysis welfare under various assumptions on 
the conduct of monetary policy. The literature related to Barro and Gordon (1983) shows that 
monetary policy should be committed or delegated to a conservative central banker to limit 
the detrimental effects associated to the time consistency issue. As noted by Dixit and 
Lambertini (2003) this literature neglects to analyze these topics in the face of a second 
stabilization agent in the form of fiscal policy. Dixit and Lambertini ((2001), (2003)) analyze 
fiscal and monetary policy interaction in a closed economy and a monetary union, under the 
most general scenario when monetary and fiscal policy has different target values for output 
and inflation. They show that the Nash equilibrium is dominated by fiscal or monetary 
leadership. Otherwise prices will be inefficiently high and output inefficiently low. A joint 
commitment is the best solution whereas fiscal discretion has the potential to evaporate the 
advantages of monetary commitment. Unfortunately Dixit and Lambertini entirely focus on 
the issue of time consistency. Thereby they neglect to analyze the beneficial impact of 
stabilization policy if the union is hit by symmetric or asymmetric shocks. To that extend we 
extend Dixits and Lambertinis joint commitment solution to the case where the common 
monetary union is hit by symmetric or asymmetric supply and demand shocks. Throughout 
the paper we will focus in particular on two aspects. First we will show that life in a monetary 
union is easier if the law of one price holds. If product markets are highly integrated the 
currency area as a whole shares one common real interest rate ( )i p-  which prevents that a 
wedge can be driven between macroeconomic outcomes in the vague of demand shocks. 
Second, we will analyse a scenario when all countries only produce non-tradables. Such a 
setting implies the existence of national inflation rates ip  which translate into national real 
interest rates ( )ii p-  that amplify shocks. 
In line with Dornbusch (1997), we can show that restrictions on the fiscal instrument might be 
harmful under such a setting (see also Chari and Kehoe (1998)), (Beetsma, Favero and 
Missale (2004)). In total we analyze sixteen different scenarios within this chapter  
conditioned on an active versus passive fiscal stance and on synchronized versus non-
synchronized supply and demand shocks (See Figure 15). In order to crosscheck the 
robustness of our results we have additionally computed the model under different 
assumptions on the way expectations are formed and under different assumptions on the way 
fiscal policy is conducted (Appendix 3. A and 3. B ). 
 87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Analysed Scenarios  
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3.1  Monetary Policy with a Passive Fiscal Policy 
 
In this section we assume that monetary policy is the only macroeconomic player in a 
monetary union, i.e. national fiscal policies remain completely passive. This means in 
particular that only the central bank will respond with its instrument –the nominal interest 
rate- to shocks in order to stabilize economic activity. 
We assume that monetary policy is guided by a loss function that we have derived and 
introduced in section 2.1.3.2. The objective function of the central bank is given by: 
 
 ( )2 20ECB yL yp p l= - + . (3.1) 
 
The ECB tries to stabilise squared deviations of the inflation rate and the output gap from 
their target values respectively. The preference parameter yl  depicts the weight monetary 
policy attaches to stabilise the output gap versus stabilising the inflation rate.  
Hence it is the task of the common central bank to set the interest rate in response to 
exogenous disturbances and consistent with the structural equations of the model so that the 
loss function LECB is minimised. Note that the ECB only targets at euro wide averages, 
whereas it does not take care of the dispersion of  goal variables across countries. In other 
words the ECB does not consider the spread as a problem as long as it is mean preserving. 
This means for example that the ECB is indifferent between the following two 
macroeconomic outcomes as depicted in Figure 16. This convention established in literature 
(linear quadratic loss function in inflation and output) is to our understanding somewhat 
inconvenient. Nevertheless throughout the exposition we take it as granted that conventional 
wisdom says that the ECB should only take care of euro wide averages of the inflation rate 
and the output gap.  
 
y1=y2=0 -y1=y2>0-y2=y1<0  
Figure 16: Mean Preserving Distribution of Macroeconomic Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 89 
3.1.1  The Law of One Price Holds 
 
Let us assume that in a monetary union only tradables are produced. Since we abstract from 
trade barriers or any other country specific features such as inhomogeneous preferences the 
law of one price will hold. Technically speaking this assumption means in particular that the 
currency area is only hit by a common supply shock. Additionally we reintroduce a common 
real interest rate ( )i p-  for the whole area. Relying on these assumptions one can derive the 
common Phillips curve as follows. Each period a ll firms negotiate new wage contracts for one 
period. Workers are assumed to care about the current state of economic activity y as well as 
on the expected inflation rate ep  over the life of the contract. For the sake of simplicity we 
assume that monetary policy is credible ( e 0p = p ). The nominal change in wages is then given 
by: 
 
 0w dypD = + . (3.2) 
 
As firms are assumed to be monopolistic competitors which price their output at a constant 
markup over marginal costs, markup pricing translates wage inflation into price inflation: 
 
 wp m= D + . (3.3) 
 
Let us assume that the mark-up factor is equal to zero ( m =0). By inserting equation (3.2) into 
equation (3.3) we get a static version of a Phillips curve: 
 
 0 2dyp p e= + + . (3.4) 
 
Obviously as monetary conditions measured in real terms ( )r i p= -  are identical for all 
member countries i, we can specify the aggregate demand relationship for country i as 
follows: 
 
 ( ) ,1i iy a b i p e= - - + . (3.5) 
 
Given this description of the economy the ECB solves the following optimisation problem. 
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 ( )2 20ECB yL yp p l= - +  (3.6) 
 
      s.t.:   ( ) 1y a b i p e= - - + 4 
          0 2dyp p e= + + . 
 
Inserting the Phillips curve into the loss function and solving the optimisation problem the 
output gap on average will be given by: 
 
 22
y
d
y
d
e
l
= -
+
. (3.7) 
 
Inserting (3.7) into the Phillips curve we see that the euro wide inflation rate will only depend 
on supply shocks: 
 
 0 22
y
yd
l
p p e
l
= +
+
. (3.8) 
 
The ECB can protect the union on average from demand shocks. Nevertheless across 
countries as we will see there can be a great dispersion in output, even if the law of one price 
holds. Inserting the reduced form expressions for the inflation rate and the output gap into the 
aggregate demand relationship yields the following reduced form for the interest rate: 
 
 
( )
( )0 1 22
1 y
y
d ba
i
b b b d
l
p e e
l
+
= + + +
+
. (3.9) 
 
Equation (3.9) nicely depicts that the reaction to demand shocks is not preference dependent 
whereas the reaction to supply shocks depends on preferences. With an increasing concern for 
output stabilisation (increasing l) the coefficient ( ) ( )( )( )2y yd b b dl l+ +  will converge to 
one, which reflects that the Taylor Principle also holds for the “output junkie”. Inserting the 
                                              
4 Note that the ECB solves its optimization problem subject to the average IS-curve and the average Phillips 
curve. Assuming that the different member states share an identical economic structure you can easily retrieve 
the average structural relationship by computing ( ) 11
n
ii
y n y
=
= å  and ( )11 n iia b n yp == + å  respectively. 
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inflation rate and the interest rate rule (3.9) into the national aggregate demand equation (3.5) 
one can easily determine the output gap for country i as follows: 
 
 ( ),1 1 22i i
y
dy
d
e e e
l
= - -
+
. (3.10) 
 
Equation (3.10) displays the key difference between a closed economy like the US and a 
monetary union like EMU. Even if the average output gap is equal to zero, this can go hand in 
hand with dispersion in national aggregates. Obviously non-synchronised demand shocks 
( ),1 1; 1icorr e e ¹  can drive a wedge between country specific output gaps. This can in the long 
run undermine the very existence of a union as each country would need notably different 
monetary conditions which is of course impossible by the very definition of a monetary union 
itself (see also Uhlig (2002)). To clarify this statement let us make the assumption of 
uncorrelated shocks ( ),1 1; 0icorr e e =  and equally sized countries. What happens if only 
country i is hit by a shock at time t? To illustrate this case let us assume that the GDP share of 
country i is a and 2 0e = . Then we can rewrite the aggregate demand shock as the following 
weighted average: 
 
 ( )1 ,1 ,11i ie ae a e-= + - . (3.11) 
 
Since shocks are uncorrelated ( ),1 ,1, 0i icorr e e - =  by assumption it holds that: 
 
 1 ,1ie ae= . (3.12) 
 
Inserting equation (3.12) into (3.10), we see that output in country i will be given by 
 
 ( ),1 ,11i iy a e= - , (3.13) 
 
whereas output in the rest of the union is equal to: 
 
 ,1 ,1i iy ae- = - . (3.14) 
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Equations (3.13) and (3.14) depict potential conflicts which might prevail in a monetary 
union. As a consequence of the shock originating in country i, output will be above its 
potential whereas the rest of the union suffers from a somewhat depressed economic activity. 
Obviously equation (3.13) shows that asymmetric shocks are a major problem for small 
countries participating in a union as the real interest rate set by the ECB is not coined for a 
country with a low GDP weight unless ( ; ) 1i icorr e e - = . In the limit , when the GDP share of 
an individual member country is almost zero, the shock will be passed through completely on 
the output gap if fiscal policy remains passive. Therefore as we will see in section (3.2) fiscal 
policy is in particular needed in small countries to squeeze the impact of shocks on the output 
gap and the inflation rate.  
We can equally retrieve these results with the help of a graphical analysis (see Figure 16 ). 
Country i is hit by a demand shock and accordingly the aggregate demand curve shifts from 
0 ( )
dy r  to 1 ( )
dy r . As we assume that fiscal policy remains completely passive over the cycle 
only the ECB reacts to the extend that the shock influences the global output gap. The 
demand shock in country i translates into a shift of the European demand curve from 0 ( )
dy r  to 
1 ( )
dy r  of size ( ) 1,1 in e . The ECB will tighten real interest rate conditions from 0r  to 1r  in 
order to stabilise economic activity on average. Nevertheless, as Figure 26 shows this 
stabilisation on the aggregate goes hand in hand with a dispersion of output across member 
states. Real interest rates for country i will be too loose giving a boost to economic activity, 
output will be above its potential (yi>0) whereas real interest rates for the rest will be too high 
resulting in a somewhat depressed economic environment( )0iy- < . 
For symmetric shocks one can make use of the graphs developed in Bofinger, Mayer and 
Wollmershäuser (2005). Table 1 summarizes the net reaction of all variables under 
consideration to a positive shock. 
 
 93 
5,5
y
r
2
4
6
8
-2 0 2y( i)i 0
d
5,5
Country i
y(i)i 1
d
2
4
6
8
-2 0 2
y(i)i 0
d
-1
5,5
Country j
r
y
2
4
6
8
-2 0 2y(i)i 0
d
Euro Area
y( i)i 1
d
i
y
 
Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. For 
the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 and 
d=0.34.  
Figure 17: Uncorrelated Demand Shock in Country i: 1, 3ie =   
 
 *1 0e >  ,1 0ie >  2 0e >  
Output gap (yi) *¯  ­  ¯  
Inflation Rate (pi) / / ­  
Interest Rate (i) ­  ­  ­  
Aggregate Output (y)  / / ¯  
Aggregate Inflation (p ) / / ­  
* Throughout the exposition we assumed that the correlation of shocks is ( )1, 1; 0ir e e =  
Table 1: Net Change of a Variable to a Positive Shock 
 
 
3.1.2  Idiosyncratic Phillips Curves 
 
Let us now assume that the country specific output is not tradable. Accordingly the law of one 
price can be violated and each member state will be characterized by an idiosyncratic Phillips 
curve. Nevertheless as we take idiosyncratic supply shocks to be iid distributed with mean 
zero and a constant variance the conditional as well as the unconditional expectations of the 
inflation rate of the individual member states are identical. Given this assumption our set of 
equations can be stated as follows: 
 
 0 ,2i i idyp p e= + +  (3.15) 
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 ,1( )i i iy a b i p e= - - + . (3.16) 
 
Assuming that the ECB only targets at averages its optimization problem remains unaltered. 
In other words the aggregate values for the output gap and the inflation gap are identical to 
the previous scenario on average. Following this line of argumentation we can state in 
particular that the nominal euro wide interest rate is still given by: 
 
 
( )
( )0 1 22
1 y
y
d ba
i
b b b d
l
p e e
l
+
= + + +
+
. (3.17) 
 
The output gap of country i is now given by (3.18):  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ),1 1 2, 22
1 1
1 1
y
i i i
y
d b
y b
db bd d
l
e e e e
l
é ù+
ê ú= - + -
- - +ê úë û
. (3.18) 
 
Equation (3.18) shows that an uncorrelated demand shock ( ),1 1; 1icorr e e ¹  can drive a wedge 
between national cycles. Additionally the dispersion across national outputs is amplified by a 
factor of ( )( )1 1 bd-  compared to a scenario where the law of one price holds (see (3.16)). As 
we will see below this can be explained by diverging real interest rate conditions ( )ii p-  
across member states. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly equation (3.16) shows that supply 
shocks originating in country i can give a boost to domestic economic activity whereas union 
wide supply shocks depress economic activity. The argument goes as follows: A supply shock 
in country i (e.g., excessive wage demands) gives a push to inflation pi that lowers its real 
interest rate ( )ii p- . This calls the ECB upon to act only insofar as the European inflation 
rate raises. Therefore, the expansionary impact of declining real interest rates in country i is 
not totally undone by subsequent raising nominal interest rates so that output will increase. 
Thus the ECB can not punish individual member states by rising average real rates which 
clearly shows that stringent rules for labour unions as well as for national governments are a 
prerequisite for a well functioning monetary union, to prevent free rider behaviour and 
negative spill over effects for other member states. The inflation rate of country i is given by 
the following equation: 
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 ( ) ( )0 1, 1 2, 2211 1
y
i i i
y
d d bd
bd db d
l
p p e e e e
l
é ù+
= + - + -ê ú
- - +ê úë û
. (3.19) 
 
The individual inflation rates in a monetary union- in sharp contrast to a closed economy- 
depend on demand shocks. Although the ECB will meet its inflation target on average this can 
go hand in hand with a significant dispersion in inflation rates across countries. In the case of 
symmetric supply shocks 2, 2ie e=  the inflation rate will again be described by equation (3.8). 
To further illustrate the results let us analyze again the case of uncorrelated demand shocks. 
The real interest rate is given by: ir i p= - . Making use of the reduced form of the inflation 
rate and the nominal interest rate in country i we can compute real interest rate conditions for 
country i as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ,11i i i
a bd
r i
b b db
a
p e
-
= - = +
-
. (3.20) 
 
Monetary conditions for the rest of the union are given by 
 
 
( ) ,1
1
1i i
a
r
b b bd
e- = + -
. (3.21) 
 
which translates into the following inflation rates: 
 
 ( )0 1,11i i
d
db
p p a e= + -
-
 (3.22) 
 
 ( )0 1,1i i
d
db
p p ae- = + --
. (3.23) 
 
With equations (3.22) and (3.23) at hand we can easily compute the corresponding output 
gaps: 
 
 ( ) ,1
1
1
1i i
y
bd
a e= -
-
 (3.24) 
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 ,11i i
y
bd
a e-
-=
-
. (3.25) 
 
This set of equations depicts that if country i is hit by an uncorrelated shock and the ECB only 
cares on averages, then national outcomes may greatly diverge. Additionally compared to a 
scenario where the law of one price holds the degree of dispersion in output is amplified by a 
factor of ( )1 1 bd-  as a consequence of diverging real interest rates across countries. Hence 
the previous two sections underline that from the perspective of monetary policy a higher 
degree of integration in product markets is favourable as the central bank can influence more 
directly the real interest rate in each country.  
In a scenario without fiscal policy it essentially depends on the size of the individual member 
country whether idiosyncratic shocks will be stabilizing or destabilizing. According to the 
Taylor Principle uncorrelated demand shocks will be destabilizing if real interest rates 
( )ii p-  will not be raised. This will only be the case if (see (3.20)): 
 
 0bd bda a- < Þ < . (3.26) 
 
Given our baseline calibration (b=0.4 and d=0.34) equation (3.26) indicates that idiosyncratic 
shocks will be destabilizing if the GDP share of the individual country under consideration is 
smaller than approximately 14%. An intuition for this result is easy to find. As the ECB is the 
only macroeconomic agent that stabilises shocks, it only reacts to euro wide averages. The 
smaller the individual country in size the smaller the impact of an idiosyncratic shock on the 
currency area and hence the smaller the reaction of the ECB to this idiosyncratic shock. This 
underlines that by far most countries in EMU need fiscal policy as an independe nt institution 
in order to deal with asymmetric shocks (APPENDIX 3. C.). Some further intuition to these 
results can be given by taking a look at Figure 18 and Figure 19. Figure 18 depicts a scenario 
where country i is hit by a demand shock of size 1, 3ie = . This translates into a shift of the 
aggregate demand curve from 0 ( )
dy i  to 1 ( )
dy i . In response to the boom in economic activity 
the ECB raises real interest rates from i0 to i1 inducing a change in economic activity that 
exactly compensates the impact of the initial demand shock on the euro wide economic 
activity. Hence we arrive at the result that demand shocks can be totally stabilised for the 
currency are on average. Nevertheless this goes hand in hand with a dispersion at the national 
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level. The increase in nominal rates leads to a decreased economic activity in the rest of the 
union. As the inflation rate is a shift parameter in the (i;y) -space the aggregate demand curve 
is shifted inwards in the rest of the union. In country i the boom in economic activity leads to 
an additional outward shift in aggregate demand. As we already indicated the size of shifts 
critically depends on the GDP share of country i.  
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* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
Figure 18: Idiosyncratic Demand Shock in Country i: 1, 3ie =  
 
Figure 19 depicts a currency area where country i is hit by a supply shock of size 2, 3ie = . 
This translates into a shift of the aggregate inflation rate by a factor of ( )2 2,ie ae= . 
Depending on preferences the ECB chooses its preferred stabilisation mix on the aggregate 
level by setting nominal rates in line with its preferences. This increase in euro wide nominal 
rates partially stabilises the inflation rate in country i. The rest of the union suffers from a 
deflationary environment. Table  13 underlines that national real interest rates – if existent- can 
drive a massive wedge between national outcomes and call for stringent rules that prevent 
unsustainable policies in individual member states which inflict negative spill over effects for 
the rest of the union. Additionally the figures display that we need fiscal policy as an 
additional macroeconomic agent in order to squeeze idiosyncratic shocks. The impact of the 
negative spill-over effect depends again on the GDP share of country i.   
Table 2 summarises the reaction of the variables under consideration to positive shocks. 
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* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
Figure 19: Idiosyncratic Supply Shock in Country i: 2, 3ie =  
 
 
,1 0ie- >  ,1 0ie >  2 0e >  2, 0ie ³  
Output gap (yi) *¯  *­  *¯  ­  
Inflation Rate (pi) *¯  *­  ­  *­  
Interest Rate (i) ­  / ­  / 
Aggregate Output (y)  / *­  ¯  / 
Aggregate Inflation (p ) / *¯  ­  / 
*Note that we implicitly assume that idiosyncratic demand and supply shocks are uncorrelated. 
 
Table 2: Net Change of a Variable to a Positive Shock 
 
 
Equation Section 3 
3.1.3  Idiosyncratic Phillips Curves and TOT Effects in the IS-   
   Equation 
 
As in section 2.2 we assume that the PPP does not hold in the short run. Accordingly given 
the definition of the real exchange rate 
 
i iq s p p-D = D + - ,           (3.27) 
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it holds that the change in intra-European competitiveness is equal to the difference in the 
national inflation rates. The inflation rate of country i is governed by the following Phillips 
curve: 
 
0 ,2i i idyp p e= + + .           (3.28) 
 
Taking care of these terms of trade effects (TOT) the IS-equation of country i can be written 
as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ,1i i i i i iy a b i cp p p e-= - - + - + ,       (3.29) 
 
where ci denotes the real exchange rate elasticity of aggregate demand. Accordingly the 
impact of domestic inflation on output is somewhat different compared to the previous 
scenario as an increase in the inflation rate triggers two effects which are simultaneously at 
work. On the one hand an increase in the inflation rate lowers ceteris paribus in a first round 
effect the real interest rate ( )ii p-  which gives a boost to economic activity. On the other 
hand an increase in the inflation rate decreases the competitiveness so that foreign demand for 
domestically produced goods is somewhat depressed. As the euro-area is modeled as closed 
economy, it has to hold for reasons of model consistency that: 
 
( )1i iy y ya a -+ - = .          (3.30) 
 
It can be shown that a necessary and sufficient condition for this equation to be valid is: 
 
( )(1 )i ic ca a -= - .          (3.31) 
 
As the resulting reduced forms are somewhat lengthy we only present numerical results in this 
section. Throughout this section we calibrate ic-  equal to 0.02ic- =  and a  equal to ( )1 3a = . 
Therefore the small bloc of the union can be labeled as Germany as its GDP-weight is 
approximately one third of the currency area and 0.04ic =  is in line with estimates as 
provided by Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) for large open economies.  
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As the euro-area in total is modeled as a closed economy the aggregate demand side can be 
stated as: 
 
1( )y a b i p e= - - + .          (3.32) 
 
The ECB still solves the same optimization problem which is given by: 
 
( )2 20ECB yL yp p l= - +          (3.33) 
 
s.t.:  1
0 2
( )y a b i
dy
p e
p p e
= - - +
= + +
, 
 
so that the instrument is set according to the following reaction function: 
 
( )
( )0 1 22
1 y
y
d ba
i
b b b d
l
p e e
l
+
= + + +
+
.        (3.34) 
 
Given this set up we can easily retrieve the reduced forms as follows. Inserting the 
idiosyncratic Phillips curves and the interest rate equation into the IS-equation we can 
compute the reduced form for the output gaps. Having these at hand and inserting them in the 
Phillips curves we can then compute the idiosyncratic inflation rates. In the following we will 
analyze what happens if country i is hit by an idiosyncratic demand shock ,1 ,1( , ) 0i icorr e e- = . 
To illustrate this scenario we assume that the GDP share a of country i is one third of the 
currency area and that the currency area is not hit by a supply shocks ( 2 0e = ). Accordingly it 
holds that: 
 
 1 ,1ie ae= .             (3.35) 
 
Table 3.C.1 depicts the scenario when country i is hit by a demand shock of size ,1 3ie = . As 
we have attached a weight of 0.33a =  to country i, this translates into an initial increase of 
1% of the European inflation rate. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the scenarios beforehand 
the ECB is able to set real interest rate conditions for the currency area in such a way that it 
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hits its targets on average. This goes hand in hand with a dispersion on the national level. As 
we have seen before, real interest rates are too expansionary to stop the economic boom in 
country i and too restrictive for the rest of the union which translates into the observed 
dispersion in economic conditions. Given the weights we have chosen the results depict the 
macroeconomic outcomes for an economy like Germany. Note in particular that the effects 
triggered by decreasing competitiveness are much too weak to undo the effects triggered by 
real interest rates.  
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* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
Figure 20: Idiosyncratic Demand Shock in Country i 
 
To generalize the derived results we will evaluate the baseline to an arbitrary country size a. 
Note that the graph depicts the output gaps iy  and iy-  and the inflation rates ip  and ip -  of 
the two blocs of the currency area under consideration. The graph nicely depicts the following 
results: For the case of a supply shock the ECB is always able to maintain its bliss point for 
the currency area on average. Nevertheless the dispersion of macroeconomic outcomes across 
the currency area is strongly governe d by the size of the country which was hit by the 
asymmetric shock. The ECB will increase interest rates by 
 
0 ,1
1
i
a
i
b b
p e
a
= + + ,          (3.36) 
 
in response to the demand shock in country i which has a GDP-weight of a. Obviously real 
interest rates will be too loose for that economy and too restrictive for the rest of the union.  
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Figure 21: Reaction of the Output Gap and Inflation Rate as a Function of the Country Size: 
     Demand Shock 
 
If the economy that was hit by the shock becomes larger, the ECB reacts stronger which 
creates more turbulence in the rest of the union. The created mismatch in monetary conditions 
triggers a deeper recession in the rest of the union. The nominal interest rate reaction to a 
demand shock monotonically increases with respect to the size of country a. Figure 22 shows 
a scenario when the currency area is hit by a supply shock of size ,2 3ie = .  
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* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
Figure 22: Idiosyncratic Supply Shock in Country i: ,2 3ie =  
Depending on its preferences the ECB will choose its preferred stabilization mix on the 
aggregate level by setting the nominal interest rate conditions in line with its preferences. This 
a a 
a 
-
-
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induces a macroeconomic dispersion which only partially stabilizes the economic boom in 
country i whereas the rest of the union suffers from a mild depression. Compared to a 
scenario where the TOT effects are not operating the dispersion is somewhat dampened as the 
country that booms looses competitiveness so that the increase in economic activity is less 
pronounced. Nevertheless for a country of the size of Germany the real interest rate effect 
clearly has the potential to dominate the TOT effect (see Figure 22). 
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 Figure 23: Sensitivity of the Output Gap and Inflation Rate as a Function of the Country  
    Size: Supply Shock 
 
Hence our analysis gives support to the result that an idiosyncratic supply shock in country i 
may give a boost to economic activity. We claim that this is an important contribution to 
literature that seems largely neglected in related studies. 
 
 
3.2  Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction 
 
In the previous section we modeled a monetary union when monetary policy is the only 
macro economic agent that actively stabilizes shocks. We basically saw for two possible 
specifications of a Phillips curve that life in a monetary union is easier if shocks are correlated 
and product markets are integrated. In this section we introduce a fiscal authority in each 
member state that is guided by a loss function and which has g, the fiscal stance parameter as 
a 
 
 
 
-
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its only instrument. The stance of fiscal policy is defined as expenditures minus revenues. 
Hence if g>0 the fiscal stance is expansionary if g<0 the fiscal stance is contractionary.  
 
 
3.2.1  The Loss Function of Fiscal Authorities 
 
We assume that national fiscal authorities are guided by a loss function.  
 
 2 2,G i i iL y gj= + .5 (3.37) 
 
Each government is interested in stabilising output around its potential. The second term in 
the loss function captures the notion that governments behaviour might be motivated for 
instance by the Treaty of Maastricht that penalises excessive (downward) movements in the 
fiscal stance parameter g. Additionally if g would be permanently larger than null the solution 
would exhibit an unpleasant debt arithmetic’s as the fiscal balance exhibits a structural 
deficit 6. The parameter j  scales the costs of using the fiscal policy instrument. 
As a specific characteristic of a monetary union the common central bank targets at union 
wide aggregates whereas the individual governments focus on national aggregates. This set-
up nests possible conflicts as the ECB can only on average meet its targets which is likely to 
go hand in hand, depending on the correlation of country specific shocks, with a dispersion in 
the individual target variables under consideration in each member state. The question we will 
answer now is to what extend fiscal policy can prevent national outcomes from diverging 
across the currency area7. Hence we will look to what extend national fiscal policies can 
mitigate asymmetric shocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
5 Note that we implicitly assume that both macroeconomic agents have an identical output target. For diverging 
targets see (Dixit and Lambertini (2001)). 
6 For a paper that focuses more strongly on the political interaction between the national governments and a 
common central bank see (Demertzis (1999)). 
7 For a focus on automatic stabilizers see Gali and Perotti 2003.  
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3.2.2  The Law of one Price Holds 
 
Let us assume that the law of one price holds. Then the Phillips curve for all countries is 
given by: 
 
 0 2dyp p e= + + . (3.38) 
 
Hence the commodity bundles produced in each country are perfect substitutes with a 
common inflation rate p. The currency union has only one common real interest rate 
r i p= - . Additionally the union is hit only by a common supply shock. The second building 
bloc of the model is the IS-equation: 
 
 ( ) ,1i i iy a b i gp k e= - - + + . (3.39) 
 
Aggregate demand now also depends on the fiscal stance parameter. We assume that g=gopt .  
Hence g is set in order to minimise the loss function of fiscal policy. Given the structure of 
the economy the ECB solves the following optimisation problem: 
 
 ( )2 20CB yL yp p l= - +  (3.40) 
s.t. 
 ( ) 1y a b i gp k e= - - + +  (3.41) 
 0 2dyp p e= + + . (3.42) 
 
Depending on the structural parameters of the economy and its preferences the ECB chooses 
the following stabilisation mix: 
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+
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Equations (3.43) and (3.44) underline that the ECB is the dominating actor of the game as it 
can push its preferred bliss point through. In other words it can always completely offset the 
effects of fiscal policy on average. The infla tion and output gap are identical to those we 
already saw for the scenario without fiscal policies. The reaction function of the central bank 
is given by: 
 
 ( )0 1 22
1 y
y
b dai g
b b bb d
l kp e e
l
+
= + + + +
+
. (3.45) 
 
The reaction function specifies the optimal nominal interest rate if governments of the 
individual member states play 
1
1 n
i
i
g g
n =
æ ö=ç ÷
è ø
å  on average. It depicts the optimal response of 
the central bank to the average current stance of fiscal policy across the currency area. 
Equation (3.45) is characterised by the following features: In the absence of macroeconomic 
shocks 1 2 0e = e =  the ECB will set interest rates equal to their long run equilibrium value 
( ) 0i a b= + p  which corresponds to a union wide output gap of null and an inflation rate that 
is equal to the inflation target. The global response to demand shocks in a union compared to 
a scenario of a closed economy is on average unaltered and given by: ( ) 1i 1 bD = e . Again the 
response to supply shocks depends on preferences. 
Fiscal authorities in each member state solve the following optimisation problem8: 
 
 2 2,G i i iL y gj= +  (3.46) 
s.t.: 
 s.t.: ( ) ,1i i iy a b i gp k e= - - + + .9 (3.47) 
 
Solving this optimisation problem we arrive at the following relationship depicting the way 
according to which fiscal policy is conducted: 
 
 ( ) ,12 2 2i i
a bg ik k kp e
k j k j k j
-= + - -
+ + +
. (3.48) 
                                              
8 Note that we do not intend to model alliances between individual member states (see Aarle, Bas van, 
Bartolomeo Giovanni. Di, Engwerda Jacob, Plasmans, Joseph (2005) ). 
9 For an analysis that includes the real exchange rate in the strategic analysis between the central bank and the 
government see  Leitemo (2003). 
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It depicts the optimal reaction of the government to the current stance of monetary policy. The 
equation is characterised by the following features: The partial derivative of g with respect to 
r is ( ) ( )( )2g r b 0¶ ¶ = k k +j > . Hence if monetary policy gets more restrictive the 
government will switch to a more expansionary stance. The higher the weight on stabilising 
its instrument j , the lower will be the strategic interaction between the two macroeconomic 
agents. Following e.g. a negative demand shock e 1 fiscal policy will become more 
expansionary.  Note that in contrast to monetary policy the government does not face a lower 
bound. Hence g can become negative (g<0). The strategic interaction between fiscal and 
monetary authorities results from the fact that the ECB responds to union-wide averages: 
 
 ( )1 ,1 ,11i ie ae a e-= + - . (3.49) 
 
Hence if only country i is hit by a demand shock, this triggers a feedback mechanism as all 
member countries have to share the adjustment burden of higher interest rates. The extend of 
the strategic feedback depends on the GDP share a  of country i. Nevertheless to simplify the 
exposition we will assume symmetry in the following. 
Given the reaction function of n fiscal authorities and the ECB we can easily compute the 
reduced form solution as we have n+1 unknowns ( )1;...; ;ng g i  and n+1 reaction functions. 
Inserting (3.43) in (3.48), averaging and plugging the resulting expression into (3.45) we get 
the following reduced form equation for the interest rate: 
 
 
( )
( )
2
0 1 22
1 y
y
b dai
b b b d
l j k j
p e e
l j
+ +
= + + +
+
. (3.50) 
 
In the absence of macroeconomic shocks ( 1 2 0e = e = ) the ECB will set interest rates equal to 
their long run equilibrium value ( ) 0i a b= + p  which corresponds to a union wide output gap 
of null and an inflation rate that is equal to the inflation target. The global response to 
monetary shocks in a union compared to a scenario of a closed economy is on average 
unaltered an given by: ( ) 1i 1 bD = e .  
The reduced form for the fiscal stance parameter can be computed by inserting the inflation 
rate and the interest rate into the reaction function of the central bank. 
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 ( ) ( )1 1, 22 2i i y
d
g
d
k k
e e e
k j j l
= - +
+ +
. (3.51) 
 
Equation (3.51) displays the difference between a closed and open economy setup of a static 
version of a New Keynesian macromodel. First we see that fiscal authorities have a 
stabilisation task in response to demand shocks as long as these exhibit a degree an 
asymmetry.  Most importantly as individual shocks are assumed to be iid there is some 
positive probability ( )
2 0,03
i if d
k j e e
k
-
-¥
æ ö+
ç ÷
è øò
 that the 3% deficit criterion cannot be met. In 
other words if the size of the shocks is large (3.51) clearly demonstrates that even under an 
optimal and sustainable fiscal stance (defined as g=0 in the absence of shocks) the Maastricht 
deficit criterion is likely to be violated with some positive probability. Nevertheless as long as 
the violation stems from the size of exogenous shocks and not from a fiscal policy that is 
conducted in an unsustainable fashion (g>0), (see chapter 4.4) the violation of the Maastricht 
criterion is a necessary precondition to restore the overall optimal outcome. Exactly for that 
reason the 3% deficit criterion can be suspended if a country is hit by a large shock. The same 
holds of course true for large demand and supply shocks. 
Inserting (3.50) and (3.51) into the aggregate demand equation we arrive at the following 
expression for the country specific output gap: 
 
 ( )2 ,1 12 2i i
y
d
y
d
j
e e e
l k j
= - + -
+ +
. (3.52) 
 
Note given standard parameterisation ( )0,5k j= =  uncorrelated demand shocks are likely to 
have a smaller impact on the overall economic activity compared to a scenario where fiscal 
policy remains passive. So indeed we can state that a Keynesian stabilization policy is able to 
dampen economic cycles compared to a policy that sets g=010. Nevertheless the stabilisation 
of shocks will not be perfect. The argument goes as follows. Assume that only one country is 
hit by a negative demand shock. Obviously, given the Nash equilibrium, real interest rates 
( )i p-  will be too tight for that country, too weak to restore an output in line with potential 
                                              
10 For a critical view that stresses that fiscal shocks itself might be a source of dispersion in output see for 
instance Canova and Pappa (2003). 
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( )0iy < . In contrast the real interest rate for the rest of the union will be too loose giving a 
boost to economic activity ( 0iy- > ). At first glance this result might seem at odds with 
intuition. One might ask why fiscal authorities do not use their instrument more rigorously in 
response to demand shocks in the equilibrium. The key to this answer lies in the strategic 
interaction between the agents. A more expansionary fiscal policy triggers higher interest 
rates for the currency area so that the marginal costs of an expansionary fiscal policy 
outweigh the marginal benefits.  
The degree of conflict potential can be summarised by the correlation between the 
idiosyncratic demand shocks versus the euro wide average ( ; )i icorr e e- . Equation (3.280) 
depicts that in a union where demand shocks are perfectly correlated ( ; ) 1i icorr e e - =  the 
output gaps of individual member states yi are identical at each point in time. Obviously a 
maximum dispersion in output will be given if ( ; ) 1i icorr e e- = - . Then the individual output 
gaps yi would exhibit a maximum dispersion which could potentially undermine the existence 
of the union in the long run as at each point in time country i finds it beneficial-evaluated in 
terms of ,G iL - to leave the union as it requires significantly different real interest rates. 
Therefore our simple static analysis clearly makes the prediction that if the law of one price 
holds life within a monetary union is easier if demand shocks are highly correlated and fiscal 
policy actively engages into stabilising shocks. Additionally the exposition provided a 
rationale for the suspension of the 3% deficit criterion in the vague of large shocks as a 
necessary condition for fiscal policy to be conducted optimally.  
It is important to note that if we set 0j =  shocks can be completely stabilised. In other words 
if fiscal policy does not put any weight on smoothing its instrument it is possible to 
completely offset uncorrelated demand shocks. Nevertheless the smoothing objective is a 
common theme in literature. 
We can present the same results with the help of a graphical analysis. Let us assume that 
country i is hit by an uncorrelated demand shock. The shock shifts the aggregate demand 
curve from 0 ( )
dy i  to 1 ( )
dy i . As a result the aggregate European demand curve shifts from 
0 ( )
dy i  to 1 ( )
dy i . As the ECB can stabilize shocks on average, it will raise real interest rates 
from i0 to i1 which brings output back to its potential and the inflation rate to the inflation 
target. The new nominal rate depresses economic activity in the rest of the union so that fiscal 
policy becomes expansionary which leads to an outward shift of the aggregate demand curve. 
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* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
Figure 24: Idiosyncratic Demand Shock in Country i: ,1 3ie =  
 
In country i the increase in nominal rates is too small so that fiscal policy will become 
contractionary leadin g to an inward shift of the 0 ( )
dy i  curve.  Figure 3 summarizes the net 
reaction of the variables to a positive shock respectively.  
 
 ,1 0ie- >  ,1 0ie >  2e  
Fiscal stance (g) ­  ¯  ­  
Output gap (y) ¯  ­  ¯  
Inflation rate (p ) / / ­  
Interest rate (i) ­  ­  ­  
Table 3: Net Change of a Variable to a Positive Shock 
 
 
3.2.3  Idiosyncratic Phillips Curves 
 
In this section we analyse the strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities in 
a union if the law of one price does not hold. We will again focus on uncorrelated 
idiosyncratic demand and supply shocks. As already shown in section (3.1.2) the existence of 
country specific real interest rates drives a further wedge between macroeconomic outcomes 
compared to a scenario where the law of one price holds. Nevertheless fiscal policy has 
stabilizing effects on the performance of member countries.  
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Like in section (3.1.2) the Phillips curve can be specified as: 
 
 0 ,2i i idyp p e= + + . (3.53) 
 
This means in particular that each country only produces non-tradable commodities. Note that 
this assumption does not mean that the country specific inflation rates can diverge arbitrarily 
over time, as we take non auto correlated shocks to be the workhorse throughout our 
exposition. The inflation rate in country i is driven by the country specific output gap ( )iy  
and the idiosyncratic supply shock ,2ie , e.g. non-sustainable wage policies. With equation 
(3.281) we effectively reintroduce country specific real interest rates. The government in the 
individual member state (i) has to solve the following optimization problem: 
 
 2 2,G i i iL y gj= +  (3.54) 
s.t. 
 ( ) ,1i i i iy a b i gp k e= - - + + . (3.55) 
 
The reaction function of fiscal policy can than be stated as follows:  
 
 ( )1 12 2 2i
a bg ik k kp e
k j k j k j
= - + - -
+ + +
. (3.56) 
 
In order to solve the game we impose symmetry, hence we assume that not only the 
coefficients in the country specific Phillips curves and the IS curves are identical but that 
additionally the countries are of equal size. Consequently averaging over the fiscal stance 
parameter results in: 
 
 [ ] ( )( )11 2 2
1
... n
a b i
g g g g g
n
k p e
k j
+ - +
= + + + = = -
+
. (3.57) 
 
Inserting (3.47) into the following equation: 
 
 
( )0 1 22
1 y
y
b dai g
b b bb d
l kp e e
l
+
= + + + +
+
. (3.58) 
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and solving for (3.58) yields (3.59). Most notably equation (3.59) is identical to the reduced 
form we already saw under scenario 1. This cannot come as a surprise as the averages of the 
variables under consideration (output gap, fiscal stance parameter,...) from the perspective of 
the ECB are identical under both scenarios. Hence from the viewpoint of monetary policy it 
does not matter whether the supply side of the economy is characterised by only one or many 
Phillips curves as long as the ECB only cares on shocks and is indifferent between mean 
preserving spreads: 
 
 
( )
( )
2
0 1 22
1 y
y
b dai
b b b d
l j k j
p e e
l j
+ +
= + + +
+
. (3.59) 
 
The fiscal stance parameter is given by: 
 
 ( )1 1 1, 2 ,2 3 2i i ig q q qe e e e= - + + . (3.60) 
where: 
( )1 2
q 0
1 bd
k
= <
k + - j
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q 0
1 bd
k
= - <
k + - j
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( ) ( )( )
2
y
3 2 2
y
b d
q 0
d 1 db
k l j + k + j
= >
+ l j k + - j
 
 
Fiscal policy exhibits a higher level of activity compared to a scenario where the law of one 
price holds as q1 is larger than the corresponding coefficient in equation (3.51). This shows 
that fiscal policy needs to become more countercyclica l as country specific real rates (i-pi) 
amplify shocks that hit the individual economies. A negative demand shock originating in the 
own country leads to a fiscal expansion as a negative output shock in the other member states 
leads to a contraction in the own fiscal stance parameter which nicely depicts that the ECB 
will relax monetary conditions which would give a boost to output in country j if fiscal policy 
would not contract. This result clearly shows the macroeconomic assignment which is nested 
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in the Nash equilibrium. Demand shocks are mainly stabilised by the ECB and not- as one 
might expect- by the individual member states. As expected a foreign inflation shock leads to 
a more expansionary fiscal stance since the government is only concerned about output and 
not about inflation. Therefore as a response to tighter monetary conditions for the whole area 
the fiscal stance becomes more expansionary. These results are qualitatively identical to those 
we already saw in section 3.2.2. 
The output gap equation is given by: 
 
 ( )i 5 i,1 1 6 2 7 i,2y q q q= e - e + e + e .11 (3.61) 
where: 
( )( )5 2q 01 bd
j
= >
k + - j
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Note in particular given our standard calibration ( )0,5; 0,34, 0,4d bk j= = = =  the 
stabilisation of idiosyncratic demand shocks is only partial compared to a scenario where the 
law of one price holds. This underlines that diverging real interest rates (i-pi) amplify shocks. 
Accordingly by the very definition of a (stable) Nash equilibrium fiscal policy has no 
incentive to de viate from the final outcome of the game as otherwise monetary policy would 
have an incentive to raise real interest rates. Hence, we come to the result that a country 
specific supply shock, e.g. wage demands that are not consistent with the inflation target of 
the ECB ( 0w pD > ) lead to an increase in domestic inflation and to a drop in national real 
interest rates. Thus the ECB cannot punish individual member states which calls for a wage 
policy that is consistent with the inflation target of the ECB. For a foreign and an aggregate 
supply shock we come to the same conclusions as in section 3.1.2. But again the analysis 
shows that fiscal policy as an independent agent is able to stabilise the impact of supply 
                                              
11 Note if we set ,1 1ie e=  and ,2 2ie e= , hence if the currency area is hit by symmetric shocks then equation 
(289) simplifies to (236). 
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shocks. So indeed as in the case of demand shocks equation (3.57) clearly demonstrates the 
advantageous of  a Keynesian stabilisation policy as the impact of supply and demand shocks 
on the macroeconomic goal variables is significantly reduced. To complete the reduced form 
description of the economy we compute the inflation rate. The reduced form expression for 
the inflation rate is characterised by the following expression: 
 
 ( )i 0 8 i,1 1 9 2 10 i,2q q qp = p + e - e + e + e .12 (3.62) 
 
where: 
q8= ( )( )2 01
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The reduced form inflation rate is characterised by the following features: In the absence of 
macroeconomic shocks that hit the euro area the individual inflation rate will be equal to the 
inflation target. Demand shocks will only have a n impact on the idiosyncratic inflation rate to 
the extend that they are uncorrelated. Compared to a scenario where only monetary policy 
takes care of shocks the introduction of a Keynesian stabilization policy optg g=  reduces the 
impact of demand shocks on the national inflation rate and the output gap. The same dramatic 
decrease (given our standard calibration) can be recorded following idiosyncratic supply 
shocks.  
Let us illustrate the results of this section. Country i is hit by a positive demand shock of size 
,1 3ie =  which gives a massive boost to economic activity in that country given unchanged real 
interest rates (p serves as a shift parameter) (see Figure 25). The aggregate demand curve in 
country i is shifted from 0 ( )
dy i  to 1 ( )
dy i . Nevertheless the idiosyncratic shock in country i 
                                              
12 Note if we set ,1 1ie e=  and ,2 2ie e= , hence if the currency area is hit by symmetric shocks then equation 
(290) simplifies to (235). 
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translates into an average euro-wide shock of size ( ) 11 n e . This calls the ECB upon to act. As 
we already saw, in the case of demand shocks, the ECB can always maintain its bliss point. 
Accordingly it will tighten monetary conditions and raise real interest rates from i0 to i1 which 
induces a change in economic activity for the whole currency area that exactly compensates 
the initial demand shock. As output on average will be back to potential for the currency area, 
the inflation rate will equally return to the inflation target. Nevertheless the policy stance in 
country i will be too loose. On contrary for the rest of the union real interest rates will be too 
tight resulting in a somewhat depressed economic activity. Accordingly the inflation rate in 
the country that was hit by the initial demand shock will be above the inflation target of the 
ECB whereas inflation in the rest of the union will be below the ECB’s inflation target. But 
remember for the union as a whole inflation will be back to target. This result nicely depicts 
that the common central bank is indifferent when it comes to mean preserving 
macroeconomic outcomes. Given this global picture we still need to look at the behaviour of 
the individual member states in equilibrium. Obviously the government in country i initiates a 
fiscal contraction as output is above its potential shifting the aggregate demand curve inward. 
In the rest of the union the governments relax the fiscal stance in order to stabilize economic 
activity shifting the aggregate demand curve outward. The degree of strategic interaction 
critically depends on the size of country i. Compared to a scenario where monetary policy is 
the only stabilizing actor fiscal authorities succeed in partially stabilizing output as depicted 
in Figure 25. Given this battery of shifts and back shifts we arrive at a final policy outcome in 
response to the idiosyncratic demand shock that is described by the following features. In 
country i output will be above potential and the inflation rate will be higher than the inflation 
target. In the rest of the union the economic environment is characterized by the opposite 
picture: output will be below potential and inflation will be below its target level. As in the 
case of a closed economy the shock will be stabilized on average. 
Figure 26 and Figure 27 depict what happens if country i is hit by an idiosyncratic supply 
shock. Assume that country i is hit by a supply shock of size ,2 3ie = . As in the case of a 
closed economy the ECB determines the overall outcome of the game depending on 
preferences l by setting the nominal interest rate accordingly. Equations (3. 61) and (3. 62) 
depict the union wide outcomes that will prevail given an aggregate supply shock of size 
( ) ,2 ,21 i in e e= . For ly equal to 0.5 we can see that the inflation rate will increase to 2.81% and 
the output gap will drop to a level of –0.55%. Now the interesting question is how this global 
outcome translates into national macroeconomic performances. Obviously the rest of the 
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union will suffer from a recession as it will face higher real interest rates which translates into 
a negative output gap. Therefore we will move along the Phillips curve to a point that is 
characterized by a lower output and a lower inflation rate. In the rest of the union the fiscal 
stance is expansionary to (partia lly) unwind the effects of the contractionary monetary stance. 
For country i itself the massive increase in inflation by 3% leads to almost unchanged real 
rates so that fiscal policy is somewhat contractionary to prevent real interest rats from 
decreasing.   
 
7,5
y
i
2
4
6
8
-2 0 2
y ( i )i 0
d y(i)i 2
d
1,46
7,5
Country i
y( i )i 1
d
2
4
6
8
-2 0 2
y(i)i 0
dy( i )i 1
d
-0,733
7,5
Country j
i
y
2
4
6
8
-2 0 2
y ( i )i 0
d
Euro Area
y(i)i 1
d
i
y
y(i)i 2
d y(i)i 2
d
 
* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
Figure 25: Idiosyncratic Demand: Shock in Country i: ,1 3ie = 13 
 
Figure 26 nicely maps the ‘dynamics’ captured in a static version of a New Keynesian 
macromodel: Supply shocks are only contractionary in sum to the extend that monetary policy 
reacts to them. As the massive inflationary shock only translates by (1/n) on the aggregate the 
reaction of the ECB for that individual country will be far too weak to contract economic 
activity. Within a monetary union labour unions can potentially hide behind the (1/n)-effect as 
the ECB cannot ‘punish’ a particular country for a wage policy that is not in line with its 
inflation target. Of course we can equally look at the effects of a supply shock by mapping the 
strategic interaction between the agents in the (i,y)-space. Given that the policy of the ECB is 
conducted optimally we have to take into account that the inflation rate as well as the fiscal 
stance parameter serves as a shift factor in the (i,y)-space. Given the initial supply shock in 
country i the aggregate demand curve will shift due to the increase in economic activity by 
                                              
13 For an analysis within the classical AS/AD framework see Hagen and Mundschenk 2002. 
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b pD . This shift in economic activity is translated into a shift of the aggregate demand curve 
by a factor of ( )1 n b pD . 
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* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
Figure 26: Idiosyncratic Supply Shocks in C ountry i: ,1 3ie =  
 
Now the ECB steps in and chooses its preferred stabilisation mix taking the reaction of fiscal 
authorities appropriately into account. Given the ECB’s preferences it will raise nominal 
interest rates and induce a stabilisation recession in order to minimize its loss function. This 
move by the ECB triggers an expansionary fiscal stance in the rest of the monetary union and 
a somewhat contractionary stance in country i. The overall policy outcome is depicted in  
Figure 27. 
Finally to demonstrate the advantageous of  a Keynesian stabilisation policy we can compute 
real interest rates for individual member states in the vague of asymmetric demand shocks. 
Making use of the reduced form the real interest rate for country i that was hit by the shock 
can be written as: 
 
 ( ) ( )( )
2
,1
2( 1 )
i
i
bda
i
b b db
k a je
p
k j
+ -
- = +
+ -
. (3.63) 
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* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
Figure 27: Idiosyncratic Supply Shocks in C ountry i: ,1 3ie =  
 
With the help of equation (3.291) we can see that shocks will not be destabilising unless: 
 
 
2bdj ka
j
-£ . (3.64) 
 
Given our standard parameterisation this scenario can be virtually ruled out. Accordingly the 
analysis clearly demonstrates the advantageous of a Keynesian stabilisation policy that 
dramatically reduces the risk that shocks will be amplified. Table 4 shows the reaction of all 
variables under consideration to a positive s hock.  
 
National 
aggreagates 
1 0e >  ,1 0ie >  2 0e >  ,2 0ie >  
Fiscal stance (g) ­  ¯  ¯  ¯  
Output gap (y) ¯  ­  ¯  ­  
Inflation rate (p) ­  ­  ­  ­  
Interest rate (i) ¯  ­  ­  ­  
Table 4: Net Change of a Variable to a Positive Shock 
 
 
 
 119 
3.2.4  Idiosyncratic Phillips curves and TOT Effects in the     
    IS-Equation 
 
As in the previous section we assume that the PPP does not hold in the short term. Therefore 
we include TOT effects in the IS equation as in section 2.3. Accordingly the IS-equation can 
be stated as follows: 
,1( )i i i iy a b i c qp e= - - + D + .           (3.65) 
 
As in the previous sections we now assume that the government in country i is guided by the 
following loss function: 
 
 2 2,G i i iL y gj= +  (3.66) 
s.t. 
 ( ) ,1i i i iy a b i c q gp k e= - - + D + + .  
 
As the analytical results are somewhat too lengthy we only present numerical results for this 
scenario. We adopt the following solving strategy to compute the Nash equilibrium. In a first 
step we compute the reaction functions of fiscal authorities where we have substituted out the 
inflation rates by making use of the national Phillips curves. Then we substitute these reaction 
functions into the IS-equation and get a reduced form expression for the individual output 
gaps. With the output gaps at hand we can compute the inflation rates for the individual 
countries and all other variables of interest. The following section presents the results. 
Figure 28 depicts the scenario if country i is hit by a demand shock of size three. Note in 
particular that compared to the previous scenario the TOT effects are partially stabilizing as 
the amplitudes of macroeconomic dispersion across the currency area are not as pronounced 
as in the previous scenarios. Nevertheless even including the TOT effects the economic forces 
triggered by diverging real interes t rates are still dominant as Germany would boom whereas 
the rest of the union suffers from a mild depression. As we have seen throughout the chapter  
many times before the economic situation is characterized by a mismatch of real interest rate 
conditions as in non of the described countries real interest rates are in line with the economic 
environment. Nevertheless as in the scenarios beforehand the ECB is able to adjust the 
monetary environment on average so that it will attain its targets. 
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* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
Figure 28: Idiosyncratic Demand Shocks in Country i: ,1 3ie =  
 
Figure 29 depicts the ideal outcome from a stabilisation perspective. It shows that the ECB is 
able to realise its favourite macroeconomic outcome. Nevertheless TOT effects in 
combination with national fiscal policies that aim at stabilising the output gap almost 
completely succeed in stabilising the output gap in the country that was the source of 
macroeconomic turbulence. The macroeconomic outcome is very comparable to the case 
where TOT effects were not present. Hence in sum we conclude that the introduction of TOT 
effects does neither qualitatively nor qualitatively alter the results if we analyse the 
macroeconomic interaction between two large blocs of a monetary union.  
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* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
Figure 29 Idiosyncratic Supply Shock in Country i: ,2 3ie =  
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3.3  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter we applied a static version of a New Keynesian macromodel a la Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler (1999) to a currency union. We focussed in particular on the impact of 
asymmetric shocks and the integration of product markets and its implication for the 
functioning of a currency union. Our results are very easy to state: Life within a monetary 
union is much easier if shocks are highly correlated and product markets are integrated. Under 
such a scenario shocks are unlikely to be amplified across individual member states as the 
ECB can within an inflation targeting regime easily deal with them. Additionally we find that 
in particular small countries are in a vulnerable position as the ECB almost neglects their 
idiosyncratic situations unless shocks are correlated. This is of course a strong argument for a 
Keynesian stabilisation policy that actively fights shocks to stabilise economic activity. We 
showed that by this very argument one can provide a strong rationale for the suspension of the 
3% deficit criterion in the vague of strong asymmetric demand and supply shocks that hit 
individual countries as a necessary precondition to restor e optimal outcomes. Our analysis 
showed that in order to avoid negative spill-over effects stringent rules are necessary in order 
to prevent national governments as well as national labour unions to conduct a beggar-my-
neighbour policy. Therefore the fathers of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were right to 
implement rules that endorse a sustainable fiscal stance in each member state. We have shown 
numerically that these results are not qualitatively and quantitatively altered if we include 
TOT effects for a large open economy like Germany. From a theoretical perspective we have 
extended Dixits and Lambertinis (2003). They entirely focus on the issue of time consistency. 
Thereby they neglect to analyze the beneficial impact of stabilization policy if the union is hit 
by symmetric or asymmetric shocks. To that extend we extend Dixits and Lambertinis joint 
commitment solution to the case where the common monetary union is hit by symmetric or 
asymmetric supply and demand shocks. 
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Appendix: Some Alternative Scenarios 
Equation Section  1 
3. A: PHILLIPS CURVE WITH TRADABLE AND NON- TRADABLE  
   SECTOR 
 
Let us discuss a third scenario which nests the two previously derived solutions as corner 
cases. We assume that each country has a tradable and a non-tradable sector. Therefore the 
consumer price inflation is given by a weighted average of the two product bundles: 
 
 ( )1CPI T NTi ip ap a p= + - . (3.A.1)  
 
In each sector- tradables and nontradables- the inflation rate is determined by the difference 
between increases in nominal wages minus productivity: 
 
 i i i iw prodp e= - + . (3.A.2)  
 
It is generally assumed that the productivity growth qi in those sectors that face international 
competition is larger than in those sectors that only produce for domestic markets, hence 
qi>vi. To simplify the exposition we assume that in each sector wages are negotiated 
separately. Very much in line with a static version of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) we assume 
that the nominal wage is determined as: 
 
 0
T
i iw q dyp- = +  (3.A.3)  
 
 0
NT
i i iw v dyp- = + . (3.A.4)  
 
Hence the union in each sector negotiates wages above productivity that are consistent with 
the inflation target of the ECB. Additionally workers wages depend on the state of the cycle. 
It seems plausible to assume that wage changes depend on overall activity as the sector 
specific characteristics are already taken into account by qi and vi. Sectors that face 
international competition are assumed to depend on the overall cycle in the union whereas 
wage demands for non-tradables are orientated on domestic markets. 
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 0 2
T Tdyp p e= + +  (3.A.5)  
 
 0 ,2
NT NT
i i idyp p e= + + . (3.A.6)  
 
Inserting leads to the following expression for the consumer inflation rate: 
 
 ( )0 ,21CPIi i idy dyp p a a e= + + - +  (3.A.7)  
 
 with: ( ),2 2 ,21T NTi ie ae a e= + -  
 
Note that this specification nests the two corner solutions discussed in section 3.1 and section 
3.2. If the law of one price holds (a=1), the Phillips curve is given by:  
 
 0 2
CPI T
i dyp p e= + + . (3.A.8)  
 
If each country only produces a non-tradable commodity bundle (a=0), the Phillips curve can 
be depicted as:  
 
 0 ,2
CPI NT
i i idyp p e= + + . (3.A.9)  
 
Now we turn to the specification of the aggregate demand side. The static version of the usual 
IS-equation can be specified as in the previous sections: 
 
 ( ) 1CPIi i iy a b i gp k e= - - + + . (3.A.10)  
 
In each member state the political party in power solves the following optimisation problem: 
 
 2 2,G i i iL y gj= +  (3.A.11)  
s.t.: ( ) ,1CPIi i i iy a b i gp k e= - - + + . (3.A.12)  
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Solving gives the following reaction function: 
 
 ( )1,2 ( )CPIi i ig a b i
k
p e
k j
= - - + - -
+
. (3.A.13)  
 
The union wide output gap is given by:  
 
 
( )( )
2
1T NTd
y
d
ae a e
l
- -
= -
+
. (3.A.14)  
 
The union wide inflation rate is given by: 
 
 ( )
2
0 2
1T NT Td
d
ae a le
p p ae
l
+ -
= - +
+
. (3.A.15)  
 
The reaction function of the interest rate is given by: 
 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
2 2
0 12 2
1 1
T NT
d bd b d d bai g
b b bb d b d
a a l a lkp e e e
l l
- + + - +
= + + + + +
+ +
. (3.A.16)  
 
which underlines that the interest rate setting behaviour is equal under the two scenarios 
previously considered. This result cannot come as a surprise as the ECB only reacts to euro-
wide averages, which are identical under the two scenarios as the shocks are iid. This 
underlines that the behaviour of the ECB remains unaltered. 
 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 2 2
0 12 2
1 1 1 1
T NT
d bd b d d d bai
b bb d b d
k j j a a l j a k a j a lj
p e e e
l j l j
+ - + + - + - + -
= + + + +
+ +
  (3.A.17)  
 
Applying the usual solving strategy we get the following reduced form equations: 
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( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
3 2
2 2
1 1
2 2 2
0 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2
1
1
1 1 1
T
CPi
i NT NT NT NT
NTi NTi NTi NTi
NTi T
bd
d d d d
d d bd bdd bd
d d
bd d
a j l k j ae
l je l je
p p k e je lje aljel k a j a
k e k le k le je
lje a l je
é ù- - + +
ê ú
ê úæ ö- + + +ê úç ÷
ê ú= + ç ÷+ + -+ + + - ê ú+ - ç ÷
ê ú- - - -ç ÷
ê úç ÷ç ÷- + +ê úè øë û
  (3.A.18)  
 
Output gap: 
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 2
2 2 2
,1 1
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2
2
1
1 1
T
i NT
i NT NT NT NT
NT NT NTi NTi
NTi NTi T
bd b d
d d d
y d d bd bd
d bd
b b bd bd
b b b d
a j lj k j ae
l j e e k ak e
je aje aje a je
l k a j
lje alje je aje
lje lje a l je
é ù- - + +
ê ú
ê ú+ - + -
ê ú
ê ú= + - + -
ê ú+ + + -
+ - - +ê ú
ê ú
- - + +ê ú
ê úë û
.    (3.A.19) 
 
Fiscal stance parameter, which nests the two corner solutions: 
 ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
2 2
2 2 2 2
1 3
2 2
2 2 2
2
2
1
1 ( 1)
T
NT NT
i
NT NT NT NT
NT NT T
bd b d
d d d d
g
d bd d d bd bd
b b b d
k a j lj k j ae
l je l je k e ak e
l j k a j je aje aje a je
lje alje a l je
é ù- - + +
ê ú
ê ú- + + + + -ê ú= ê ú+ + + - + - + -ê ú
ê ú
+ - + +ê úë û
(A.1). 
  (3.A.20)  
 
 
3. B: ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIOMS ON THE CONDUCT OF  FISCAL   
 POLICY 
 
Of course each theoretical model critically depends on the assumptions one makes about the 
functioning of the economy. In order to check the robustness of our results we have derived 
throughout the main part of the text we want to alter our set of assumptions alo ng two 
dimensions. First of all, we illustrate the effects of introducing the Fisher equation in the IS-
curve instead of the real interest rate. Second of all, we analyze the impact if each government 
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in country i internalizes its impact on the euro-wide inflation rate. To shorten the appendix we 
just calculate for each alternative assumption the most complicated case with monetary and 
fiscal policy interaction when the law of one price does not hold. 
 
Introducing the Fisher Equation 
Following other strands  of literature (e.g.  Uhlig (2002)) we introduce the Fisher equation into 
the IS-curve. The Fisher equation states: 
 
   ei rp- = .             (3.B.1) 
 
Making use of the Fisher equation we can restate the IS-curve as follows: 
 
( ) ,1e i iy a b i gp k e= - - + +           (3.B.2) 
 
In order to simplify the exposition we assume-without loss of generality- that the inflation 
target of the central bank is equal to zero ( )0 0p = . Accordingly we can state the Phillips 
curve as follows: 
 2dyp e= +      (3.B.3) 
 
Let us assume that the private sector builds rational expectations according to the following 
loss function: 
( )( )2e eL = p p - p .                     (3.B.4) 
 
Hence the private sector is happy if it anticipates at the outset of the game the inflation rate 
correctly, which boils down to the following equation: 
 
0
ep p= .                                (3.B.5) 
 
Given this somewhat altered structure of the economy the ECB solves the following 
optimization problem subject to the aggregate Phillips curve: 
 
 2 2ECB yL yp l= +     (3.B.6) 
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which translates into the following average area wide output gap: 
 
 22
y
dy
d
e
l
= -
+
. (3.B.7)  
 
Inserting the output gap into the Phillips curve yields the following expression for the 
inflation rate: 
 
 22
yd
l
p e
l
=
+
. (3.B.8)  
 
Making use of this assumption as well as on the timing of the game we arrive at the following 
interest rate equation: 
 
 
( )1 22
1
y
a d
i g
b b bb d
k
e e
l
= + + +
+
. (3.B.9)  
 
Note that this equation is exactly equal to the one we derived in PART I of the book. This 
cannot come as a surprise as a nominal instrument rule that targets zero inflation should be 
identical to a monetary policy that targets the real interest rate. But let us now turn more 
importantly to the optimisation problem of fiscal authorities. Now the government faces the 
following optimisation problem: 
 
 2 2,G i i iL y gj= +  (3.B.10)  
s.t.: 
 ( ) ,1ei i i iy a b i gp k e= - - + + . (3.B.11)  
 
Given the assumptions we have made on the private sector and the  way according to which 
expectations are formed it holds that in each member state 0eip = . Making use of this result 
the reaction function of fiscal policy can be stated as follows: 
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 ,12 2 2i i
a b
g i
k k k
e
k j k j k j
= - + -
+ + +
. (3.B.12)  
 
Taking expectations over the average fiscal stance parameter gi and inserting it into the 
reaction function of monetary policy we arrive at the following reduced form expression for 
the interest rate: 
 
 
( )
( )
2
1 22
1
y
da
i
b b b d
k j
e e
l j
+
= + +
+
. (3.B.13) 
 
This can of course be used to solve for the fiscal stance parameter, 
 
 ( ) ( )1 1, 22 2i i y
d
g
d
k k
e e e
k j j l
= - +
+ +
 (3.B.14) 
 
the output gap in the individual member country i, 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ),1 1 22 2i i y
d
y
d
j
e e e
k j l
= - -
+ +
 (3.B.15) 
 
and the corresponding inflation rate in member country i: 
 
 ( ) ( )2 2,1 1 2, 22 2
1
i i y i
y
d
d d
d
j
p e e l e e
k j l
é ù= - + + -ë û+ +
. (3.B.16) 
 
In order to shortly evaluate the plausibility of the results one can see that if shocks are 
symmetrical ( ),1 1; 1ir e e =  and ( ),2 2; 1ir e e =  than the equations simplify to: 
 
( ) 22i y
d
y
d
e
l
= -
+
                   (3.B.17) 
 
 22
y
i
yd
l
p e
l
=
+
. (3.B.18) 
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As this setup may be a natural alternative to the structure of the economy as assumed 
throughout the main Part of the text let us give some comments on the results: 
· Demand shocks only have an impact on the average macroeconomic outcomes even if 
they are not synchronized.  
· In the absence of shocks the output gap will be equal to zero and the inflation rate will 
be equal to the inflation target.  
· The model setup is internally consistent as in the case of synchronized supply and  
 demand shocks the country specific equations boil down to the euro area equations. 
Nevertheless one result is dramatically altered. As we assume that not the actual real interest 
rate matters but the expected real interest rate, real interest rates are de facto equal across 
countries. Hence we do have no longer the phenomenon that country specific real interest 
rates can drive a wedge between country specific macroeconomic outcomes. In the main part 
of the text we saw that a dispersion across national outcomes could be amplified by diverging 
real interest rate conditions. By assumption this scenario is ruled out if we replace the real 
interest rate by the Fisher equation as eip  is always zero and additionally impose that  the 
shocks are white noise. (Uhlig 2002) additionally makes an interesting point which can 
equally be retrieved within our model. The model presented in the paper and Uhlig’s version 
of the model share the characteristic, that real interest rate volatility is larger if fiscal policy is 
conducted according to a discretionary policy compared to a scenario where it remains 
passive. This point can easily be seen by comparing the interest rate reaction as described by 
the equations (3.B.9) and (3.B.13). To state the case we compute a numerical example. Let us 
assume that the currency area is hit by a symmetric of size 2 1e = . 
The table shows that discretionary policy has the side effect of an increasing interest rate 
volatility in the case of an aggregate supply shock. Note that this result is rooted in the Nash-
equilibrium as fiscal policy does not endogenize that monetary policy can implement its 
preferred stabilization mix by compensating the more expansionary fiscal stance by higher 
interest rates. This result might call for monetary leadership which could be implemented by 
means of a Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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Table  3.B.1: The Impact of F iscal Policy on the Interest Rate Volatility 
 FISCAL POLICY REMAINS PASSIVE DISCRETION 
Shock +1 -1 +1 -1 
Output Gap -0.55 0.55 -0.55 0.55 
Inflation 2.81 1.19 2.81 1.19 
Nominal Interest 
Rate 
7.19 2.81 7.88 2.12 
Real Interest 
Rate 
4.38 1.62 5.07 0.93 
Interest rate 
volatility 
3 1.38±  3 2.07±  
 
Alternative assumptions on the optimization problem of fiscal authorities 
In this part of the appendix we want to illustrate that the results derived in the main text are 
qualitatively the same, irrespectively whether we assume that the government in country i 
internalizes the Phillips curve. Internalizing the Phillips curve means that the government 
takes account for the effects its own actions have on the euro wide inflation rate. As in the 
previous sections we assume tha t the ECB solves the identical optimization problem: 
 
 2 2CBL yp l= +  (3.B.19) 
s.t. 
 2dyp e= + . (3.B.20) 
 
Using this setup we arrive at the following results: 
 
 0 22
y
yd
l
p p e
l
= +
+
, (3.B.21) 
 
this translates into the following output gap equation 
 
 22
y
d
y
d
e
l
= -
+
. (3.B.22) 
 
Which still translates into the following reaction function for monetary policy: 
 
 131 
 ( )0 1 22
1 y
y
b da
i g
b b bb d
l kp e e
l
+
= + + + +
+
 (3.B.23) 
 
Now let us turn to fiscal policy: As a novelty compared to the main Part of the text we assume 
that the government in country i internalizes the effects of its individual actions on the euro-
area wide inflation rates: 
 
 2 2,G i i iL y gj= +  (3.B.24) 
 
s.t.: 
 ,1( )i i i iy a b i gp k e= - - + +  (3.B.25) 
 
 0 ,2i i idyp p e= + + . (3.B.26) 
 
Consolidating the constraint we can equally state the constraint of the optimization problem 
as follows: 
 
 0 1, 2,
1
1 1 1 1 1 1i i i i
ba b b
y i g
bd bd bd bd bd bd
p k
e e= + - + + +
- - - - - -
. (3.B.27) 
 
Given this somewhat altered optimization problem we arrive at the following reduced forms: 
For the interest rate  
 
 
( )( )
( )( )
2
0 1 22
11
1
y
y
d bd d bai
b b b d bd
k l j
p e e
l j
- + - +
= + + +
+ -
, (3.B.28) 
 
the fiscal stance parameter: 
 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
2
1 ,2 22 2 22 2 2 2
1
1 1 1 1
y
i i i
y
d bd d bb
g
bd bd bd d bd
k k l jk k
e e e e
k j k j l j k j
- + - +
= - - +
+ - - - + + -
,  
  (3.B.29) 
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the reduced form output gap parameter: 
 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
2
,1 1 2 ,22 222 22 2
11 1
1 11
y
i i i
y
d bd d bbd bd b
y
bd bdd bd
k l jj
e e e e
k j kl k j
- + - +- -
= - - + +
+ - + -+ + -
,  
  (3.B.30) 
 
and the inflation rate: 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2
0 1 1, ,2 22 2 22 2 2 2
11 1
1
1 1 1
y
i i i
y
d d bd d bd bd db bd
bd bd d bd
k l jj j
p p e e e e
k j k j l k j
æ ö - + - +- -ç ÷= + - + + +ç ÷+ - ç ÷+ - + + -
è ø
  (3.B.31) 
 
In order to shortly evaluate the plausibility of the results one can see that if shocks are 
symmetrical ( ),1 1; 1ir e e =  and ( ),2 2; 1ir e e =  the equations simplify to: 
 
( ) 22i y
d
y
d
e
l
= -
+
           (3.B.32) 
 
 22
y
i
yd
l
p e
l
=
+
 (3.B.33) 
 
The following results stand out: 
· Demand shocks only have an impact on the overall results if demand shocks are not 
perfectly synchronized. 
· In the absence of macroeconomic shocks the inflation rate is equal to the inflation 
target and the output gap is equal to zero.  
· The results are qualitatively unaltered to the results derived in the main part of the 
text. 
In order to compare the results somewhat deeper we compute the value for the reduced form 
coefficients given our standard calibrations in comparison to those derived in the main text. 
Without going into detail the tables demonstrate that the internalization of the aggregate 
inflation rate does not alter the quantitative results significantly.  
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Table 3.B.2 : Fiscal Stance  
( )1 1 2 ,2 3 2i i ig q q qe e e e= - + +  
 MAIN PART APPENDIX 
q1 0.733 0.802 
q2 -0.293 -2.143 
q3 0.846 1.4 
Calibration: 0.4; 0.34; 0.5; 0.5b d l j k= = = = =  
 
 
Table 3.B.3 : Output Gap 
( )1 1 2 2 3 ,2i i iy q q qe e e e= - + +  
 MAIN PART APPENDIX 
q1 0.733 0.69314 
q2 -0.846 -0.319 
q3 0.293 0.867 
Calibration: 0.4; 0.34; 0.5; 0.5b d l j k= = = = =  
 
 
Table 3.B.4: Inflation Rate 
( )0 1 1 2 ,2 3 2i i iq q qp p e e e e= + - + +  
 MAIN PART APPENDIX 
q1 0.250 0.2357 
q2 -0.287 -0.282; 
q3 1.10 1.094 
Calibration: 0.4; 0.34; 0.5; 0.5b d l j k= = = = =  
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3. C: TABLES 
 
Table 3.C.1  GDP-Weights14: 
 
Country  EU11 
Belgium 3.3 
Germany 29.9 
Greece 2.6 
Spain 10.9 
France 20.5 
Ireland 1.3 
Italy 19.2 
Luxemburg 0.3 
Netherlands 5.4 
Austria 3.2 
Portugal 2.1 
Finland 1.6 
Data were taken from (ECB 2003) 
 
Table  3.C.2 : Figure 17  
 Country one  REST OF THE 
UNION 
Euro Area Initial Levels  
Interest Rate 7.5 7.5 7.5 5 
Output Gap 2 -1 -1 0 
Fiscal stance / / / 0 
Inflation Rate  2 2 2 2 
Real Interest Rate  5.5 5.5 5.5 3 
 
 
 
                                              
14 For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
d=0.34 and 0.5j k= = . 
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Table  3.C.3 : Figure 18 
 Country one  REST OF THE 
UNION 
Euro Area Initial Levels  
Interest Rate 7.5 7.5 7.5 5 
Output Gap 2.31 -1.16 -1.16 0 
Fiscal stance 0 0 0 0 
Inflation Rate  2.79 1.61 1.61 2 
Real Interest Rate  4.71 5.89 5.89 3 
 
 
Table 3.C.4: Figure 19 
 Country one  REST OF THE 
UNION 
Euro Area Initial Levels  
Interest Rate  7.19 7.19 7.19 5 
Output Gap 1.68 -1.02 -1.02 0 
Fiscal stance 0 0 0 0 
Inflation Rate  5.15 1.68 1.66 2 
Real Interest Rate  2.07 5.53 5.53 3 
 
 
Table 3.C.5: Figure 20 
 
 
COUNTRY ONE REST OF THE 
UNION 
EURO -AREA  INITIAL 
LEVELS  
INTEREST RATE 7.5 7.5 7.5 5 
OUTPUT GAP 2.33 -1.14 0 0 
FISCAL STANCE 0 0 0 0 
INFLATION RATE 2.79 1.62 2 2 
REAL INTEREST RATE 4.71 5.88 5.5 3 
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Table 3.C.6: Figure 22 
 
 
COUNTRY ONE REST OF THE 
UNION 
EURO-AREA INITIAL 
L EVELS 
INTEREST RATE 7.19 7.19 7.19 5 
OUTPUT GAP 0.22 -0.93 -0.55 0 
FISCAL STANCE 0 0 0 0 
INFLATION RATE 5.07 1.71 2.81 2 
REAL INTEREST RATE 2.12 5.51 4.36 3 
 
 
Table 3.C.7: Figure 24 
 Country one  REST OF THE 
UNION 
Euro-Area Initial Levels  
Interest Rate  7.5 7.5 7.5 5 
Output Gap 1.33 -0.66 -0.66 0 
Fiscal stance -1.33 0.66 0.66 0 
Inflation Rate  2 2 2 2 
Real Interest Rate  5.5 5.5 5.5 3 
 
 
Table 3.C.8: Figure 25 
 Country one  REST OF THE 
UNION 
Euro-Area Initial Levels  
Interest Rate  7.5 7.5 7.5 5 
Output Gap 1.46 -0.73 -0.73 0 
Fiscal stance -1.46 0.73 0.73 0 
Inflation Rate  2.50 1.75 1.75 2 
Real Interest Rate  5.00 5.75 5.75 3 
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Table 3.C.9: Figure 26/ Figure 27 
 Country one  REST OF THE 
UNION 
Euro-Area Initial Levels  
Interest Rate  7.88 7.88 7.88 5 
Output Gap 0.03 -0.84 0.85 0 
Fiscal stance -0.46 0.42 0.42 0 
Inflation Rate  5.01 1.71 1.71 2 
Real Interest Rate  2.87 6.17 6.17 3 
 
 
Table 3.C.10: Figure 28 
 
 
COUNTRY ONE REST OF THE 
UNION 
EURO-AREA INITIAL 
L EVELS 
INTEREST RATE 7.5 7.5 7.5 5 
OUTPUT GAP 1.37 -0.69 0 0 
FISCAL STANCE -1.57 0.79 0 0 
INFLATION RATE 2.47 1.77 2 2 
REAL INTEREST 
RATE 
5.03 5.73 5.5 3 
 
 
Table 3.C.11: Figure 29 
 
 
COUNTRY ONE REST OF THE 
UNION 
EURO-AREA INITIAL 
L EVELS 
INTEREST RATE 7.88 7.88 7.88 5 
OUTPUT GAP -0.086 -0.79 -0.55 0 
FISCAL STANCE 0.07 0.83 0.58 0 
INFLATION RATE 4.99 1.75 2.81 2 
REAL INTEREST 
RATE 
2.89 6.13 5.07 3 
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Table 3.C.1 2: Comparison of Impact Coefficients in the Vague of Idiosyncratic Demand Shocks: ,1ie  
 
 
 
 
 Only Monetary Policy Monetary and Fiscal Policy  
 Law of one Price Many Phillips Curves Law of One Price Many Phillips Curves 
General 
1 
 
1
1 db-
 
 
2
j
k j+
 
 
( )2 1 bd
j
k j+ -
 
 
yi 
Calibrated 1 1.16 0.67 0.73 
General / / 
2
k
k j+
 
 
( )2 1 bd
k
k j+ -
 
 
gi 
Calibrated / / 0.67 0.73 
General 1
d
bd-
 
 
( )2 1
d
bd
j
k j+ -
 
 
pi 
Calibrated 
/ 
0.40 
/ 
0.25 
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Table 3.C.1 3: Comparison of Impact Coefficients in the Vague of Idiosyncratic Supply Shock: ,2ie  
 
 
 
 
 Only Monetary Policy Monetary and Fiscal Policy  
 Law of one Price Many Phillips Curves Law of One Price Many Phillips Curves 
General / ( )1
b
bd-
 
 
/ ( )( )2 1
b
bd
j
k j+ -
 
 
yi 
Calibrated / 0.46 / 0.29 
General / / / ( )2 1
b
bd
k
k j
-
+ -
 
 
gi 
Calibrated / / / -0.29 
General 
1
1 bd-
 
 
( )
2
2 1 bd
k j
k j
+
+ -
 
 
pi 
Calibrated 
/ 
1.16 
/ 
0.25 
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Table 3.C.1 4: Comparison of Impact Coefficients in the Vague of Global Supply Shocks: 2e  
 
 
 
 Only Monetary Policy Monetary and Fiscal Policy  
 Law of one Price Many Phillips Curves Law of One Price  Many Phillips Curves 
General 
2
y
d
d l
-
+
 
 
( ) ( )21
y
y
d b
bd d
l
l
+
-
- +
 
 
2
y
d
d l
-
+
 
 
2
y
d
d l
-
+
 
 
yi 
Calibrated -0.55 -1.02 -0.55 -0.55 
General / / ( )2 y
d
d
k
j l+
 
 
( )2 y
d
d
k
j l+
 
 
gi 
Calibrated / / 0,55 0.55 
General 
2
y
yd
l
l+
 
 
2
y
yd
l
l+
 
 
2
y
yd
l
l+
 
 
2
y
yd
l
l+
 
 
pi 
Calibrated -0.81 -0.81 -0.81 -0.81 
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4  MONETARY POLICY AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN  
  CLOSED ECONOMIES AND MONETARY UNIONS:    
  TWO APPLICATIONS 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In chapter 2 and chapter 3 we have reviewed and extended the framework of New Keynesian 
macroeconomics. We have seen that the existence of nominal inertia has a fundamental 
impact on the functioning of the economy and the role macroeconomic stabilization agent’s  
play. In particular it prevailed that nominal inertia leaves leverage for the central bank on the 
real interest rate by which it can steer the economy according to its preferences. In a monetary 
union we have shown as a contribution to literature that diverging real interest rates have the 
potential to destabilize the very stability of the currency area itself. This calls for a 
renaissance of fiscal policy from a stabilization perspective. 
In this chapter we will apply the New Keynesian reduced form three equation apparatus to the 
data. We will discuss two separate topics. On the one hand we will estimate key parameters of 
a New Keynesian macromodel for closed economies, namely the USA and evaluate the 
implied mechanics of the model. This means that we analyze the implied autocorrelations and 
cross-correlations with respect to changes in key parameters like preference vectors of 
monetary policy and the degree of forward-lookingness of economic agents. By this analysis 
we gain insights into an economy with rational agents and nominal inertia. The second 
application focuses on the European monetary union. We will analyze the sense and nonsense 
of the SGP. This chapter extends the basic framework of chapter 3 to a dynamic setting. As 
we hold it to be unrealistic that real world fiscal policy is conducted by optimal control we 
replace it by a simple rule . After having analyzed the SGP we will make some broad 
guidelines along which we think it proofs necessary to rebuild  the SGP. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we will extend the basic New 
Keynesian framework to a quarterly setting. This means in particular that we will introduce a 
ric her lag structure in the Phillips-curve and the IS -equation. Having specified the economic 
model we will show how to rewrite them in state space notation and explain in some depth the 
econometric estimation technique. Following the technical issues we will address the two 
above mentioned topics.  
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4.1  A New Keynesian Macro Model as a Vehicle to Model a 
   Large Closed Economy and the European Monetary   
   Union 
 
In this section we will extend the basic New Keynesian three equation apparatus to a quarterly 
setting to realistically describe the data. This means in particular that we will augment the 
intertemporal Euler-equation and the Phillips curve by a richer lag structure. This seems 
necessary to generate enough persistence in order to be able to explain stylized facts like 
hump shaped responses of impulse responses following a demand or supply shock (see 
Walsh, (2003) ch. 1). Additionally we will amend the basic equations by open economy 
characteristics. Concerning the IS-equation we take care of possible international linkages of a 
country associated with the real exchange rate and the real interest rate channel. Additionally 
we will pay attention to direct spill over effects. With respect to the Phillips curve we will add 
imported inflation to model the effects of diverging infla tion rates in a monetary union. In the 
following we will introduce two quarterly models, namely a closed economy and a monetary 
union model. 
 
 
4.1.1  The Empirics of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
 
As shown in section (2.1.1.5) a cornerstone of New Keynesian macromodels is the HNKPC 
(e.g., Jondeau and Bihan (2001) ; Roberts (1997) ; Sbordone (2002)). In its most sophisticated 
version (see section (2.1.1.5)) it can be stated as follows: 
 
t f t t 1 b t 1 t tE mc+ -p = g p + g p + l + e% .         (4.1) 
 
( )( ) ( )
( )
1
1 1
f b
where: 1 1 1
            ,  ,  1 1
-
- -
l = -q -bq - w xf
g =bqf g =wf f = q + w -q -bé ùë û
%
 
 
As we will fit the Phillips curve to a quarterly data set we allow for a more generalized lag-
structure of the following form: 
 
 10 1 1
K s n
t f t t k b j t j yi t i tk j i
E ypp g p g b p b e- + - -= = == + + +å å å . (4.2) 
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The current rate of inflation is explained by a weighted average of past and future inflation 
rates as well as the current and lagged value of the output gap. Equation (4.2) nests all 
possible specifications of the Phillips curve  as outlined in section (2.1.1). If we set fg  equal 
to null equation (4.2) is equal to a purely backward looking specification as proposed by 
Svensson and Rudebusch (1999).  
 
Study Phillips -Curve  Period 
Region 
Estimation 
Method  
Castelnuovo 
(2003) 
 
[ ]
1 3 1
1 2 3 4
0.1  0.141
      0.9 0.282 0.025 0.292 0.385
t t t t
t t t t
E yp p
p p p p
- + -
- - - -
= × + ×
+ × × - × + × + ×
 
1987Q3-
2001 Q1 
USA 
 
Minimum 
Distance 
Estimation 
 
Linde (2002) 
 
1 10.463 0.72 0.032t t t t tE y pp p p e+ -= + + +  
 
1960Q1-
1997Q4 
USA 
 
FIM L 
 
Söderlind et 
al. (2005) 
 
[ ]
1 3 1
1 2 3 4
0.1 + 0.13
      0.9 0.67 0.14 0.4 0.07
t t t t
t t t t
E yp p
p p p p
- + -
- - - -
= × ×
+ × × - × + × + ×
 
 
1987Q4-
1999Q4 
USA 
 
Matching 
Moments 
 
Domenech et 
al. (2001) 1 1 1
0.537 0.463 0.063t t t t tE yp p p+ - -= + +  
1986Q1- 
2000Q4 
USA 
GMM 
Gali et al. 
(2001) 
 
1 1 10.364 0.599 0.02t t t t tE mcp p p+ + -= + +  
 
1960:1-
1994:4 
Euro-Area 
 
GMM 
 
Jondeau et al 
(2001) 
 
1 1 10.747 0.462 0.037t t t t tE mcp p p+ + -= + +  USA GMM 
Rudd et al 
(2001) 
 
1 1 10.605 0.393 0.000t t t t tE yp p p+ + -= + -  
 
1960:Q1-
1997 Q4 
Euro-Area 
 
GMM 
 
Rudebusch 
(2000) 
 
1 10.29 0.71 0.13t t t t tE yp p p+ -= + +  
 
1968:3- 
1996:Q4 
Euro-Area 
 
OLS 
 
Gali et al. 
(1999) 
 
1 1 10.682 0.252 0.037t t t t tE mcp p p+ + -= + +  
 
1960:1-
1994:4 
Euro-Area 
GMM 
 
*Note as most authors present a battery of estimates we have taken the ones which we considered as the most 
relevant ones. 
Table 5: Hybrid Phillips Curves 
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Setting 0.5b fg g= =  yields the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) specification. If we set 1fg =  we 
have a purely forward-looking NKPC where inflation only depends on expected future 
inflation like in Taylor’s (1979), Calvo’s (1983), and Clarida, Gali and Gertler’s (1999) 
specification. No consensus has yet emerged up to which degree the price setting behaviour of 
economic agents is governed by forward-looking behaviour. Table 5 presents some evidence 
from estimated and calibrated ‘baseline’ versions for the USA and the Euro-Area. The 
presented baseline estimates of the degree of forward-lookingness vary from 0.1 to 0.75. This 
dispersion in estimates is somewhat inconvenient as the dynamics of the reduced form system 
depend critically on the true degree of forward and backward-lookingness embedded in the 
Phillips curve and the IS -equation. 
In the second part of this chapter when we analyze the SGP we need to modify the closed 
economy NKPC. In order to describe the inflation dynamics in a monetary union we augment 
the HNKPC by the inflation rate that prevails in the rest of the union ,i tp - .  
 
Study Identified Loss Function Period Estimation 
Method 
Di 
Bartolomeo 
et al. (2003) 
1 1 ˆt b t f t t y t t tE y qp g p g p g h e- += + + + +  
1994- 
2002 
GMM-
Estmination 
    
    
Leitemo et 
al. 
(2001) 
( )1 d mt q t q tp g p g p= - +  
( )1mt t t tq qp p -= + -  
1 1 1 1 1t b t f t t y t t qq t t tE E y E q
pp g p g p g g e- - + - -= + + + +  
Calibration   
 
Batini et al 
(2001) 
 
 
( )41 1 1 114t b t f t t y t q t j tjE y q pp g p g p g g e- + - -== + + + D +å  Calibration  
 
Batini et al.  
(1999) 
( ) ( )1 1 1 11t b t f t y t t q b t f t t ty y q E qp g p g p g g i i e- + - +é ù= + + - + - D + D +ë û  - Calibrated 
    
Table 6: Open Economy Phillips Curve 
 
The basic idea for this open-economy version of a Phillips curve is as follows. When foreign 
inflation rates start to pick up, than domestic inflation rates will equally accelerate, as parts of 
the products that domestic agents purchase come from abroad.  
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 , , 1 , , , , ,1 1
s n
i t f i t i t k b j i t j yi i t i i t i tj i
E ypp g p g b p b xp e- + - - -= == + + + +å å . (4.3) 
 
Note, compared to related studies (see Table 6) we have directly implemented the foreign 
inflation rate in the Phillips curve as nominal exchange rate movements can be excluded as an 
independent source of real exchange rate movements in a monetary union, where the nominal 
exchange rate is fixed once and for all. 
 
 
4.1.2  The Empirics of the New Keynesian IS-Curve 
 
The second building bloc of New Keynesian macromodels is the intertemporal IS -equation. It 
gives a description of the demand side of the economy. The New Keynesian IS-curve is a 
relationship that relates the output gap negatively to the expected real interest rate and to 
tomorrow’s output gap. As we have shown in section (2.1.1.5) state of the art hybrid IS-
equations can be stated as follows 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1t t t t t t t
h h h
y y y i
h h h h
p x x
s s- + + +
- -
= + - - + -
+ + + +
,   (4.4) 
 
where h depicts the degree of habit formation in consumption. The stronger the representative 
household centres its consumption decisions on last period’s consumption level the more 
inertial becomes the output gap. As we will apply the equation to a set of quarterly data we 
augment the equation by a richer lag structure15: 
 
 ( )1 1 1 31 1
        
1
n m
t y t yi t i y yj t j r r t t t ti j
y E y y i Ev b v b b v p h- + - - - += == + - - - +é ùë ûå å . (4.5) 
 
As in the case of the Phillips curve this very general specification nests the different types of 
Euler equations we have highlighted in section (2.1.2) as corner solution. Setting yv  equal to 
zero equation (4.5) collapses to the case of a purely forward-looking intertemporal Euler 
                                              
15 Note the convention that 1t t t tx E x h-= +  is an easy way to introduce an error term in equation (4.2) as the 
recent realization is defined as the expected realization 1t tE x-  plus the expectational error term th . 
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equation, whereas in the case of yv  equal to one we are left with a purely backward looking 
specification. Table 7 presents some baseline estimates for the IS-curve. Reviewing these 
studies there seems to crystallise a consensus that a substantial degree of backward 
lookingness is needed to fit the actual data. At least half of the economic agents are assumed 
to be backward-looking according to the reviewed studies. 
 
Study Phillips -Curve Period Method 
Castelnuovo 
(2003) 
 
( )
1 1
1 2 1 1 3
0.2
0.8 1.229 0.244 0.073
t t t
t t t t t
t
y E y
y y i E p
h
- +
- - - - +
= ×
+ × × - - -é ùë û
+
 
 
1987:Q3-
2001:Q1 
Minimum 
distance 
Estimation 
Smets et al 
(2003) ( )1 1 10.41 0.588 0.88t t t t t t ty E y y r p h- - += + - - +   
Bayesian 
econometrics 
    
Söderlind et 
al. (2005) 
 
( )
1 1
1 2 1 1 3
0.5
0.5 1.15 0.27 0.09
t t t
t t t t t
t
y E y
y y i E p
h
- +
- - - - +
= ×
+ × × - - -é ùë û
+
 
 
1987Q4-
1999Q4 
Matching 
moments 
    
Domenech et 
al. (2001) 
1 1 2 3
4 2 3
0.499 0.488 0.047 1.09
0.161 0.08181 0.00819
t t t t t t
t t t t
y E y y y y
y r r h
+ - - -
- - -
= + + -
+ - - +
 
 
1986Q1- 
2000Q4 GMM 
Smets et al 
(2003) ( )1 1 10.41 0.588 0.88t t t t t t ty E y y r p h- - += + - - +   
Bayesian 
econometrics 
Table 7: Hybrid IS-Equations 
 
In the second part of this  chapter when we analyze the SGP we need an open economy 
specification of the closed economy IS-equation. In order to capture the international linkages 
we augment the IS-equation by the following features: 
 
 ( ), ,t i t i tq p p-D = -  (4.6) 
 ,
d
t i tex yV -=  (4.7) 
 1, 1 1, 1, 1 1,
f
t t t tg g y gc l e-= - + + . (4.8) 
 
Relationship (4.6) is the change in the real exchange rate as a measure for intra-European 
competitiveness. If foreign inflation rates are higher than domestic ones domestic products 
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become more attractive and hence the output gap will be pushed above its potential until the 
new equilibrium is reached. With exd (see equation (4.7)) we measure the excess demand that 
results if a foreign country has a boom in output, so that exports and hence economic activity 
start to accelerate. Equation (4.8) is the fiscal policy rule. Combining these equations we 
arrive at the following open economy IS-relationship: 
 
 1, 1, 1 , 1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 31 1
1, 1, 1 2, 1,               
n m
t f t i y s t s b yj t j r r t t ts j
t t t t
y E y y i E
g q y
v b v b b v p
f i j h
- + - - - += =
-
é ù= + - -ë û
+ + D + +
å å . (4.9) 
 
Study Identified Loss Function Period Estimation 
Method 
Di 
Bartolomeo 
et al. (2003) 
( )1 1 1t b t f t t i t t t ty y E y i E qv v b p i h- + += + - - + +  1994-2002 
GMM-
Estmination 
 
Leitemo et 
al. (2001) 
 
Söderström 
(2001) 
( )1 1 1 1 1 14 d ft y b t f t t t t t t yf t ty y E y i E q yb v v b p i b h- - + - - -é ù= + - - + + +ë û  - Calibration 
 
Batini and 
Nelson 
(2000) 
( ) ( )41 1 114t f t t t t t q t j tjy E y i E qv b p b h+ + -== - - + +å  - Calibration 
    
Table 8: Open economy IS-Equations 
 
Compared to related studies (see Table 8) we have directly implemented the change in the real 
exchange rate in the IS-equation which is equal to the difference in national inflation rates as 
the nominal exchange rate is fixed in a monetary union. 
 
 
4.1.3   The Empirics of Quadratic Loss Functions 
 
The third building bloc of a New Keynesian model is a relationship depicting the way 
according to which monetary policy is conducted. In section (2.1.3) we have proposed the 
following intertemporal loss function: 
 
{ }2 20 0 it t i y t iiL E ypb l p l
¥
+ +=
= +å .       (4.10) 
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In empirical work it has proven to be necessary to augment the standard loss function by an 
interest smoothing term in order to be able to explain the data. Therefore we introduce interest 
rate smoothing as an independent goal of monetary policy. It is an observable fact that 
monetary policy is implemented gradually. Typically short -term rates are not changed by 
more but 25 or 50 basis points (see e.g., Martin and Salmon (1999)). In other words monetary 
authorities do not implement their desired interest rate target cold turkey but perform a 
gradual adjustment to the desired target level. This observable interest rate setting behaviour 
can be rationalised among others by the following argument: Policymaker’s are confronted 
with three major types of uncertainties. Model uncertainty, parameter uncertainty and data 
uncertainty. It is well documented that each of these uncertainties tends to reduce the 
aggressiveness with which policymakers react with their instrument to the set of 
predetermined variables. In other words the coefficients in the optimal monetary policy rules 
are smaller in absolute values. 
This automatically translates into a smoother interest rate setting behaviour. One 
straightforward way to introduce interest rate smoothing in the model is to introduce an 
additional term tiD  in the loss function that penalizes excessive movements in the interest 
rate. Given these goals of monetary policy we can state the loss function as follows (e.g., 
Svensson (2003)): 
 
 { }2 220 0 kt t i y t i i t iiL E y ipb l p l l¥ + + D +== + + Då . (4.11) 
 
There are only a few studies available that try to pin down the  true preferences ( ); ;y ipl l lD  of 
monetary policy makers for the US and the Euro-area. Reviewing these studies (see Table  9) 
there seems to emerge the following consensus: Central banks seem to put a higher weight on 
stabilising the inflation rate around the inflation target than stabilising output at its full 
capacity level. Additionally a high weight is put on interest rate smoothing. Output 
stabilisation only seems to play a minor role for the conduct of monetary policy. Note that we 
already gave an analytical explanation for this finding in section (2.1.3.2). 
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Study Identified Loss Function Period/ 
Region 
Estimation 
Method 
 
Castelnuovo 
(2003) 
 
2 2 20.5 0.5t t t tL y ip= + + D  
 
1987-2001 
USA 
 
Minimum 
Distance  
 
Estimation 
Woodford (2003) 2 2 20.048 0.077t t t tL y ip= + + D  
/ 
USA 
 
Second Order 
Approximation 
    
Söderlind et al. 
(2002) 
2 2 20.1 1.5t t t tL y ip= + + D  
1987-1999 
USA 
Matching  
Moments 
    
Dennis (2001) 
 
2 2 20.23 12.3t t t tL y ip= + + D  
 
1979-2000 
FED 
 
 
FIML 
 
Bavero et. al. (2002) 
 
2 2 20.00125 0.0085t t t tL y ip= + + D  
 
1980-1998 
FED 
 
GMM, Euler 
Equation 
 
Cecchetti et. al. 
(1999)) 
2 20.25t t tL yp= +  
 
1987-1999 
Germany 
 
Slope of the 
Aggregate Supply 
Relationship 
    
Table 9: Loss Functions 
 
As a summary statistic the following box collects the closed economy equations in a New 
Keynesian setting. 
 
Central bank is guided by the following  period loss function  
2 2 2
t t y t i tL y ipl p l lD= + + D  
 
Quarterly New Keynesian Phillips curve 
1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 2, 1,1 1
s n
t f t t k b j t j yi t i t tj i
E ypp g p g b p b xp e- + - -= == + + + +å å  
 
Quarterly New Keynesian IS-curve 
( )1, 1, 1 , 1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 31 1
1, 1, 1 2, 1,
1
        
        
n m
t y t i y s t s y yj t j r r t t ts j
t t t t
y E y y i E
g q y
v b v b b v p
f i j h
- + - - - += =
-
é ù= + - - -ë û
+ + + +
å å
 
Box 1: New Keynesian Macromodel for a Closed Economy 
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4.1.4  The Current Setting of Fiscal Policy 
 
With respect to the open economy monetary union part of this chapter we need to augment the 
model by fiscal policy in order to address the SGP . The institutional design of the European 
monetary union was heavily shaped by the „Delors Report“ tha t called for stringent rules for 
national fiscal policies as a prerequisite for an efficient functioning of monetary policy (see 
Bofinger (2003)). In particular the German side was anxious that individual member states 
could conduct an unsustainable fiscal policy that would trigger a chain reaction of higher 
average inflation and nominal interest rates for the rest of the union. Therefore the fathers of 
the SGP intended to design fiscal rules for national policymakers that prevented fiscal 
authorities itself from being a major source of economic disturbance (Canova and Pappa 
(2003); Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba  (2002) ). This was laid down in particular by the 
following two interrelated rules which are intended to serve as a firewall against myopic fiscal 
policymakers: 
· The budget should be balanced over the cycle. If the economy is hit by a large shock the 
ratio of the current nominal balance to GDP should not exceed the 3% -line unless the 
economy is hit by a large shock. 
· The debt to GDP ratio should be in the medium run close to or below 60%. 
According to the SGP the cyclically adjusted balance should be balanced over the cycle. 
Nevertheless this does of course not rule out the possibility that the cyclically adjusted 
balance is used in a discretionary manner. As automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal 
policy are freely allowed to operate the definition of a sustainable fiscal policy combines at 
least from the perspective of the Commission long run sustainability with short run flexibility 
(EEAG, (2003))16.  
If the cyclically adjusted balance is zero on average, automatic stabilisers can freely operate 
and the likelihood that the 3%-deficit criterion will be broken is low (see Figure 30). Only if 
the economy is hit by a large shock so that y<yCAB the monitoring procedure will be triggered. 
Nevertheless if the cyclically adjusted balance is on average –c% small shocks are likely to 
run fiscal policy into troubled waters as normal output fluctuations already trigger the 
monitoring procedure 17. Obviously a fiscal policy stance that exhibits a negative nominal 
                                              
16 Note that the European Council has recently agreed to modified the SGP (March 2005). In particular the 
conditions under which the 3% deficit criterion can be broken have been relaxed. Additionaly the period by 
which deficit violations have to be reversed have been relaxed substantially by the introduction of additional 
factors such as negative output gaps or the quality of public finances (see Bundesbank 2005). 
17  For an overview on the deficit procedure see ECB (2003) Monthly Bulletin Box 7, p. 58.  
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balance even if the output gap is zero increases the likelihood to break the 3%-deficit criterion 
in the vague of shocks. 
 
Output gap
yCAB0yCABc yCAB-c
-3% Maastricht deficit criterion
CAB=-cCAB= 0CAB=c
Nominal balances
 
Based on EEAG (2003), p.54. 
Figure 30: The Actual B udget Balance as a Function of the Output Gap 
 
In order to incorporate fiscal policy into our small scale macromodel we follow Taylor (2000) 
who has proposed for reasons of plausibility that US fiscal policy can be described by the 
following simple rule: 
 
 1, 1 1, 1,
g
t t tg g yc e= - + , (4.12) 
 
where 1,tg  denotes the nominal balance in percent of GDP. With 1 1,tyc-  measuring the 
reaction of fiscal policy to the state of the cycle. The constant 1g  depicts the structural fiscal 
balance over the sample period; 1,
g
te  denotes a fiscal spending shock. For the sample period 
1983-1999 Taylor has estimated c  to be -0.37 and the constant was estimated to be 0.31. 
Hence Taylor makes the prediction that a decline in the output gap by 1% induces an increase 
in government financial deficit by 0.37 percent. Additionally Ballabriga and Martinez-
Mongay (2002) proposed to introduce inertia in fiscal spending decisions: 
 
 1, 1 1, 1, 1 1,
f
t t t tg g y gc l e-= - + +
(
. (4.13) 
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Central Bank is Guided by the Following Period Loss Function 
2 2 2ˆ ˆt t y t i tL y ipl p l l nD= + + D  
 
The Area Wide Aggregates 
1 1, 2 2,ˆt t tp v p v p= +   
2
1
1ii v= =å  
1 1, 2 2,ˆt t ty y yv v= +   
2
1
1ii v= =å  
 
Augmented Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
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E ypp g p g b p b xp e- + - -= == + + + +å å  
 
Augmented Hybrid New Keynesian IS -Curve 
( )1, 1, 1 , 1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 31 1
1, 1, 1 2, 1,
1
        
        
n m
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Fiscal Policy Rule  
( )1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1,gt t t tg g y gf c l e- -= + - + +
(
 
( )2, 2 2, 1 2, 1 2,gt t t tg g y gf c l e- -= + - + +
(
 
 
Change of the Real Exchange Rate 
( )1, 2, 1,t t tq p pD = -  
( )2, 1, 2,t t tq p pD = -  
Box 2: Open Economy New Keynesian Macromodel for a Monetary Union 
 
Obviously this simple specification of fiscal policy does not disentangle whether the cyclical 
stance is automatic (automatic stabilizers) or intentional (discretionary policy). But as it is our 
aim to measure the overall impact of fiscal policy on the cycle this cannot come as a 
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drawback. Throughout the paper we will not take debt smoothing as an independent goal of 
fiscal policy into account. Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2002) have shown that the 
output gap is equally influenced by the level of debt. Auerbach (2002) comes to a similar 
finding for the USA as he reports that fiscal policy seems to respond systematically to both: 
cyclical factors and the fiscal balance during recent decades. As a summary box 2 collects the 
equations characterising the monetary union model. 
 
 
4.2  Econometric Methodology 
 
In this section we will show in some depth how to take the two models to the data. In a first 
step we will rewrite the two models in state space notation. The state space notation allows by 
standard software routines (see Söderlind (1999)) to solve for the rational expectations 
equilibrium of the model, to generate the impulse response functions and define relevant 
concepts of interest, such as variance-covariance matrices. Having rewritten the models in 
state space notation we will then estimate them by matching moments. Additionally we will 
shortly highlight the alghor ithms applied to estimate the structural parameters of the model.  
 
 
4.2.1  Rewriting the Model in State Space Notation18 
 
Within this section we will set-up the general state space representation of the models. Let us 
assume that we can rewrite  the model in the following generalized form (Söderlind 2003): 
 
           0 1 1 0 1t t t tA x A x B i n+ += + + .          (4.14) 
 
Equation (4.14) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
         
2
1, , 11, 1 1,
0 1 0
12, 1 2, 0
t tt t
t
nt t t
x x
A A B i
E x x
e ++
´+
é ùé ù é ù
= + + ê úê ú ê ú
ë û ë û ë û
,       (4.15) 
 
                                              
18 All codes for basic computations were taken from Paul Söderlind homepage: 
http://www.hhs.se/personal/PSoderlind/Research/MonEEAMatLab.zip.  
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where xt is a ( )1 2 1n n+ ´  vector of n1 predetermined variables and n2 “forward-looking” or 
“non-predetermined” variables. The shocks that drive the system are stacked into 1 , , 1t te + . Due 
to the specific model set up the variance-covariance matrix S  is diagonal. Therefore we 
interpret the individual shocks as structural shocks . The nominal short term interest rate it is 
the instrument of the central bank. The matrices A0, A1 and B0 denote the parameters of the 
model. Premultiplying equation (4.15) by A0 it can equally be written as follows (see e.g.: 
Söderlind (1999) ; Svensson (1999)): 
 
1,1, 1
1
2,2 1
tt
t t
tt t
xx
A Bi
xE x
n+ +
+
é ùé ù
= + +ê úê ú
ë û ë û
.         (4.16) 
 
Since A0 is block diagonal w ith an identity matrix as its upper left block (1:n 1;1:n1) and the 
lower block of (n1+1, n1+n2) is zero it has to holds that: 
 
            
2 2
1, 1 1, 11
0
1 10 0
t t
n n
A
e e+ +-
´ ´
é ù é ù
=ê ú ê ú
ë û ë û
.          (4.17) 
 
For details how to rewrite the two models (see Box 1 and Box 2) see appendix 4.A. 
Concerning the sequence of events the follow ing holds true. At the start of period t X1t, driven 
by the shock terms te  is realised. Then the central bank, conditional on the available 
information set ( )1 1 1 1, , , , ,...t t t ttX X ie e - - -  chooses ti . At the end of period t X2t results. Finally 
rational expectations on 2 1t tE x +  are formed on the available information at the end of period t. 
Note that one can solve for the rational expectations equilibrium as outlined by Backus and 
Driffil (1986) and Oudiz and Sachs (1985). Following Söderlind (2003) the rational 
expectations equilibrium shares the following characteristics (see Söderlind (2003), p.26). 
· Although the policy maker reoptimizes each period it is possible to find each period 
stable time invariant stationary policy rule if one lets the algor ithm iterate to infinity. 
· Once the rational expectations equilibrium has been determined the rational 
expectations variables as well as the monetary policy rule can be expressed as a linear 
function of the state variables x1t. 
In order to initialize the state space routines we need to specify a measurement vector that 
defines the goal variables of monetary policy 
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             t x t i tz C x C i= + ,           (4.18) 
 
with 1, 2,t t tx x xé ù= ë û  and Cx and Ci are defined appropriately. Given this vector of target 
variables we can then define the following period loss function as stated in equation (4.18). 
By applying standard matrix algebra the loss function can be rewritten as: 
 
 
[ ]
'
'
''
'    =
t t t
tx
t x It
ti
L z Kz
xC
x i K C C
iC
=
é ù é ùé ù ê ú ê úë û ë ûë û
. (4.19) 
                                       with: 
0 0
0 0
0 0
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Multiplying out equation (4.19) it holds that 
 
 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' '
t t x x t t x i t t i x t t i i t
t t t t t t t t
L x C KC x x C KCi i C K C x i C K C i
xQx xUi i U x i Ri
= + + +
= + + +
, (4.20) 
 
where it holds that: 
 
 
'
'
'
x x
x i
i i
Q C KC
U C KC
R CKC
=
=
=
.  
 
Additionally we need to specify the unconditional variance-covariance matrix S  of the 
disturbance vector 1, 1te + . 
Under the assumption that a rational expectations equilibrium exists it holds that the 
instrument of monetary policy can be expressed as a linear function of the predetermined state 
variables: 
 
 1,t ti Fx= - . (4.21) 
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The closed loop dynamics of the model (the economy in conjunction with the policy rule)  
which serves as a starting point to generate diverse measures which we are interested in can 
be stated as follows: 
 
( )1, 11 12 1, 1,t t tx A A C x e= + +            (4.22) 
2, 1,t tx Cx= ,                (4.23) 
 
where A11 and A12 are the respective sub-matrices of 10 1A A A
-= , which have been partitioned 
conformably with x1,t and x2,t. Using the algorithms as described in  Söderlind (1999), the 
matrix C which maps the predetermined into the non-predetermined variables is determined 
numerically. Equipped with equations (4.22) and (4.23) we can compute the variance-
covariance matrix of the predetermined variables x1,t and the goal variables zt: 
 
 [ ]
1 1
1( ) ( )
t tx x
vec I M M vec-S = - Ä S  (4.24) 
            with: ( )11 12M A A C= +  
and 
 ' 1 1[ ] ( )' 'zz t t t t XXE z z CX CX C CS = = = S% % % % . (4.25) 
with C% =CX1+CX2C+CiF 
 
Note that the equations (4.24) and (4.25) are very useful as they allow us to compute the 
variances, covariances, autocorrelations and cross -correlation of the theoretical New 
Keynesian model implied by a particular parameter constellation.  
 
 
4.2.2  Econometric Methodology 
 
In this section we will present the estimation technique. The estimation is based on the 
following state space representation: 
 
            1 1t t tX MX u+ += + ,           (4.26) 
 
which is a short hand notation for equation (4.22) and (4.23). The closed loop dynam ics of the 
model serves as a starting point to generate the variances, covariances and cross-correlations. 
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For matching the theoretical New Keynesian model to the data we have to estimate a set of 
parameters. For the closed economy model this set of parameters is given by: 
 
          ( )us f y y ipV g v l l lD= .         (4.27) 
 
We fit the closed economy US model to the term of Alan Greenspan (1987:4 – 2002:1). For 
the open economy part of this chapter  we estimate an extended set of parameters to capture 
the international linkages: 
 
        ( )euro f y y ipV g v l l l i c d x jD= .    (4.28) 
 
The euro-area model covers the time period starting from the  soft European monetary system 
in 1983 to the second quarter of 2003. The synthetic European data set was provided by the 
ECB. The applied estimator V  minimises a distance measure ( )J V  (see e.g. Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)) 
 
( )( ) ( )( )' 1ˆ ˆminJ V
V
V V-= Y - Y Y - Y ,      (4.29) 
 
where Yˆ  denotes the empirical sample moments and ( )VY  describes the mapping from V  to 
the theoretical sample moments of the New Keynesian model implied by that particular 
parameter constellation. Note that any positive semi definite matrix assures consistent 
estimates (see Verbeek, p. 135). The matrix V denotes the weighting matrix which we have 
set equal to the identity matrix. Hence we estimate both models by minimizing a quadratic 
norm between the theoretical moments (variances, sample correlations, cross correlations) of 
the New Keynesian model and the empirical sample moments which characterize the specific 
data sets. For a detailed definition of the individual criteria for the US-data (1987:4-2002:2)  
We additionally impose the restriction that the individual standard deviations of the goal 
variables should not display a greater percentage deviation but c from historical counterparts. 
We set c=0.5.   
The open economy model was fitted to the sample autocorrelation function, where we opted 
for a lag length of twenty. Note that we can assume that following a macroeconomic shock it 
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basically takes around 20 quarters before the initial shock is completely undone. To model the 
disequilibrium dynamics it seems sufficient to model a lag length of 20 quarters. 
Note that the choice which parameters to estimate and which to calibrate is rarely to nowhere 
discussed in literature. Nevertheless common wisdom applies. Generally one should not try to 
estimate parameters which make no difference. In other words only if a variation in an 
element of V  is likely to have a significant impact on the value function J  we can expect to 
retrieve meaningful estimates. In other words it has to hold that: 
 
              
,
0
i i
J
V -
D >>
D
.           (4.30) 
 
If on contrary the value function is very flat with respect to large variations of a specific 
parameter it does not make sense to try to estimate that parameter as the concrete 
parameterization does not make a difference for the value function over a large interval. 
Therefore one says that a parameter is locally non identifiable. Dividing the set of parameters 
in those to be estimated and those to be calibrated we have relied on related studies by 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). Concerning the group of calibrated parameters we 
proceed as follows. The backward looking inflation polynomial in the Phillips curve ipa , the 
impact of economic activity on inflation ya , the interest rate sensitivity of economic activity 
in the IS-curve rb , and the autoregressive part in the output gap equation yib  were specified 
by estimates as reported by Rudebusch (2000) which are displayed in Table 10. Rudebusch 
(2000) used the following specifications: tp  was specified as the quarterly inflation rate in the 
GDP chain-weighted price index tp  seasonally adjusted and calculated at an annual rate 
( )14 ln lnt tP P-- ; tp  is the four quarter moving average constructed as ( )
3
0
1 4 t ji p -=å ; ti  is 
the four quarter average federal funds rate, hence 
31
4 0 t ji
i -=å ; yt is the output gap constructed 
as the percentage deviation of the output Yt from trend output *tY , where 
*
tY  was taken from 
the Congressional Budget Office. All variables were demeaned prior to estimation. Note in 
particular that the specification as proposed by Rudebusch (2000) implies that the sum over 
the inflation polynomial (
4
1
1ii pb= =å ) is equal to one, so that the long run neutrality of 
money holds. This means in steady state ( 1 2 3 ...t t t tp p p p p- - -= = = = = .) it holds that: 
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 [ ]( ) 11 2 3 4 01y p p p pb b b b a p-= - + + + . (4.31) 
 
Obviously the property of long run neutrality is violated as long as 
( )1 2 3 4 1p p p pb b b b+ + + ¹ . Higher inflation targets 0p  could boost output permanently, which 
would violate the long run neutrality of money. Thus, it is desirable to set the slope coefficient 
equal to one b=1, which translates into ( ) 11 0b a -- = . This is from an economic point of 
view somewhat problematic as b  should be interpreted as a discount factor. 
 
PARAMETER SYMBOL ESTIMATE 
Phillips Curve     
Inflation  Polynom 
1p
a   0.67 
 
2p
a   -0.14 
 
3p
a   0.4 
 
4p
a   0.07 
    
Output Coefficient ya   0.13 
    
IS-Curve     
Output Polynom  
1yb   1.15 
 
2y
b   -0.27 
    
Interest Rate Elasticity rb   -0.09 
    
Fiscal Policy    
Structural fiscal balance 1g   -1.8 
    
Table 10: Parameter Calibration 
 
Based on this partitioning Table  11 summarizes the estimated set of parameters V  that 
minimize s the distance measure (4.29). 
For the closed economy US-model the estimates can be characterized as follows: The weight 
ly  on stabilising squared deviations of the output gap around zero is rather small compared to 
the weight put on the other two goal variables of monetary policy. It is well known that this 
does not mean that monetary policy does not care on the output gap. This is quickly 
confirmed if one takes a look at the optimal monetary policy rule which is given by:  
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 1 2 3 1 10.2947 0.1140 0.1169 0.0166 0.2348 0.0701 0.6391t t t t t t t ti y y ip p p p- - - - -= + + + + + +  (4.32) 
 
Hence monetary policy reacts on impact with an increase of 0.2348 to current changes in the 
output gap and with a coefficient of 0.0701 to changes in last period’s output gap. This can be 
explained as follows: Even a central bank that only puts a modest weight on output 
stabilization opts to react on movements in economic activity in order not to loose control 
over the inflation rate as the output gap is the driving variable of the inflation process (e.g., 
Svensson (2003)). 
 
PARAMETER SYMBOL ESTIMATE 
Degrees of forward 
lookingness  USA Euro-Area 
Phillips Curve fg  0.6 0.35 
IS Curve yv  0.4 0.24 
    
Monetary Policy     
Weight on inflation pl  1 1 
Weight on output yl  0.15 0.61 
Weight on interest rate 
smoothing ilD  1.85 0.2836 
Fiscal Policy   
Automatic Stabilization c  / -0.53 
   
Other parameters   
Demand Externalities  j  / 0.2586 
TOT effect in IS-equation i  / 0.3144 
Imported Inflation x  / 0.3090 
Fiscal Policy multiplier f  / 0.3144 
Table 11: Parameter Estimates 
 
The finding that output gap stabilization only seems to be of minor importance as an 
independent goal of monetary policy is well in line with related studies that coherently come 
to the same result. The relatively high weight on financial market stability as an independent 
goal of monetary policy confirms earlier results by Dennis (2001) and Söderlind, Söderström 
and Vredin (2005) . The high weight on interest rate smoothing is reflected in the optimal 
discretionary monetary policy rule as the coefficient on it-1 is equal to 0.6391.  The degree of 
forward-lookingness in the Phillips curve is identified to be equal to 0.4. Hence 40% of 
economic agents seem to build rational expectations on the inflation rate whereas 60% set 
their prices based on rule of thumbs. This result lies in the midst of the estimates presented by 
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related studies. Accordingly the estimation results give further evidence that purely forward-
looking Phillips curves do not fit the facts. The degree of forward-lookingness in the IS-
equation is estimated to be equal to 0.4. Hence only a modest degree of forward-lookingness 
seems to be present in the data, whic h confirms earlier results by Fuhrer (2000). In other 
words a purely forward-looking IS-equation is not able to describe the optimal consumption 
plan of households. Consumption decisions seem to be mainly driven by rule -of-thumb 
behaviour and habit formation. Households centre their current and future spending decisions 
on yesterday’s consumption level or alternatively around some targeted level of consumption.  
 
LEVELS  ONE-QUATER-CHANGES RANK 
iy  STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
AC(1) AC(2) AC(3)  
S TANDARD 
DEVIATION 
AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) 
 Inflation 
Data 0.9794 0.649 0.514 0.585  0.8105 -0.32 -0.283 0.101 
Fitted 1.4668 0.6733 0.4970 0.4938  1.1857 -0.2303 -0.2649  
 Output Gap 
Data 1.6953 0.945 0.865 0.755  0.5462 0.28 0.278 0.049 
Fitted 1.4906 0.7823    0.9837    
          
 Federal Funds Rate 
Data 1.9326 0.930 0.814 0.671  0.5365 0.58 0.303 0.191 
Fitted 1.5113 0.58 0.303 0.191  0.4626 0.5873 0.2810  
Table 12: Time Series Properties: Simulated and Actual Data: (1987:4-2002:1) 
 
As Table  12 indicates, the estimated vector [1 0.15 1.85 0.4 0.4 1]USV =  captures the 
correct signs of the autocorrelation functions over all relevant variables. Nevertheless the 
model has some problems in displaying the low variance in the inflation rate and the low 
variance in the first difference of the output gap. 
Qualitatively the estimation results retrieved for the euro-area model are very comparable. In 
particular it prevails that the number of backward-looking agents is more important than the 
number of forward-looking households and firms. Additionally monetary policy puts a higher 
weight on stabilizing the inflation rate than stabilizing the output gap. Nevertheless the weight 
on output stabilization seems to be more important for the euro-area sample than for the term 
of Alan Greenspan. Of course one should keep in mind that we rely for the euro-area on a 
synthetic data set starting in 1983. As Italy had average inflation rates of 9.6%, Spain of 9.3% 
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and Greece of 19% in the 1980’s, there is of course a bias towards persistent inflation cycles  
in the data sample. Nevertheless it is common practice to estimate Euro-area parameters on 
long data samples. Related studies like Smets and Wouters (2005) use data samples ranging 
back to the first quarter of 1974. Note that the model fits the inflation and interest dynamics 
quite well whereas it had some problems in capturing the output gap dynamics (see Figure 
31). The open economy parameters are in line with those reported in literature. The estimated 
parameter for automatic stabilization is with a point estimate of -0.53 close to the value 
proposed by Aarle, Bartolomeo, Engwerda and Plasmans (2002) who have calibrated c  equal 
to 0.5c = . 
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Figure 31: Minimum Distance Estimation by Matching Theoretical to the Empirical SACF 
 
 
4.2.3  Excursus: A Note on the Applied Algorithm and      
    Determinacy 
 
In this section we will shortly highlight the implemented algorithms. Like in many 
applications there is a trade -off between robustness and speed. Depending on the overall 
computational task we have chosen the appropriate algorithm. For the closed economy part 
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the computational burden is manageable so that we have opted to implement a tight grid-
search method. The overall computational task can be handled within a few hours. In the case 
of the open economy model grid search algorithms  are not feasible due to the excessive 
computational burden. Therefore we applied more sophisticated techniques like Nelder-Mead 
search algorithms. Additionally we will show that both estimates are stable and determinate 
which assures that we have found two unique rational expectations equilibria. 
 
 
4.2.3.1 Closed Economy Model 
 
For the closed economy model we have applied a simple but robust method, namely a grid 
search algorithm. This method is robust but time consuming. Nevertheless as we only try to 
estimate in total five parameters it is still feasible. We iterate the individual parameters over 
the following ranges: 
· fg  In the interval from 0 to 1 with step size 0.1.  
· yv  From 0 to 1 with step size 0.1. 
· rv  Was set alternatively equal to null or one. 
· yl  In the interval from 0 to 4 w ith step size 0.05. 
· ilD  In the interval from 0 to 6 with step size 0.1.  
This procedure generates a total of 960,000 constellations for the value function. We have 
chosen the one that produces the global minimum  Jot within the grid. Note that this procedure 
is explicitly based on the assumption that the underlying value function is well behaved. This 
assumes of course that the grid is reasonably dense so that we hit the global optimum 
sufficiently close. Nevertheless under the assumption that the quadratic value function ( )J V  
is sufficiently well behaved we have a priori no reason to believe that we miss the optimum 
by a large scale . 
 
 
4.2.3.2   Euro-Area Model 
 
In the open economy part of the chapter we estimate in total 10 coefficients simultaneously. 
Therefore a grid based procedure as applied in the closed economy part of the chapter is no 
longer feasible. Applying a sufficiently accurate grid would mean that we would have in total 
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96,000,000,000 parameter constellations to compute. This would hardly be feasible in terms 
of time consumption. Therefore we have opted to estimate the open economy part of the 
chapter by faster algorithms that do not scan the whole value function within a prespecified 
space but rely on more sophisticated techniques. To initialize the minimum distance estimator 
we apply the following two step procedure: 
 
          1.   
( )
,min ,max
min |
: ;
i i
i i i
J
i
V V
V V V
-
é ù" Î ë û
          (4.33) 
 
          2.   ( )min
prior
i
prior
iJ
V
V .             (4.34) 
 
In the first step we try to obtain good starting values for the algorithm. Therefore we fix all 
elements in the vector iV  except one. We minimize the function ( )|i iJ V V-  on the bounded 
interval [ ]min max;V V . The formulated priors for the individual parameters as well as the specific 
bounds are formulated on the basis of plausibility. By this procedure we retrieve a vector 
priorV . In a second step we use these optimized priors to estimate the global optimum letting 
all parameters in prioroptV  variable. The concrete optimization was performed by a 
multidimensional unconstraint non-linear minimization procedure. The applied algorithm is a 
so called derivative free Nelder-Mead algorithm. The Nelder Mead algor ithm is based on 
simplex transformations. For details see Mirand and Fackler (2002), pp.62-64.  
 
 
4.2.3.3   Technical Equilibrium Analysis 19?  
 
Following Blanchard and Khan (1980) we test for uniqueness and stability by computing the  
eigenvalues. It has to hold that the number of unstable eigenvalues is equal to the number of 
forward-looking variables. A look at the  partitioned state vector tells us that the number of 
predetermined variables is equal to nine. The number of forward-looking variables is equal to 
four: 
· { }'1 1 2 3 1 1 2 3, , , , , , , ,t t t t t t t t t tX y y i i ip p p p- - - - - - -=  
                                              
19 All codes for basic computations were taken from Paul Söderlind homepage: 
http://www.hhs.se/personal/PSoderlind/Research/MonEEAMatLab.zip 
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· { } '2 3 2 1 1, , ,t t t t t t t t tX E E E E yp p p+ + + += . 
 
Figure 32 confirms that for [ ]1 0.15 1.85 0.4 0.4 1USV =  the number of forward-
looking variables satisfies the proposition as stated by Blanchard and Khan (1980). Hence we 
conclude that the identified baseline configuration USV  generates a stable and unique solution.  
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
The simulations were performed under the baseline estimate as reported in Table  11. 
Figure 32: Regions of Determinacy: US-Model 
 
For the open economy model one can apply the same procedure as beforehand. As can be 
seen the model is remarkably robust against changes in the preference vector of monetary 
policy. For a vast range of parameter constellations [ ]0 50y il lDé ù Îë û  uniqueness and 
stability holds. On contrary the model seems to display indeterminacy for combinations of 
high degrees of forward-lookingness in the Phillips curve and the IS -equation. This scenario 
occurs if we have low degrees of habit persistence in the IS-equation and a high share of 
Calvo price setters in the Phillips curve. Additionally indeterminacy and instability seems to 
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be an issue for combinations of very active fiscal (high degree of automatic stabilization) 
paired with varies degrees of activism on the side of monetary policy (varying degrees of 
output stabilization). Figure 33 shows how the determinacy property reacts to changes in the 
baseline calibration as monetary policy reacts more strongly to changes in inflation and 
output. It impressively illustrates that as soon as monetary policy puts a weight on price 
stability in its main focus determinacy is assured in the quarterly setting. Nevertheless in the 
case where monetary policy neglects its legal mandate to safeguard stable prices ( 0pl = ) the 
model becomes indeterminate. Additionally combinations of high degrees of forward-
lookingness in price setting and high degrees of forward-lookingnes in consumption decisions 
induce indeterminacy, whereas a higher degree of price stickiness builds in ‘path-dependency’ 
that generates determinacy. 
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The simulations were performed under the baseline estimate as reported in Table  11. 
Figure 33: Regions of Determinacy: Euro-Area Model 
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4.3  Evaluating the Closed Economy Model: The Mechanics 
   of an Estimated New Keynesian Macromodel 
 
In the following we will discuss in detail the mechanics of a New Keynesian macromodel as 
embedded in the data. The following section will proceed as follows. In a first step we will 
analyze the disequilibrium behaviour of the model by means of impulse response analysis. 
Then we will systematically analyze the correlation structure embedded in the model with 
respect to changes in key parameters like the degree of forward-lookingness and the 
preference vector of monetary policy. 
 
 
4.3.1  Impulse Response Functions  
 
The main characteristics of the estimated baseline configuration for the closed economy US-
model are depicted in Figure 34. The high degree of interest rate smoothing and the lags in the 
hybrid Phillips-curve and the IS -equation translate into hump shaped impulse response 
functions that can be considered in line with conventional New Keynesian macromodels (e.g., 
Walsh (2003), ch. 11). We will shortly discuss each impulse response function in term. 
Quite remarkably the impulse response function of the inflation rate with respect to an interest 
rate shock does not exhibit a prize puzzle (see Figure 34(b)). Following an interest rate shock 
the impulse response function of the interest rate starts to decline and reaches its peak 
response after three quarters. Due to the drop in economic activity the inflation rate equally 
starts to decline and reaches its peak response with a lag of six quarters. After approximately 
20 periods all series are back at their baseline values. Hence long run neutrality holds. The 
impulse response functions nicely depict the transmission structure encapsulated within this 
particular specification of a New Keynesian macromodel. The peak response in the output gap 
leads the peak response in the inflation rate which can be explained by the backward-looking 
inflation dynamics in the HNKPC. This reflects that the output gap is the driving variable of 
the inflation process within a hybrid specification and that monetary policy can only disinflate 
by deeds. Monetary policy seems largely to accommodate supply shocks (see Figure 34(a)). 
The initial unit supply shock leads to a pronounced but modest increase in the interest rate, 
which goes hand in hand with a drop in the output gap induced by a tighter stance in monetary 
policy (peak response after 3 quarters). Consequently the inflation rate starts to decline and 
returns to its baseline after 13 quarters. The output gap exhibits a pronounced reaction, which 
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reaches its peak response after 6 quarters. Following a positive unit demand shock (see Figure 
34(b)), monetary policy reacts by raising real interest rates (peak response after 3 quarters). 
Due to the stronger economic activity the inflation rate equally starts to rise. It reaches its 
peak response after 3 quarters. All depicted time series return to their baseline values after 13 
quarters. This somewhat pronounced response compared to a supply shock reflects that 
monetary policy only puts a modest weight on output gap stabilisation ( 0.15l = ). 
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Impulse Response Function for the baseline configuration: [ ]1 0.15 1.85 0.4 0.4 1V = . 
Figure 34: Impulse Response Function 
 
 
4.3.2 Baseline Evaluation and the Implied Model Dynamics 
 
In the following section we will perform a battery of baseline evaluations to get a deeper 
understanding of the mechanics of the model. In particular we will take a look at the 
sensitivity of the variances, covariance’s and the implied autocorrelations and cross 
correlations with respect to changes in the individual elements of the identified vector  
[ ]US y i f ypV l l l g vD= . Figure 35 shows how the variances of the goal variables 
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respond ceteris paribus to a change in the individual elements of V . The results are largely in 
line with expectations. An increasing weight on the individual goal variables, hence the 
inflation rate, the output gap and the change in interest rates respectively lead to a drop in the 
variances of each of these variables. E.g. if monetary policy puts an increasing weight on 
interest rate smoothing (inc reasing ilD ) the variance of the interest rate starts to decline. The 
same holds true for the other target variables of monetary policy. Nevertheless reducing the 
variance of one goal variable is no free lunch. Let us assume that monetary policy puts a 
higher weight on stabilizing the inflation rate (increasing pl ). As side effect the variance of 
the interest rate increases. In other words the central bank needs to make a more rigorous use 
of its instrument in response to supply or demand shocks.  
This is in particular obvious if we take a look at Figure 35(b). Figure 35(b) depicts the 
implications if monetary policy puts a greater concern for economic activity. As we see the 
variance of the output gap drops with an increasing yl . Nevertheless this can only be realized 
at the cost of an increase in the variance of the inflation rate. This means in particular that 
central banks take a less vigorous stance on supply shocks thereby increasing the fluctuations 
in inflation. With respect to the degree of forward-lookingness the following seems to hold 
true. An increasing degree of forward lookingness in the hybrid Phillips curve fg  and in the 
intertemporal IS-curve yv  implies a sharp drop of the variance of the interest rate. Hence if 
we keep the preference vector corresponding to the period loss function 
2 2 20.15 1.85t t t tL y ip= + + D  fixed an increasing degree of forward-lookingness serves as a 
substitute for a more aggressive monetary policy stance. Therefore one might say that an 
increasing degree of forward-lookingness implies that monetary policy does not need to “lean 
against strong persistence” in the data. Hence the results presented by purely backward 
looking models stating that estimated response coefficients in monetary policy rules are 
smaller than optimal coefficients retrieved by control methods may be s purious. In the light of 
the presented results these studies might simply neglect to capture the degree of forward-
lookingness 0.4y fv g= =  present in the data. Influential backward looking models are for 
instance Ball (1997) or Rudebusch et al (1999). Figure 36 evaluates the impact of changes in 
the estimated vector [ ]y i yp pV l l l m mD=  on the autocorrelation patterns of the 
inflation rate. As one would expect, an increasing weight on stabilizing the inflation rate 
around the inflation target leads to a drop in the persistence of the inflation process (see 
Figure 36 (a)).  
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Figure 35: Variances with Changing [ ]US y i f ypV l l l g vD= * 
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In other words if monetary policy uses its instrument more rigorously to keep the inflation 
rate close to the inflation target the degree of persistence in the inflation process declines. 
This underlines that the degree of persistence is endogenous to the monetary policy regime. 
Nevertheless the ‘beneficial’ reduction of persistence in one variable comes at a cost. E.g., an 
increasing weight on stabilizing the output gap leads to an increase in persistence of the 
inflation process. One likely explanation can be given as follows: As monetary policy tends to 
react stronger to movements in the output gap it will tend to ‘overlook’ supply shocks leading 
to a higher degree of persistence in the inflation rate. An increasing weight on stabilizing the 
change in interest rates leads to an increase in the inflation persistence, which can be quite 
naturally explained by the fact that monetary policy uses its instrument less vigorously to 
keep the inflation rate on track. As expected an increasing degree of forward lookingness 
leads to a drop in the degree of persistence of the inflation rate. Forward looking price setters 
anticipate that the central bank will raise real interest rates in order to keep inflation under 
control. Therefore price increases tend to be more modest and deviations from the inflation 
target are less pronounced. Note that in the limit with yv  converging to one, when we 
approximate the NKPC the inflation process converges towards white noise. Figure 37 shows 
the sensitivity of the autocorrelations of the interest rate with respect to the individual 
elements of the estimated vector. Increasing weights on interest rate stabilization raises the 
persistence in interest rates as monetary policy uses its instrument more cautious and gradual 
(Figure 37 (c)). Hence the interest rate reaction in response to shocks will be more sustained. 
This automatically leads to a higher degree of persistence. Varying weights on stabilizing the 
output gap do not have a significant impact on the autocorrelation structure (Figure 37 (b)). 
Figure 37 depicts some cross-correlations inherently nested in the chosen baseline 
calibrationV . Evaluating the cross-correlations is of key interest as the purely forward looking 
New Keynesian macromodel makes two strong predictions. On the one hand it states that 
there should be a positive correlation between changes in the output gap and the inflation rate. 
Hence higher real interest rates today foreshadow an economic boom tomorrow. Secondly the 
New Keynesian macromodel predicts that increasing inflation rates are negatively correlated 
with economic activity. Both predictions are at odds with the data. Therefore one needs to 
introduce backward-looking behaviour in order to change the signs of the relevant cross-
correlations. The following results stand out: Figure 37 depicts the cross correlation of the 
inflation rate tp  with the lagged differences of the interest rate 1,t ti i -D D  and 2ti -D .  
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*setting 1rv =  dominated setting 0rv = in terms of the chosen criterion, therefore we kept 1rv =  for all possible specifications. 
Figure 36: Autocorrelations of Inflation with C hanging [ ]US y i f ypV l l l g vD=  * 
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An increasing degree of forward lookingness in the IS-curve strengthens the correlation 
between past changes in the interest rate and today’s inflation rate.  
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Figure 37: Autocorrelations of the Interest Rate [ ]US y i f ypV l l l g mD= * 
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This result can be interpreted as a faster ‘pass-through’ effect running from interest rates to 
the inflation rate. Figure 36 (c) depicts the cross-correlation between the current output gap 
ty  and past changes in the interest rate 1,t ti i -D D  and 2ti -D . Figure 38 shows that the model 
needs a critical mass of rule-of-thumb setters otherwise the prediction of the purely forward-
looking IS-equation will dominate according to which high interest rates today will 
foreshadow an economic boom (see equation (144)).  Hence given the preference vector 
[ ]1 0.15 1.85 0.4 0.4 1V =  there is a restriction on the set of reasonable parameter 
constellations yv . The model needs at least 60% of economic agents that are forward 
looking. The same holds true for the cross correlation between the inflation rate and the 
output gap. Unless we do not have a critical mass of 60% of economic agents that are 
backward-looking the cross correlation will predict that periods of high inflation were driven 
by periods of low output gaps. 
 
*setting 1rv =  dominated setting 0rv = in terms of the chosen criterion, therefore we kept 1rv =  for all possible specifications. 
Figure 38: Selected Cross Correlations with Changing [ ]US y i yp pV l l l v vD=  
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4.3.4  Some Conclusions 
 
Within this chapter we proposed a calibration technique, which explicitly takes the variances, 
covariances, autocorrelations and cross-correlations into account. Based on this technique we 
present evidence that around 60% of the pricing and consumption decisions are not made by 
optimising agents but by rule of thumb setters. This result is in line with earlier studies and 
underlines that purely forward-looking Phillips curves and IS-equations are unable to match 
the persistence present in the data. The finding that a majority of households and firms do not 
seem to optimise but base their decisions on heuristics may be a fruitful area for future 
research. We have indicated that ‘conventional wisdom’ which states that estimated 
coefficients are smaller than those retrieved by means of optimal control may be spurious. 
The analysis of the level of variances present in the data as well as the evaluation of selected 
cross-correlations clearly indicates that some degree of forward lookingness is necessary to fit 
the facts. If monetary policy opts for a stable and unique rule, the job of monetary policy 
makers is  much easier as it would be in a purely backward-looking system. Thus due  to the 
implied self stabilizing properties of forward looking systems grounded on peoples 
expectations on stabilizing monetary policy itself (self -fulfilling expectations)  the 
disequilibrium dynamics are less pronounced. The evaluation of some selected cross 
correlations served as a useful benchmark to put restrictions on the degree of forward and 
backward-lookingness in the data in the Phillips curve and the IS-equation. The identified 
preference vector of monetary policy indicates that the dominant goal of US monetary policy 
is the stabilization of the inflation rate around the inflation target. Output -gap stabilization as 
an independent goal of monetary policy only seems to play a minor role for the conduct of 
monetary policy.  
 
 
4.4 The Stability and Growth Pact: Time to Rebuild!20* 
 
In this section we will apply the open economy model to address the SGP. With the launch of 
the third stage EMU the member countries have embarqued to unknown territory. Once more 
                                              
20 * The chapter benefited from presentation in Berlin (9th Workshop Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic 
Policies -Alternatives to the Orthodoxy, Alternative Macroeconomic Policies , 2005), Göttingen (Workshop 
International Economics, 2005), Geneva (xth Spring Meeting of Young Economists, 2005) and Dresden (Annual 
Meeting of the German Economic Association 2004). The authors would like to thank the session participants 
for valuable comments, in particular Alina Barnett (Warwick University). 
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the economic momentum served as a vehicle to link irreversibly the fate of the member 
countries as it was from the outset of the union. As a consequence the twelve member states 
had to rethink and rebuild a new common European macroeconomic architecture- The SGP- 
that enshrined the views on monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the euro area. 
Unfortunately, the grandfathers of the SGP were not ignited by the challenge to restructure 
but mostly guided by cautioness. Or put differently the new architecture is a child of German 
“Angst”. Given the current problems and shortcomings of the SGP it is time to rethink and 
rebuild. 
The unique feature of a currency area is given by the fact that the different macroeconomic 
agents, the ECB, national governments and labour unions focus on different levels of target 
variables. The common central bank whose policy we assume to be conducted according to 
the notion of inflation targeting (Svensson (1999)) focuses on union wide aggregates. It sets 
nominal interest rates for the currency area consistent with its inflation target while equally 
having a concern for economic activity. This means in particular that the interest rate policy 
of the ECB will be indifferent against mean preserving distributions of macroeconomic 
outcomes across member states. In contrast governments basically focus on national 
aggregates. In a monetary union that is subject to asymmetric shocks fiscal policy serves as a 
buffer to block idiosyncratic shocks from spreading to other member countries. Of course 
fiscal policy might equally be itself the source of destabilisation as incentives for  free-rider 
behaviour are present. Therefore a monetary union calls for a renaissance of fiscal 
stabilization policy21. Obviously this calls for rules which neatly balance the chances and 
perils that are nested in monetary and fiscal policy interaction in a currency union with 
decentralised fiscal authorities. 
This section is structured as follows: In a first step we aim to identify a small scale symmetric 
two country macromodel for the euro area that realistically describes the data. To specify a 
model we need to identify the monetary and fiscal policy rules that describe the current 
macroeconomic paradigm in reign in Europe. Thereby we stress the view taken by the 
European Commission on fiscal policy rules and the view taken by the ECB- given its high 
status of legal independence- on monetary policy rules. 
                                              
21 In a closed large economy it is somewhat a consensus that active demand management should be conducted by 
the central bank as these have heavily improved over the last decades when it comes to stabilize economic 
fluctuations. Taylor (2000) comes to the following conclusion: "In the current context of the U.S economy, it 
seems best to let fiscal policy have its main countercyclical impact through the automatic stabilizers. U.S. 
monetary policy has been doing a good job in the recent decades at keeping aggregate demand close to its 
potential GDP, partly because this is consistent with the Fed's inflation objective and partly because it is viewed 
as a good policy in its own light. " 
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Once we have calibrated the model we perform a battery of tests. In particular we want to 
evaluate the impact of symmetric and asymmetric fiscal spending shocks to underline the 
need for rules as fiscal policy instrumentalised by myopic politicians inflicts substantial 
damage on the rest of the union. This holds in particular as the ECB will only take care on 
idiosyncratic events insofar as they have an impact on the overall European averages. In a 
second step we analyse how effective fiscal policy is in stabilising economic cycles by 
computing the impact of varying degrees of automatic stabilizers on the correlation structure 
of the model. In particular we will evaluate whether fiscal policy can reduce the persistence 
nested in the output gap and the inflation rate. We will state the case that the rules as laid 
down in the SGP are of little use. The implicit assumption of the SGP that “high deficits lead 
to high inflation rates” has generated a malfunctioning alarming system. The 3% deficit 
criterion impairs the ability of fiscal policy to effectively stabilize the cycle. We finish the 
chapter by giving some proposals along which we think the SGP should be reformed. 
 
 
4.4.1 Specifying a Symmetric Two Country Model for the Euro Area  
 
In this section we will shortly highlight the current macroeconomic interaction in the euro-
area as enshrined in the treaty of Maastricht and the SGP in order to identify a realistic model 
for the euro area. As we will see the current macroeconomic paradigm in reign in Europe was 
highly shaped by the view that one needs stringent fiscal policy rules to safeguard the de-facto 
independence of the ECB22. The European Council feared that an unsustainable fiscal policy 
at the national level causes negative spill over effects in the form of higher inflation rates and 
real interest rates for the rest of the union, and in the worst case scenario ultimately calls for a 
bail out as a consequence of unsustainable debt to GDP ratios. In conclusion one can say that 
the current SGP was strongly shaped by the view that wet nosed governments could 
ultimately inflate Europe. In the following section we put the focus on identifying monetary 
and fiscal policy rules that were designed to prevent such developments. 
 
 
 
                                              
22 The European Council stated: “The European Council underlines the importance of safeguarding sound 
government finances as a means to strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable 
growth conducive to employment creation. It is also necessary to ensure that national budgetary policies support 
stability oriented monetary policies. “ (European Council (2003)).  
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4.4.1.1  The Current Setting of the ECB  
 
Despite its official strategy (ECB (2004)) it is common practice to specify the objective 
function of the ECB by the following loss function, although it is typically related to a regime 
of inflation targeting: 
 
 { }2 2 20 0 tt t y t i ttL E y ipb l p l l
¥
D=
= + +å .23 (4.35) 
 
According to equation (4.35) the ECB tries to reduce aggregate price dispersion across the 
currency area while equally having a concern for stabilising economic activity. The 
preference parameter yl  depicts the weight monetary policy attaches to stabilise the output 
gap versus stabilising the inflation rate. Additionally Woodford (2003, ch. 6) has shown that 
equation (4.35) can be derived as a second order approximation to a households expected 
utility problem in a New Keynesian macromodel (see 2.1.3.2). In order to achieve its targets 
the ECB sets the interest rate in response to exogenous disturbances and consistent with the 
structural equations of the model so that the loss function Lt is minimised. Note that the ECB 
only targets at euro area wide averages, whereas it does not take care on the dispersion of goal 
variables across member states. In other words the ECB does not consider the spread as a 
problem as long as it is mean preserving. Additionally we assume that the ECB implements 
its desired target rate only gradually. As indicated interest rate smoothing can be rationalized 
by a broad range of arguments. Among them are for instance that the ECB does not want to 
disrupt financial markets. Additionally gradualism can be a direct result of uncertainties to 
which a monetary policy maker is exposed (Brainard uncertainty, model uncertainty, data 
uncertainty (Martin and Salmon Chris (1999)). From a theoretic perspective interest rate 
smoothing is a device of making use of private sector expectations of further interest rate 
steps in the same direction in a forward looking environment (Lansing and Bharat (2003)). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
23 Note that throughout our exposition we will make use of the fact that after scaling the intertemporal loss 
function by ( )1 b-  the intertemporal loss function approaches the weighted average of the unconditional 
variances of the individual goal variables: ( ) [ ] [ ] [ ]
1
lim 1 t t y t i tL Var Var y Var i
b
b p l lD
¾¾®
- = + + D . 
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4.4.1.2  On The Need for Stringent Fiscal Policy Rules in a    
     Monetary Union 
 
In the proceeding section we have identified a symmetric two-country model for the euro area 
that generates a stable and unique rational-expectations equilibrium. Based on this model we 
will now provide the basic rationale for stringent rules in a currency area. In order to 
understand how fiscal policy functions in a monetary union and why there is a need for 
stringent rules we evaluate the impulse response functions with respect to symmetric and 
asymmetric fiscal spending shocks.  
As can be seen from Figure 39 a symmetric fiscal spending shock induces persistent  
deviations of the inflation rate from the inflation target of the central bank. Due to the boost in 
fiscal spending economic activity starts to accelerate and output is above its potential. As 
monetary policy aims at stabilising inflation as well as the output gap the central bank will 
increase short term interest rates which depresses economic activity. Quite naturally the 
impulse response pattern is similar to that one would observe in the case of a demand shock. 
In sum the impulse-response function depicts that fiscal spending shocks can induce persistent 
swings in all key variables. Quite obviously as known from VAR-analysis persistence is a 
very common theme and not specific to a monetary union. Potential conflicts are nested in 
asymmetric spending shocks as they potentially  generate dispersion in macroeconomic 
aggregates across the currency areas (see ch. 3). Therefore the need for rules prevails for the 
case of asymmetric fiscal spending shocks. Let us assume that fiscal authorities in country one 
trigger an unexpected fiscal expansion. The impulse-response functions illustrate that a 
central bank that is indifferent against mean preserving spreads can hardly operate 
conveniently in such an environment. The key problem for the ECB prevails in the graphs 
(a)/(b)/(c)/(d). The persistent deviations in all target variables are remarkable. The spending 
shock in country one boosts its own inflation rate as well as the output gap if both blocs are of 
equal size. The ECB only reacts modestly compared to a symmetric spending shock as the 
short term nominal rate is only raised round about half of the size one could observe for a 
symmetric shock. The ECB faces the fundamental problem that economic activity in country 
one is fuelled by the domestic spending shock whereas country two exhibits cyclical swings, 
as the ECB increases short term interest rates. Thus the ECB can not punish individual 
member states by raising average real interest rates which clearly shows that stringent rules 
are a necessary prerequisite  for the well functioning of a monetary union, to prevent free rider 
behaviour and negative spill over effects for other member states. The depression in economic 
activity in country two is somewhat dampened as our model allows for direct demand spill 
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over effects. Additionally we can already see that automatic stabilizers in country two prevent 
swings in the output gap from becoming more persistent. Hence the impulse response 
functions show that automatic stabilisers serve as a useful instrument to cushion the 
consequences of an unsustainable policy in other member states. 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function for the estimated baseline calibration.  
Figure 39: Symmetric F iscal Spending Shoc k* 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function for the estimated baseline calibration.  
Figure 40: Asymmetric Fiscal Spending Shock 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function for the estimated baseline calibration.  
Figure 41: Measuring some Indicators for D ispersion 
 
This simple illustration clearly indicates that there is a need to safeguard the ECB by stringent 
fiscal rules. In the case of asymmetric fiscal spending shocks fiscal authorities can be a source 
of destabilisation. The link between fiscal deficits and high inflation rates that were of great 
concern to the fathers of the SGP is clearly present. The two causal mechanisms in our model 
that govern the divergence in real conditions are the wedges in the real interest  rate and the 
wedge in the intra-european competitiveness. Ceteris paribus the real rate effects will be more 
pronounced in relatively closed economies whereas with an increasing degree of openness the 
real exchange rate effect is likely to decrease in importance.  
 
 
4.4.1.3  On the Deficiencies of the SGP 
 
In the previous section we have stressed the need for stringent policy rules that combine long 
run sustainability with short run flexibility. Unfortunately the current SGP is inappropriate to 
achieve this task. The main construction error of the SGP is its underlying assumption that 
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countries with high deficits have produced high inflation rates. As shown in Bofinger (2003) 
by regression analysis this is generally not true for the euro area. This fundamental 
construction error implies that the SGP has at least two series deficiencies which we will 
discuss in term. In particular it potentially impairs the ability of fiscal policy to effectively 
stabilise the cycle. Additionally the 3% deficit criterion has created a malfunctioning alarm-
system which needs to be reformed. 
 
 
4.4.1.3.1  The Impact of Automatic Stabilizers on the Correlation Structure 
 
In this section we analyse how powerful fiscal policy is. To get a deeper understanding we 
evaluate the mechanics of the model. In particular we will take a look at the sensitivity of the 
variances and autocorrelations with respect to changes in the stance of fiscal policy as 
measured by c  (see equation (4.312)). Remember throughout our model we have assumed 
that fiscal policy is conducted according to the following rule: 
 
 1, 1 1, 1, 1 1,
g
t t t tg g y gc l e-= - + +
(
. (4.36) 
 
In order to evaluate the power of fiscal policy we analyse the impact of fiscal policy on the 
standard deviation of the inflation rate, the output gap and the interest rate if fiscal policy 
engages more actively in dampening cycles (increasing c ). Figure 42 shows that a 
symmetric increase in fiscal activity (increasing c ) leads to a drop in the standard deviations 
of the aggregate inflation rate and the output gap. Nevertheless overstabil ization of the output 
gap leads to an increase in inflation volatility as national fiscal policy runs counter to a 
restrictive monetary stance in the case of a supply shock.  
Not surprisingly the variance in the output gap drops as fiscal policy becomes more active, as 
it smoothes out the impact of demand shocks (Figure 42). As positive side effect a more stable 
output gap translates into less persistent fluctuations of the inflation rate. Hence a more active 
fiscal policy does not only succeed in stabilising output but also serves as an instrument to 
bring the inflation rate closer to a white noise process. 
In order to compare the stabilisation properties of fiscal and monetary policy Figure 42 
depicts the ability to reduce the persistence of the inflation rate and the output gap 
respectively. Quite remarkably fiscal policy –guided by a simple rule- is very effective in 
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stabilising the inflation rate as persistence sharply drops in response to a more active fiscal 
stance (up to a level of 0.3c = ). The ability to reduce inertia in output is comparatively 
better than the one of monetary policy, although the output gap seems to exhibit a high degree 
of persistence. Hence a passive fiscal polic y can hardly be rationalised from a stabilisation 
perspective given the sound evidence on the ability of fiscal policy to stabilise economic 
activity.  
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function for the estimated baseline calibration.  
Figure 42: Standard Deviations 
 
The preceding two sections clearly present evidence that a currency area needs fiscal policy 
rules. On the one hand rules are necessary in order to prevent individual member states from 
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free rider behaviour. On the other hand fiscal policy is potentially a powerful tool from a 
stabilisation perspective. Therefore we conclude that a tying hands policy that would prevent 
fiscal policy from being used actively to fight cycles can hardly be rationalised. Such a trade-
off constellation clearly calls for stringent rules that liberate the potential benefits while 
equally dampening the potential harms. This was of course exactly what the fathers of the 
SGP had in mind when trying to combine short run flexibility (operate within 3%-deficits) 
with long run sustainability (debt to GDP< 60%), but unfortunately as we will illustrate in the 
next section the rules designed were flawed from the outset as they are based on the faulty 
assumption that high inflation rates mirror high deficits. 
 
 
4.4.1.3.2  Deficiency 1: The 3% Deficit Criterion Impairs the Ability of Fiscal
     Policy to Stabilise Economic Activity 
 
The current SGP assumes that ‘sound budgetary positions’ are the dominant strategy to 
safeguard price sta bility. Therefore the 3% deficit criterion limits the ability of short run 
flexibility as the SGP assumes that excessive deficits might cause inflation and unsustainable 
debt dynamics in the long run. Based on the following simulations: 
 
 1t t tX MX v-= + . (4.37) 
 
{ }'1 , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 1 , 1 , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 1 ,, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tX y y g i i i y y gp p p p p p p p- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -=
{ }'1 , , , , , ,,0,0,0, ,0, ,0,0,0, ,0,0,0, ,0,g gt i t i t i t i t i t i tn e h e e h e- - -= ,24 
 
we either assume asymmetric supply or demand shocks that hit country one. 
 
Table 13 shows the beneficial impact of automatic stabilisers. The ratios indicate the 
relationship of the aggregate variable with and without automatic stabilisation. As indicated 
the ratios are all well below one which clearly signals the beneficial impact of automatic 
stabilisation. Additionally the results show that within the New Keynesian framework output 
stabilisation is a valuable device to keep the inflation rate on track, as it helps to smooth out 
the impact on demand shocks as well as the consequences of fiscal spending shocks itself.  
E.g., in the case of a symmetric demand shock the ratio of output gap variability with 
                                              
24 Note that the error vector is based on the variance covariance matrix as given in appendix A.3. 
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stabilization and without stabilization drops round about 22%. Additionally the variability of 
inflation sharply drops as the main source of inflation variability is smoothed. The same 
applies for the case of a supply shock where the reduction in inflation variability translates 
into less output variability as the central bank does not need to make a rigorous use of the real 
interest rate. 
 
COUNTRY I 
RATIO (Y 0.3c = /Y 0c = ) RATIO (Y 0.5c = /Y 0c = ) 
SYMMETRIC SHOCK  
OUTPUT GAP 
0.84 0.93 
INFLATION RATE 
0.74 0.86 
SYMMETRIC S UPPLY SHOCK 
OUTPUT GAP 
0.84 0.96 
INFLATION RATE 
0.76 0.90 
SYMMETRIC DEMAND SHOCK  
OUTPUT GAP 
0.78 0.68 
INFLATION RATE 
0.40 0.84 
SYMMETRIC FISCAL SHOCK 
OUTPUT GAP 
1.75 1.49 
INFLATION RATE 
0.98 0.49 
Table 13 : Switch from an Active F iscal Stance 0.3c =  to a Passive 0c =  one. 
 
 
4.4.1.3.3   Deficiency 2: A Defective Alarming System 
 
In this section we will show that the SGP is a defective alarming system that is likely to 
trigger the monitoring procedure even if fiscal policy is conducted in a sustainable fashion. To 
state the case the starting point is the following reduced form: 
 
              1t t tX MX v-= + .          (4.38) 
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{ }'1 , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 1 , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 1 ,, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tX y y g i i i y y gp p p p p p p p- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -=
{ }'1 , , , ,,0,0,0, ,0, ,0,0,0, ,0,0,0, ,0,g gt i t i t it i t i t itn e h e e h e- - -=  
Fiscal policy is conducted according to the notion: 
 
 1, 1 1, 1, 1 1,
g
t t t tg g y gc l e-= - + +
(
. (4.39) 
 
To make realistic inferences we have calibrated 1 1.8%g = -  which is approximately the 
average from (1996 - 2005) and is also equal to the structural balance projected for 2006 for 
the euro area on average by the OECD. Clearly a structural balance equal to -1.8% would not 
be in line with the strict view the Commission takes but it would well be consistent with the 
60% (debt/GDP) ratio in the long run (see (De Grauwe (2000)). Therefore we model by 
assumption a sustainable fiscal stance. The 3%-deficit criterion can only be breached within 
our simulation if the fiscal stance parameter is driven by large demand, supply or fiscal 
spending shocks itself. In the following we want to illustrate with the help of a simulation that 
the alarm system nested in the SGP is not reliable.  
To make realistic inferences within our small scale macro model we have taken care of the 
fact that the structural supply and demand shocks hitting the individual member countries are 
correlated (see Angeloni and Ehrmann (1999), Karman and Weimann (2004)). The structural 
variance covariance matrix was set equal to the following baseline calibration which is based 
on the assumption that the structural shocks are correlated by 0. 2 (See Appendix 4.G). 
Based on this reduced form we have simulated the model over a hypothetical period of 
100,000 quarters 25. Table 14 shows the results of the simulation. Hence the Maastricht criteria 
are too strict as in none of the identifie d outcomes the long run sustainability is endangered as 
we have modelled by definition a sustainable fiscal stance. Therefore as long as the violation 
of the 3%-deficit criterion stems from the size of exogenous shocks and not from a fiscal 
policy that is conducted in an unsustainable fashion the violation of the Maastricht criteria is a 
necessary precondition to let automatic stabilisers freely operate. Of course it is equally 
possible that fiscal spending shocks itself might be responsible for “excessive deficits” (e.g. a 
                                              
25 Note that their is quite some discussion whether the very introduction of a currency area has altered the 
correlation structure of shocks. Karman and Weimann (2004) argue that there is evidence from bivariate VAR-
analysis that shocks effecting the demand and supply side of the economies in Europe have converged to a 
degree of correlation of round about 0.5 for both types of shocks respectively. Within our simulation we have 
chosen lower correlations which were reported by Angeloni and Ehrmann (1999).The correlation of fiscal 
spending shocks was set equal to null. Bruneau et al (1999) report modest negative correlations of -0.11 prior 
to the introduction of the monetary union. 
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natural disaster like in Germany’s flooding events 2002). But as long as these shocks are 
symmetrically distributed and centered around null they are unproblematic. 
Based on this analysis we have found that the unconditional probability for an individual 
member country to be driven above the 3% deficit criterion by a large shock is approximately 
9%. A related study by Hallet and McAdam estimates the probability to be equal to 8%. This 
in itself might seem an acceptable probability. Nevertheless the currency area consists of 
twelve member states. Let us for the sake of simplicity assume that the member countries are 
of equal size and that the unconditional probabilities are uncorrelated. Then we see that the 
probability of triggering the ala rming mechanism on error dramatically increases well above 
50% which does not seem to be sustainable from a political perspective. Hence with the help 
of the proceeding analysis we indicate d that the current setting implied that the 3%-deficit 
criterion is unreliable as a warning system to identify an unsustainable fiscal stance. The 
assumed causal relationship between high inflation rates driven by fiscal policy and the fiscal 
balance is everything but exhaustive. Additionally one should keep in mind that historically a 
direct relationship between the fiscal balance and the inflation rate was only given if fiscal 
policy could borrow directly from the central bank. But this is explicitly ruled out by Art. 102 
as the ECB is prohibited to borrow funds to fiscal authorities. 
 
CALIBRATION 
PROB. FOR INDIVIDUAL 
COUNTRY I 
PROB. THAT AT 
LEAST ONE OUT OF 
12 
WAS INFLATION 
ABOVE 2% 
Fitted 0.0934  0.69 0.179 
Hallet; McAdam (2003) 0.0800 0.63  
Table 14 Simulation: Percentage of Quarters when g is below 3%  
 
Therefore we propose to reform the three percent deficit criterion. In particular we think that 
triggering of the monitoring procedure should be conditioned on additional macroeconomic 
variables. In particular we would like to propose to test whether the actual inflation rate is 
above 2%. The logic is quite simple. Only if the inflation rate and the deficit criterion are 
violated simultaneously fiscal policy might undermine the credibility of the central bank in 
the medium to long run. In other scenarios high deficits are likely to simply mirrow weak 
economic growth. Under such settings fiscal spending cuts are procyclical. Conditioning the 
monitoring procedure on the criterion whether the inflation rate was in the target range of the 
ECB dramatically reduces the risk of triggering the 3% deficit criterion on error. 
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4.4.2   Some Propositions  
 
In the previous sections we have outlined that the current institutional setting impairs the 
ability of the euro area members to use fiscal policy as an effective stabilisation tool. What 
one effectively needs to understand is that limiting the functioning of fiscal policy effectively 
adds more fluctuations on other parts of the economy (e.g., the output gap). Quite clearly 
today’s rules in reign were shaped by the views on the functioning of the economy we as 
economists had at the outset of the 1990’s. This view was still heavily shaped by myopic 
politicians that aimed at cheating the public. In that respect De Grauwe (2002) states: 
 
“The stability pact is a vote of no confidence by the European authorities in the strength of the 
democratic institutions in the member countries. It is quite surprising that EU-countries have 
allowed this to happen, and that they have agreed to be subjected to control by European 
institutions that even the International Monetary Fund does not impose on banana republics.” 
 
Generally the relationship between the cyclical stance of fiscal policy and the level of 
indebtness is not yet well understood. In particular the question which needs to be addressed 
is to which extent can the CAB be negative on average but still consistent with a long run 
sustainable debt to GDP ratio. Today’s answer seems to be zero which is clearly at odds with 
for instance the golden rule that states that long term public investments that generates yields 
over many periods to come should be financed by debt. Nevertheless there seems to be some 
evidence that a high level of existing debt seems to induce procyclical movements in the fiscal 
stance during downturns  (OECD 2002). 
Since fiscal policy rules are essential for the functioning of a monetary union, the analysis of 
this chapter calls for a reform of the SGP. While the current framework with its focus on 
inflation is clearly too one -dimensional, it could be relatively easily supplemented with an 
additional dimension which takes care of the mix between the common monetary policy and 
national fiscal policies. This chapter can only give some general suggestions. Since the ECB 
has a very strong interest in preventing excessive inflation at the national level, it would be 
useful to base the assessment of fiscal policy on forecasts for the national rate and their 
compatibility with the ECB’s inflation target.  
As long as the majority of forecasts show that a country’s inflation rate will remain within the  
ECB’s target range of “below 2%”, there would be presumption that the overall policy mix of 
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national fiscal policy and the national real interest rate is adequate. In this situation, a fiscal 
deficit exceeding the 3% threshold would not pose a problem for the common monetary 
policy. Of course, it would be necessary to make an additional assessment whether this fiscal 
policy stance could threaten the overall solidity of a country’s public finances. E.g., in the 
present situation of Germany such a risk could be clearly excluded. 
If the majority of forecasts shows an inflation rate that exceeds the ECB’s target range by a 
certain margin (e.g. one percentage point), there is a presumption that the policy mix is 
inadequate. If in this situation the deficit exceeds 3%, there is a strong indication that the 
national fiscal policy is not compatible with an adequate policy mix and an excessive deficit 
procedure would be warranted.  If the forecasts show that the national rate will exceed the 
ECB’s inflation target by a wider margin (e.g. two percentage points), one can think of 
imposing sanctions for fiscal policy even if the deficit is below three percent or even if it is in 
a much better position. The main advantage of this inflation targeting framework, which 
would of course need much discussion in detail, is that it provides the flexibility that national 
fiscal policy needs in a monetary union in order to cope with idiosyncratic shocks. At the 
same time, it would set more stringent fiscal limits for high inflation countries than envisaged 
in the SGP. 
In sum, the main flaw of the SGP is its neglect of the interplay of national fiscal policy and 
national monetary conditions in a monetary union. Although, as the example of Portugal 
shows, an “excessive deficit” can be caused by fiscal laxness, it can also be due to a self-
aggravating process of below average growth, subdued nominal wage increases, below 
average inflation and an above average real interest rate. Thus, the SGP’s one dimensional 
focus on the deficit-inflation nexus can be misleading. A strict application of the SGP can 
have the consequence that a country is forced to abandon its only macroeconomic stabiliser 
and even to pursue a procyclical fiscal policy. Together with above average real interest rates 
such a policy mix entails a high risk of deflation and of a further widening of monetary 
conditions within EMU. As monetary policy would become very difficult under such 
conditions, the ECB should also have a strong interest in avoiding such risks. Since fiscal 
policy rules are necessary in a monetary union, the SGP should be supplemented in a way that 
it sanctions fiscal policies only if a country’s overall macroeconomic policy stance is 
inflationary, i.e. if forecasts show that its inflation rate will exceed the ECB’s target rate by 
one or more percentage points. Such an “inflation targeting” approach would not only provide 
a better policy mix in countries with weak growth, since the 3 % threshold would not be 
binding. It would also improve the policy mix in above inflation countries since one could 
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think of sanctions whenever the fiscal policy stance contributes to inflation beyond the ECB’s 
target range. 
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APPENDIX : THE GENERAL MODEL SETUP 
 
 
4. A: STATE SPACE NOTATION 
 
US-model: Closely following Söderlind, Söderström and Vredin (2005) we can rewrite our 
basic equation in state space form as follows. In a first step we lead our model one period 
ahead and solve for the rational expectations variables 4 t 2 and Et t tE yp + +  w ith the highest time 
index: 
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Hence we can rewrite the general model in state space form as: 
 
1 1 1 1
0
2 1 2 2 10
t t t
t
t t t n x
X X
A A Bi
E X X
e+ +
+
é ù é ù é ù
= + +ê ú ê ú ê ú
ë û ë û ë û
.      (4.A.3) 
{ }'1 1 2 3 1 1 2 3, , , , , , , ,t t t t t t t t t tX y y i i ip p p p- - - - - - -=  
{ }'2 3 2 1 1, , ,t t t t t t t t tX E E E E yp p p+ + + +=  
{ }'1 ,0,0,0, ,0,0,0,0t t tn e h=  
 
Where 1tX  is a 9 1´  vector of predetermined state variables 2 tX is a 4 1´  vector of forward 
looking variables and 1tn  is a vector of shocks. Following Söderlind, Söderström and Vredin 
(2005) we have made use of the fact that 1 1 1 1 1 1 and that t t t t t t t tE y E yp p e h+ + + + + += + = + . 
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( )1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 / 4r r r rB b v b v= + -é ùë û  
 
Euro-Area model: Applying the same apparatus as beforehand we lead our mode l one period 
ahead and solve for the rational expectations variables 4 t 2 and Et t tE yp + +  w ith the highest time 
index. Then for country i the Phillips curve and the IS equation can be stated as follows: 
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 (4.A.4)  
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Hence we can rewrite the general model in state space form as: 
 
1 1 1 1
0
2 1 2 2 10
t t t
t
t t t n x
X X
A A Bi
E X X
e+ +
+
é ù é ù é ù
= + +ê ú ê ú ê ú
ë û ë û ë û
.      (4.A.6) 
{ }'1 , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 1 , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 1 , 2 , 3 , , 1 ,, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tX y y g i i i y y gp p p p p p p p- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -=
{ }'2 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 1 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 1, , , , , , ,t t i t t i t t i t t i t t i t t i t t i t t i tX E E E E y E E E E yp p p p p p+ + + + - + - + - + - +=  
{ }'1 , , , ,,0,0,0, ,0, ,0,0,0, ,0,0,0, ,0,g gt i t i t it i t i t itn e h e e h e- - -=  
 
Where 1tX  is a 17 1´  vector of predetermined state variables 2 tX is a 8 1´  vector of forward 
looking variables and 1tn  is a vector of shocks. Following Söderlind et al. (2005) we have 
made use of the fact that 1 1 1 1 1 1 and that t t t t t t t tE y E yp p e h+ + + + + += + = + . 
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Note that due to the specific structure of the matrix A0 it holds that 10 t tA v v
- = . 
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4. B: DEFINING THE MEASUREMENT EQUATION 
 
US-model: Let us define a vector Yt of measurement variables in which the monetary policy 
maker is interested in. We assume that the goal variables are given by: 
 
[ ]1 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 2 1 2t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tY y y i i i i i i i yp p p p p p p p- - - - - - - - - - -= D D D D D D D  
 
We can define the target variables as a function of the state variables and the interest rate. 
 
( )1 2  t X X t i tY C C X C i= +                    (4.B.1) 
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  X2 18x4C 0=  
 
     [ ]0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 'iC =   
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Euro-Area Model: Applying the same procedure as beforehand let us define a vector Yt as 
target variables in which the ECB is interested. We assume that the common central bank is 
only interested in aggregate variables: 
 
[ ]1 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 2 1 2t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tY y y i i i i i i i yp p p p p p p p- - - - - - - - - - -= D D D D D D D  
 
We can define the target variables as a function of the state variables with the help of equation 
(4.B.1). 
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[ ]0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 'iC =  
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4. C: THE LINEAR QUADRATIC CONTROL PROBLEM 
 
The starting point of the linear quadratic control problem is the following value function: 
( )' ' '1 1 1 1 12 2
0
( , ) min
t
T
t
t t t t t T T Ti
t
V X t X Q X iR i X W Xb + + +
=
ì ü= + +í ý
î þ
å .      (4.C.1)  
Subject to the constraint: 
 
1 1 1 111 12 1
2 1 2 2 121 22 2 0
t t t
t
t t t n
X X vA A B
i
E X XA A B
+ +
+ ´
é ù é ù é ùé ù é ù
= + +ê ú ê ú ê úê ú ê ú
ë û ë ûë û ë û ë û
.        (4.C.2)  
 
Premultiplying by A0 yields the standard state space form:  
 
 1 1 1 1
2 1 2
t t
t t
t t t
X X
A Bi v
E X X
+
+
+
é ù é ù
= + +ê ú ê ú
ë û ë û
. (4.C.3)  
 
With 10 1A A A
-=  and 10 1B A B
-= . Given the specific structure of the matrix A0 it holds that: 
1
0 1 1t tA v v
-
+ += . The variance covariance matrix will be given by: 
 
( )'1 1 1 ' 11 0 0 0 0v t t t tA v A v A v v A- - - -S = = .         (4.C.4) 
 
 
Consequently it holds that the variance-covariance matrix stays a diagonal matrix with the 
following diagonal elements: { }2 20 0 0 0 0 0 0diag e hs s  
 
The value function has to satisfy in each period the following Bellman equation: 
 
( ){ }' ' 1( ) min
t
t t t t t ti
V X X Q X i R i V Xb += + + .        (4.C.5) 
 
A cornerstone assumption in order to solve the model is to postulate a (linear) way according 
to which expectations are formed. We make the fundamental assumption that expectations are 
built as follows: 
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2, 1 1 1, 1t t t t tE X C E X+ + += .            (4.C.6) 
 
As every distinct policy rule is linked to a different C matrix the approach takes care of the 
well-known Lucas critique. The policy maker cannot take expectations as given when 
changing the policy rule. With this assumption at hand one can arrive at a value func tion, 
which is only expressed in terms of predetermined variables: 
 
   ' * ' *1 1 1( ) ( )t t t t t t t tV t X Q X r R r E Vb += + +        (4.C.7) 
 
Taking the F.O.C we arrive again at expressions for the optimal feedback rule as well as for 
the Ricatti-matrix V. Nevertheless contrasting the backward looking case our solution 
algorithm is quite different, as we do not only lack the matrix V but also the matrix C. 
Therefore the algorithm functions as follows. With an initial guess for V0 and C0 at hand we 
can iterate on the respective matrix equation until some matrix norm 1t tC C e+ - <  and 
1t tV V e+ - <  has converged.  
 
The (converged) time invariant solution can be written as: 
TIME INVARIANT SOLUTIONS IN THE BACKWARD LOOKING MODEL 
( ) ( )
1 1 11 12 1 1
2 1
1* * * *' *' *
1 1 1
( )t t
t t
t t t t t t t t t
X A A C B F X
X CX
F R B V B U B V A Xb b
+
-
+ +
= + -
=
= - + +
 
 
 
The solution nicely depicts the expectational feedback, as the variable C does not only 
determine the forward looking variables X2t but also influences the predetermined variables 
X1t. 
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4. D: THE INDIVIDUAL CALIBRATION CRITERION 
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Criterion 5: [ ]287 02 87 025 (( ( ( )) ( ( )) ) / ( ( )) )Crit abs sdtv d y stdv d y stdv d y- -= -  
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4.E. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF THE TEN BEST      
   ESTIMATES 
 
Table 15 Time series properties: Simulated and actual data: (1987:4-2002:1) 
LEVELS  ONE-QUATER-CHANGES 
RANK 
iy  STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
AC(1) AC(2) AC(3)  
S TANDARD 
DEVIATION 
AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) 
 Inflation 
Data 0.9794 0.649 0.514 0.585  0.8105 -0.32 -0.283 0.101 
1 1.4678 0.6325 0.4487 0.4069  1.2584 -0.2501 -0.193  
2 1.4688 0.632 0.4473 0.4042  1.2601 -0.2491 -0.1924  
3 1.4588 0.627 0.4406 0.3983  1.26 -0.2502 -0.1931  
4 1.4485 0.6217 0.4336 0.3921  1.2599 -0.2513 -0.1939  
5 1.4377 0.6161 0.4261 0.3856  1.2598 -0.2525 -0.1947  
10 1.4668 0.67328 0.49702 0.49383  1.1857 -0.23026 -0.2649  
 Output Gap 
Data 1.6953 0.945 0.865 0.755  0.5462 0.28 0.278 0.049 
1 1.6026 0.8256    0.9464    
2 1.613 0.8278    0.9467    
3 1.6085 0.8265    0.9475    
4 1.6038 0.8252    0.9484    
5 1.5988 0.8237    0.9493    
10 1.4906 0.78226    0.98367    
          
 Federal Funds Rate 
Data 1.9326 0.930 0.814 0.671  0.5365 0.58 0.303 0.191 
1 1.7351 0.58 0.303 0.191  0.6093 0.6042 0.2837  
2 1.7262 0.58 0.303 0.191  0.5999 0.6136 0.296  
3 1.7332 0.58 0.303 0.191  0.6075 0.6109 0.2916  
4 1.7411 0.58 0.303 0.191  0.6159 0.608 0.2869  
5 1.7501 0.58 0.303 0.191  0.6253 0.6049 0.2818  
10 1.5113 0.58 0.303 0.191  0.4626 0.5873 0.2810  
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4. F: STYLIZED TIME SERIES PROPERTIES: LEVELS AND  
   DIFFERENCES 
 
Figure 4.A.1: US-data 
0
1
2
3
4
5
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Inflation
P
er
c
en
t
 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Output gap
P
er
ce
nt
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Interest Rate
P
e
rc
e
nt
 
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
Change in Inflation
P
e
rc
e
nt
 
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
Change in Output Gap
P
e
rc
e
nt
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
Difference in Fund Rates
P
e
rc
e
nt
 
All data were taken from: http://research.stlouisfed.org/ fred/ 
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Figure 4.A.2: Euro-Area-data 
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4. G: VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRIX 
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4. H: IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS 
 
Figure 4.H.1: Symmetric Supply Shock Hitting the Currency Area* 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function for the estimated baseline calibration.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.H.2: Symmetric Demand Shock Hitting the Currency Area* 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function for the estimated baseline calibration.  
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Figure 4.H.3: Asymmetric Supply Shock Hitting the Currency Area*  
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function for the estimated baseline calibration.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.H.4: Asymmetric Supply Shock: Dispersion Indicators * 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function for the estimated baseline calibration.  
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Figure 4.H.5: Asymmetric Demand Shock Hitting the Currency Area * 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function for the estimated baseline calibration.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.H.6: Asymmetric Demand Shock: Dispersion Indicators* 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function for the estimated baseline calibration.  
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Figure 4.H.7: Interest Rate Shock Hitting the Currency Area* 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function for the estimated baseline calibration.  
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5 Concluding Remarks 
_____________________________________________ 
 
 
We have shown in depth tha t New Keynesian macroeconomics makes it possible to think 
micro founded and Keynesian at the same time. Based on a highly stylized economy New 
Keynesian macroeconomics can be reduced to a system of three equations: An intertemporal 
IS-equation, a NKPC and a relationship depicting the conduct of monetary policy. The insight 
that there exists nominal inertia in the economy states nothing but that the central bank can 
steer the real short term interest rate by manipulating the nominal short term interest rate 
according to its preferences. Following these ‘new insights’ monetary policy serves as an 
insurance company that promises to smooth out macroeconomic fluctuations. Quite 
impressively it offers these services to society at negligible  costs. Theoretical evidence seems 
to suggest that exogenous shocks might be detrimental in terms of output and price volatility 
if monetary policy would not dampen economic cycles (Canzoneri, Cumby, Dina (2004)). Not 
surprisingly the concrete question whether an economy is good natured in terms of 
stabilization properties depends critically on the people populating the economy. The more 
households and firms believe in the New Keynesian model, the trend growth path and the 
inflation target, the easier the economy can be steered by the central bank. In a backward 
looking environment it becomes more difficult to manoeuver the economy as we do not 
observe the self-stabilizing properties of forward looking systems. Economic agents do not 
react on impulse to signals set by the central bank but just on macroeconomic outcomes. This 
lengthens the link between monetary impulses and the reaction in the goal variables. Hence, if 
monetary policy opts for an instrument rule that generates a stable and unique rational 
expectations equilibrium , the conduct of monetary policy is much easier as it would be in a 
purely backward looking economy, due to the implied self-stabilizing properties of forward 
looking systems grounded on people’s expectations on stabilizing monetary policy itself (self-
fulfilling expectations). We have shown in depth in chapter 2.2 that it is possible to map the 
New Keynesian framework into a simple three equation model that preserves the main 
insights of the theory while  equally being powerful enough to discuss central issues like 
inflation targeting and issues of credibility. 
Given this New Keynesian apparatus of mind we have analyzed the interaction between 
monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union. Unfortunately a dominating stream in 
literature (Dixit and Lambertini (2003) ) focuses on game theoretic interactions based on the 
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Barro-Gordon (1983) framework.  Unfortunately Dixit and Lambertini entirely focus on the 
issue of time consistency. Thereby they neglect to analyze the beneficial impact of 
stabilization policy if the union is hit by symmetric or asymmetric shocks. Therefore we 
extend Dixits and Lambertinis joint commitment solution to the case where the common 
monetary union is hit by symmetric or asymmetric supply and demand shocks. In contrast to 
Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003) we apply the New Keynesian framework to analyze a 
currency area. We have shown that asymmetric shocks can drive a wedge between 
macroeconomic outcomes even if the central bank is guided by a state of the art strategy of 
inflation targeting. Largely neglected in related literature we have evaluated the impact of 
diverging real interest rates in a currency area. In principle, fiscal policy guided by a loss 
function can significantly reduce cyclical variations in macroeconomic aggregates. Therefore 
we have proposed to reform the current SGP. A monetary union calls for a renaissance of 
fiscal policy from a stabilization perspective. With the launch of third stage EMU the member 
countries have embarqued to unknown territory to tighten the political vision of a common 
European future. While the current macroeconomic framework with its focus on the defcit 
criterion is clearly too one-dimensional, it could be relatively easy supplemented with an 
additional dimension which takes care on the mix between the common mone tary policy and 
national fiscal policies. We have proposed that as long as the majority of inflation forecasts 
shows that a countries inflation rate will remain within the ECB’s target range there would be 
the presumption that the overall policy mix of national fiscal policy and the national real 
interest rate is adequate. In this situation, a fiscal deficit exceeding the 3% threshold would 
not pose a problem from the perspective of the common monetary policy.  
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